Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

399. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic¹

Washington, March 24, 1967, 5:11 p.m.

162169. Following uncleared memcon is Noforn, FYI only and subject to revision:

At his request UAR Ambassador Kamel called on Secretary Rusk March 23. In beginning Ambassador referred his likely departure indicating that while he had no orders he had received indications likely assignment European post. He then reviewed history US–UAR relations over recent years emphasizing that US interests in Middle East great and preservation those interests depended in part on US relations UAR. During periods those relations good US interests better protected than in periods strain between two countries.

Non-alignment basic to UAR policy and without non-alignment friction between Great Powers could develop with strong likelihood confrontation in area particularly in view increasing importance Soviets attach Middle East.

Over recent years basic US presence has been PL 480 wheat. Kamel now under specific instructions not ask for wheat although purely personally he recognizes wheat has been major counter Soviet influence.

While wheat arrangements between us now discontinued must make major and speedy effort find way restore relations between us. Situation now highly delicate but not impossible overcome.

Kamel recommended we search for new avenues cooperation but was not specific in suggestions. Urged we take new look at Yemen and as he had suggested many times before recommended offer US good offices to bring about solution this difficult problem. UAR does not wish overthrow Faisal and has no desire harm US interest in area. Faisal on other hand appears desire prolong Yemen conflict to bring about US–UAR military confrontation which would be very difficult situation for both countries. Essential US overcome belief in UAR that US does not want conflict to end and condones Faisal’s actions. Ambassador Battle recalled suggestion he made President Nasser during their last meeting re possible US willingness help pave way solution. Neither President Nasser nor Vice Presidents Amer and Sadat to whom similar suggestion advanced appeared encourage possibility. Kamel responded by urging US make another effort this direction.

Kamel then reviewed importance Western position UAR and expressed concern difficulties with US increased as result absence relations with UK. He urged US encourage UK take initial step to bring about resumption relations, since UK larger power and must not be reluctant make first move.

In summary Kamel urged early action by US find modus vivendi, based on continuation icebox policy re Israel and effort restore waning confidence between US–UAR. He emphasized again situation sensitive but controllable.

Secretary in responding expressed concern difficulty US had to get across fact to Nasser that US wants good relations UAR. Expressed concern that Nasser has concluded for reasons not clear to us that US wishes ill to UAR regime. This not the case with President Kennedy, President Johnson nor Secretary Rusk. Suspicions erode confidence and undoubtedly affect willingness Nasser listen to us in our statements desire maintain good relations. Secretary agreed Israeli problem probably manageable and domestic pressures not as important an influence politically as some Arab observers believe and not of nature to eliminate chance good relations.

Secretary then mentioned Arab neighbors afraid of UAR. Nasser has created impressions that have led to fear of his intentions. Leadership cannot be demanded, it must be granted. If UAR wished to lead Arabs and Arabs willing to be led US would have no objection but this would be different situation from insistence and coercion. We would hope Nasser could find way to reassure Arabs including King Faisal of peaceful intentions in manner which would remove attitudes of fear.

One effect of level of arms Russia has put into UAR is to upset equilibrium and raise concerns other countries. Imperative some effort be made settle arms race. Once in past Secretary had asked Gromyko whether Russia willing assist in limiting arms race. Gromyko had replied affirmatively with respect nuclear arms but negatively with respect conventional arms. Therefore must conclude USSR considers present policy advantageous to Russian interest particularly when Russians make public reference to special friendships with UAR, Algeria and Syria.

Another point of difficulty is that Nasser has never fully understood problems inherent in dealing with giant democracy and all its complexities. What is said can make tremendous difference in attitudes and speech such as that on February 22 can cause great harm. This particular speech came at moment of consultation Congressional leaders re new PL 480 agreement. While US does not need flattery or cajoling silence itself might be great contribution.

One channel we must look to in period strain is private field. Business ties and private investment to extent UAR wishes permit can help improve political relations.

Secretary agreed consider various points made by Ambassador and expressed appreciation his efforts over past years improve relations between US–UAR.

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 17 UAR-US. Secret; Limdis. Drafted and approved by Battle and cleared by Bergus. Also sent to Jidda.