Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

136. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

Washington, June 17, 1967, 3:30 p.m.

212261. Ref Rabat’s 5531 and 5532.²

1. You should assure Laraki and Oufkir of our continuing deep concern for Moroccan security. We are giving urgent attention to specific problem raised reftel and, while you are not in position give specific response at this time, GOM can be sure that we are carefully examining situation in light of all prevailing circumstances in Maghreb and Near East. We will remain in closest contact at both military and governmental levels on this matter.

2. You should add that while we do not have any independent evidence suggesting that Algerians readying attack against Morocco, we are taking all steps available to us ascertain further information about Algerian intentions. We obviously do not know Boumediene’s thoughts at this time, but seems most illogical to us that he would contemplate attack against Arab country at same moment he is trying to exert some leadership in reuniting Arabs against Israel.

3. We naturally hope to avoid new arms race throughout North Africa and Middle East. We are closely following Soviet actions and intend to probe their intentions in this respect. We consider it highly important in interest of countries of the area and of the world to bring arms deliveries to area under some kind of control.

4. However, we certainly recognize Morocco’s right and desire to be in position to defend itself. This is why, in light this latest request, we are now urgently reexamining availability of resources, as well as how our resources and influence can be brought to bear to insure that eventuality GOM fears does not materialize. Timing of our response will have to take into consideration general situation in Middle East as well as Maghreb.

5. FYI. Apart from probable practical impossibility of providing any substantial amount of equipment that Moroccans could use effectively within time indicated, we are reluctant take risk of action which might excuse Soviet increases arms supply at this delicate juncture of Near East crisis. Moreover, we do not exclude possibility that Moroccan request is essentially ploy by Oufkir to get US to react in a hurry. In this connection we would be disturbed by possibility suggested in some [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] reports that Oufkir might even be considering preemptive strike against Algeria. We would hope of course you could find means discourage any such possibility.

6. While unable for present to give Moroccan request clear answer in affirmative, we are also anxious that King does not take our reply as flat turndown. We want to retain GOM’s confidence, especially in view of its potentially constructive role in Arab-Israeli settlement, and to reassure King that we continue to follow with close interest Morocco’s relations with its Algerian neighbor and would be far from indifferent if there were serious danger of Algerian attack. Your response to Laraki and Oufkir should therefore be governed by various and to some degree conflicting considerations set out above.³

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19–8 US–MOR. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Root and Palmer on June 16; cleared by Kitchen, Hoopes, Saunders, and Bundy; and approved by Eugene V. Rostow.
2. Telegrams 5531 and 5532 from Rabat, June 15, reported that Foreign Minister Laraki and General Oufkir informed the Embassy that recent intelligence reports indicated that Algeria planned to attack Morocco July 8. Laraki said that Morocco would have to obtain more arms very quickly, since its 3–4-day holding strategy was invalid after the Arab-Israeli war when Israel won in 3 hours. (Ibid., POL 32–1 ALG–MOR)
3. In telegram 5605 from Rabat, June 20, the Embassy responded that the Department’s telegram did not answer the question posed by the Moroccan Government, which was primarily interested in how it could meet the serious security problem it faced on its eastern border. Morocco wanted to know if the United States was prepared to supply the arms it needed, so that, if necessary, it could make other provisions over the next few months. (Ibid., DEF 19–8 US–MOR)