128. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECT
- Morocco’s Security and King Hassan’s Visit to the United States
PARTICIPANTS
- Dr. Ahmed Laraki, Moroccan Ambassador to the United States
- The Secretary
- Ambassador William C. Trimble, AF
- Mr. R. Peter Spicer, AF/AFN
- Mrs. S. Porson, Interpreter
Ambassador Laraki said that the King had talked with Mr. Palmer about the organization of Africa.2 On the continent there are the so-called “moderate” states and those termed “revolutionary” or “progressive.” Morocco, Ethiopia, the Ivory Coast, Senegal and Tunisia have been moderate, but have not received assistance in their endeavors. On the other hand, there are massive arms buildups in Algeria, Tanzania, Guinea, the UAR and Somalia. This concerns the King and all the moderate heads of state who are counting on Morocco to deal with the problem, because if it cannot be solved, then there will be a split in Africa along horizontal or vertical poles, i.e., Algeria-Congo (Brazzaville) or Guinea, UAR, and Algeria.
Three weeks ago, the King received personally a MUSLO (MAAG) mission. The conversation lasted for four hours and revealed that U.S. and Moroccan data on weapons agree. When the King talked with Mr. Palmer, the latter stated that it is the policy of the United States to avoid an arms race. The King replied that Morocco too wishes to avoid an arms race, preferring a race for prosperity. But how is this possible when Morocco’s neighbor has 450 tanks and Morocco only 100; when Morocco’s neighbor has 800 heavy artillery pieces and Morocco only 80; when Morocco’s neighbor has 120 bombers and fighters and Morocco only 10?
According to Ambassador Laraki, the King asked Mr. Palmer whether the United States would agree to try and work out a “table of organization” to deal with the situation, and Mr. Palmer said no. [4 lines of source text not declassified]3
Ambassador Laraki continued by saying that the King wants to talk to the President and Secretary Rusk but believes that if this is the thinking of the Department of State and the Executive Branch of the United States Government, it would be better to avoid a reception here which would offer only platonic discussions, no concrete results.
In the light of the frankness in U.S.-Moroccan relations, the King wished that Secretary Rusk be asked if this is the thinking of the United States Government. If it is, it would be better, in the King’s estimation, for a mutually acceptable formula to be found to cancel the King’s trip.
Ambassador Laraki stated that this does not mean that Morocco is changing its orientation. After all, Morocco is an established monarchy, the King being the seventeenth in his line, and the country is stable and will never turn socialist. In his conversation with Ambassador Laraki, the King said that during his trip to the USSR seven weeks ago, the Russians [Page 190] had made a number of offers which the King turned down because of the former’s ulterior motives and because he did not wish to receive instructions from them in his own country. But on the other hand, the King does not want to come to the United States and go home empty-handed. It would be difficult for him to have refused the Russian offers and then not achieve anything in the United States.
Ambassador Laraki again assured the Secretary that this did not represent a change in the centuries-old friendship which links our two countries.
The Ambassador added that the King had asked him to remind Secretary Rusk of his statement made at the train station here in 1963 during the King’s visit, in which the Secretary spoke of the King’s role in Africa. But, asks the King, how can he play that role without the understanding of his friends?
Ambassador Laraki concluded with the statement that he had simply summarized the issues, knowing that Mr. Palmer had no doubt sent detailed reports to the State Department.
In reply the Secretary stated that he could not reply immediately, because the question is too serious. We have not yet received full reports from Mr. Palmer, and the Secretary would have to contact Mr. Palmer and obtain a detailed report of the conversation. The Secretary then said that there are some matters that cannot be dealt with by means of a short question and a short response. The Secretary did not think that he had enough information to judge. He added that he would never comment, even informally, on the relations between the King and President Johnson without consulting the President. Therefore, he needed to have more information because the question raised is very serious.
The Secretary then asked the Ambassador to convey his personal greetings to the King and to assure him of the friendship and interest of the United States in Morocco’s safety and prosperity. He added that one would have to look very hard to find a better friend of Morocco, since independence, than the United States.
In conclusion, the Secretary said that he wished to examine the questions presented and, in view of their nature, could not reply at this time.
Ambassador Laraki said he would transmit the Secretary’s comments to the King and would keep the Secretary informed of all developments.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19–8 US–MOR. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Officer in Charge of Moroccan Affairs R. Peter Spicer and Porson and approved in S on February 9. The source text is labeled “Part II of II.”↩
- Telegram 3394 from Rabat, January 23, reported Palmer’s conversation with the King. (Ibid., ORG 7 AF)↩
- In telegram 3504 from Rabat, January 27, Palmer commented that Laraki’s demarche had embroidered some aspects of his conversation with the King beyond recognition. [text not declassified] (Ibid., POL MOR–US)↩