Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

398. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel¹

Washington, March 19, 1967, 4:51 p.m.

158247. Ref: Amman’s 2566 and 2567.²

1. While we believe GOJ fear of Israeli retaliatory raid at this juncture is exaggerated, Dept in complete accord Embassy Amman’s analysis likely consequences in Jordan should raid take place. In circumstances, Ambassador should, at level he considers appropriate, inform GOI soonest of GOJ’s concern and efforts GOJ making prevent infiltration drawing on substance reftels. Ambassador should leave GOI in no doubt as to Dept’s strong disapprobation retaliatory raid against Jordan which we firmly believe could have catastrophic consequences for Jordanian regime. GOI should also be made aware of Department’s conviction that GOJ doing everything within its capabilities to stop infiltration.³

2. Embassy Amman’s offer to pass to GOJ any appropriate info relevant to border situation should be made to GOI.⁴

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 32–1 ISR–JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted and approved by Robert B. Houghton and cleared by Davies and Sterner. Also sent to Amman, Beirut, Cairo,CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, Damascus, and Jerusalem.
2. Telegram 2566 from Amman, March 19, commented on a telegram from the Defense Attache Office in Tel Aviv (not found) transmitting a message from Rabin to Khammash. The telegram expressed concern about the possibility of another Israeli attack on Jordan and recommended warning the Israelis against the possible “catastrophic consequences” of such an attack. Noting that the Jordanians had rejected any direct contact with Israel in the wake of the Samu raid, it recommended that if the Israelis had information for the Jordanians, they should forward it to the Embassy in Amman, which would pass it to the appropriate authorities. (Ibid.) Telegram 2567 from Amman, March 19, reported that Khammash confirmed that it was still Jordan’s policy to take all possible action to prevent infiltration into Israel. (Ibid.)
3. Barbour reported in telegrams 2985 and 2990 from Tel Aviv, both March 20, that the Embassy had conveyed the Department’s position to the Israeli Government. (Ibid.)
4. Burns reported in telegram 2597 from Amman, March 21, that he relayed the substance of Rabin’s message to Khammash, who replied that arrangements for direct Jordanian-Israeli patrols, telephone contact, or direct exchange of information were politically impossible at that time but that Khammash would be happy to receive information conveyed through U.S. Government channels. (Ibid., POL 32–1 ISR–JORDAN) Telegram 159758 to Tel Aviv, March 21, stated that although the Department agreed to a U.S. role as a channel of information in this instance, it considered that the Mixed Armistice Commission was the proper “third party” in such cases and did not wish to be regularly involved as a channel between parties. (Ibid.)