Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

396. Memorandum From the Country Director for the United Arab Republic (Bergus) to Lucius D. Battle¹

Washington, March 16, 1967.

SUBJECT

• The CIA in US–UAR Relations

Your farewell talk with Nasser demonstrates that once again CIA operations [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] have created a major problem in US–UAR relations.² The response of CIA here to Nasser’s allegations³ [2 lines of source text not declassified] was unsatisfactory. CIA appears to hope that these incidents can be swept under the rug. This should not be allowed to happen. At the same time I think that any approaches made by the Department to CIA on this subject should place the matters raised by Nasser with you in their proper perspective. These particular incidents simply reinforce some basic suppositions which I believe that many of us have felt for a long time. I would hope that our discussions with CIA would therefore concentrate primarily on the basics to the end that a more acceptable method [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] can be found. These observations are submitted to you in line with this hope.

In the Near East CIA is happiest and most productive in those situations where it has been welcomed by the local authorities and used by them as an adjunct to its own internal security services. [2 lines of source text not declassified] These close relations naturally create an instinctive warm glow between the CIA and these particular countries. While this in itself is not reprehensible, I do believe that it colors the attitudes of the CIA and contributes to a readiness there to divide the Near East into “the good guys” and “the bad guys”. I think that this factor should be constantly borne in mind both by the CIA leadership and our own policymakers on the seventh floor and in the White House. At issue is the question as to whether the US can in fact accept the proposition that some at least of the Near East states are fully sovereign, are jealous of their sovereignty and are legitimately entitled to that jealousy. There should also be recognition that CIA in the 50’s had and then lost [1 line of source text not declassified]. That there should be feelings of nostalgia for this among the CIA leadership is probably also natural but such feelings should not be allowed to color judgments.

CIA, at least in the Near East, has yet to prove that it can operate usefully and effectively in a sophisticated and/or hostile environment. Since the loss of its [2 lines of source text not declassified] the CIA has been able to produce very little by way of useful intelligence [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] UAR. This little has been produced at considerable risk to our relations and presumably considerable cost to the taxpayer. At the same time intelligence targets in the UAR are probably increasing in number. We may have come to the point where the experts should make a basic re-examination of targets in the UAR and methods of achieving them. Hide-bound attitudes as to methods plus the nostalgic hostility towards the Nasser regime mentioned above can only give us more trouble in Egypt.

[5–1/2 lines of source text not declassified] The only safe assumption is that the UAR is probably aware of most, if not all, of our intelligence operations in Egypt or with Egyptians in other countries. From this assumption flow two rather important considerations:

1) We are constantly at risk that the UAR will blow an operation at a time and in circumstances of its own choosing,

2) That Egyptian informants are being coached to tell us what the UAR wants us to hear. This must be kept in mind in evaluating the product of such informants.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL UAR-US. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Bergus. Battle left Cairo on March 5 and assumed the duties of Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs on April 5.
2. Battle reported in telegram 5031 from Cairo, March 4, that during his March 4 conversation with Nasser (see Document 393), Nasser referred to their December 10 conversation (see footnote 3, Document 341), told Battle that the UAR Government had information about two alleged former CIA agents, and charged that a third country’s contacts with the Egyptian army were under U.S. direction. Battle stated that he was unaware of any information concerning the charges and that he wanted to review them and deal harshly with any such actions, which were clearly contrary to U.S. policy. (Department of State, INR Historical Files, Roger Channel Telegrams, Cairo)
3. At a March 16 meeting among Davies, Bergus, Gardner, and a CIA representative, the CIA representative stated that there had been no thought of using the alleged agents to work against Nasser, that the charge that a third country’s contacts with the Egyptian army were under U.S. direction was a lie, and that “it was ridiculous to think that the Agency had any thought of trying to overthrow Nasser.” (Ibid., NEA/CIA Weekly Meetings, 1967–1969)