105. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff1
RWK:
Ferguson’s MAP proposals for Morocco have run into heavy sledding. The big problem is that OSD has to absorb a $170 million shortage in MAP funds. (Initially counted on $1.215 billion, but recoupments are lower than expected, Congress will cut some, requirements are going up in Vietnam, Laos, Congo, Ethiopia, etc. Congress imposed a $25 million ceiling on Africa; Ethiopia takes $10 m., Congo already claims $8 m. and may go another $10 m.)
So DOD hasn’t yet found the money for the $2 million program Ferguson initially proposed (half training, half equipment), not to mention jets. They figure the best they can say to Hassan’s request for planes and tanks is to promise a survey. DOD is also thinking of some sort of guarantee that we’d rush in MAP jets if Algeria attacks, but that doesn’t look very good to me since the need would pass before Moroccans could learn to use them.
The objections are strictly financial. Everyone agrees the military balance is tipping toward Algeria. Everyone agrees it would be good to help Hassan. But we just don’t have the money.
I think our position ought to be that it’s ridiculous to say we aren’t going to have any MAP at all if the Navy is still interested in Kenitra and if we’re interested in a Moroccan counter to Algeria. It may be we’ll have to stall on jets this year. (Nobody is even willing to think about that right now.) But we should keep the bureaucracy thinking in terms of continuing MAP for Morocco. (I’ve talked to AFN, ISA, Bronez, and will drop a hint to the Navy next week.)
This is just a preliminary note on where we stand. State (To Rabat 95 attached)2 has asked Rabat, Algiers, Paris, and Madrid for some more dope on how serious the Algerian threat and Moroccan vulnerability are. When replies are in, we can push our line further.