Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

119. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

Washington, June 12, 1965, 3:50 p.m.

745. Deptel 735.² Following is FYI and Noforn, based on uncleared memo of conversation and subject to possible later revision.

Ambassador Bengelloun told Secretary morning June 12 King had asked him explain recent political decisions Morocco³ in view close and friendly relations our two countries. Outlined genesis crisis and impossibility find solution in face unreasonable demands of political parities and lack of clear parliamentary majority. Emphasized King’s decision suspend parliament and assume control was entirely within constitutional framework and in no way resembled coup d’etat some French papers pictured.

In response Secretary’s question, Ambassador said initial reaction masses was favorable, because parliament “had not projected good image.” It argued endlessly over petty matters and failed act on country’s crucial problems. When Secretary queried regarding internal or externally-inspired resistance, Ambassador said UNFP, in person Bouabid, accepts decision, though without much enthusiasm. Istiqlal is “resolutely opposed” and challenges right of King to invoke Article 35 in situation. Mass of people want strong and stable government, however. Abroad, Bengelloun said no real reaction yet. Algeria quiet but UAR might “tend not facilitate.”

Secretary in reply noted USG much interested in security and prosperity of Morocco. He hoped King’s pledge protect freedom of individual and rights of political parties and unions would prevent atmosphere from becoming strained, tense, or explosive. In search for economic progress, he hoped King would consult often with leaders of various sectors of community in order mobilize them and enlist their aid. Secretary offered best wishes to King during this trying time as he worked to bring Morocco back to kind of system of government he had envisaged for his people in promulgating constitution.

Ambassador emphasized again this is provisional situation as King sought “return of calm.” Said “King’s authority is at stake.”

Upon preparing to leave, Bengelloun said Foreign Minister Benhima had telephoned to say King suggests Benhima visit Washington again soon to review general situation with Secretary and exchange views on current problems. In noting identity of views on many subjects, he mentioned specifically Moroccan stance on FRG relations and plans for moderating role at Bandung II.

Said Benhima planning visit Bonn June 17, “which amounts to direct challenge to Arab opinion.” Called Moroccan policy on FRG issue “courageous.”

On Bandung II, said King felt it unwise not have Afn Chief of State there so plans attend at least on day, probably June 29.

Bengelloun was told Dept would establish when Secretary might be able see Benhima, possibly early July.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 MOR–US. Confidential. Drafted by Chase, cleared by Barbour and Williams in EUR/WE and Sterner in NEA/NE, and approved by Newsom. Repeated to Algiers, Bonn, and Paris and pouched to Cairo and Tunis.
2. Dated June 9. (Ibid.)
3. On June 7, King Hassan declared a state of emergency under Article 35 of the Moroccan Constitution of 1962, suspended the Parliament, and assumed direct control of all legislative and executive functions. On June 8, he announced the appointment of a 20-man Cabinet (including 13 members of the previous Cabinet), with himself as Prime Minister.