Office of the Historian

156. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia1

Washington, July 28, 1965, 5:15 p.m.

38. Ref: Your 34.2 Embassy should convey to President Bourguiba or other high-level Tunisian leaders following points concerning US position on Libyan situation as raised by President Bourguiba in his conversation reported in reftel:

1.
US welcomes opportunities afforded by excellent US–GOT relations for frank exchanges re political and security situation in area. President’s wide experience and forthright appraisal of regional problems, both current and future, are particularly valuable to USG in developing its own policies and programs for areas.
2.
As Tunisians no doubt are aware US has expressed interest in Libya’s security and territorial integrity, which are matters of importance to USG. This continuing interest stems from our long-standing friendship with Libya and the extensive US relations with Libya which have grown up over past years. We believe Tunisians, with whom US has similar ties based on mutual confidence and interests, will appreciate soundness this US approach to Libya.
3.
We believe that assistance to Libya from friendly countries should, of course, be with the consent of GOL in order avoid unfortunate and unintended misunderstanding among friends and to insure maximum effectiveness such assistance as may be requested.
4.
US is not in a position to provide such assistance to Tunisia with any understanding or implication that the assistance was to be used in circumstances such as those alluded to by FonMin. FYI—Use of US-supplied equipment in third countries would of course require consultation with USG and latter’s prior consent. End FYI.
5.
Our own impression of situation in Libya is that political atmosphere is possibly receptive to closer cooperation with Tunisia.

Re para 5 above, we would appreciate Embassy assessment as to probable GOT reaction to suggestion that Tunisians consider direct [Page 235] approach to GOL on such contingency subjects as GOT has raised with US.

FYI—With respect to current GOT arms request Embtel 39,3 at this juncture we believe it preferable as next step that ARMA merely listen to forthcoming Tunisian explanation of plans and requirements. Following this presentation, which was promised for May, we will know better scope of Tunisian needs and areas where we could best assist. End FYI.

Rusk
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 TUN. Secret. Drafted by McClanahan and Blake on July 27; cleared by Lang in DOD and by Warren; and approved by Trimble. Repeated to Tripoli, CINCEUR, and CINCUSAFE.↩
  2. In telegram 34 from Tunis, July 16, Russell reported a conversation with President Bourguiba, who declared that he was convinced that Nasser was contemplating moving into Libya on the pretext of assuring stability, most likely after King Idris’ death. Noting that Nasser’s enmity toward a Tunisian regime friendly toward the West was implacable, Bourguiba said that having Nasser on the Tunisian-Libyan border would be intolerable. Tunisia wanted to be in a position to protect itself by drawing a line somewhere in west Libya if Nasser were to cross its eastern border, and he hoped for U.S. understanding of this position and material support so Tunisia’s security could be assured if this occurred. (Ibid.)↩
  3. Dated July 19. (Ibid., DEF 19 US–TUN)↩