Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

381. Memorandum of Conversation Between the UAR Ambassador (Kamel) and Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, January 17, 1967.

SUBJECT

• Lunch with Ambassador Kamel

At a two-hour lunch this afternoon Ambassador Kamel went over much of the same ground as he has with Secretary Rusk² and Mr. Walt Rostow.³ Much of what he said was a repeat of his familiar analysis of how important it is that the US maintain a position in Cairo over the next 3–4 years until oil revenue put the UAR on its own feet. Essentially, he made two points:

1. The importance of a US decision on food aid within the next ten days. He had obviously absorbed Mr. Rostow’s Saturday⁴ admonition that it was time he stopped describing Cairo’s acceptance of Soviet wheat as a threat to the US and started thinking of it as a threat to the UAR. He made very clear that, in painting the specter of Moscow’s filling the Egyptian wheat gap, he was not threatening the US but simply stating a fact of life—that a sick man needs moral support from more than one quarter.

2. His three-part plan for progress in the Middle East which he had outlined to Secretary Rusk but not to Mr. Rostow:

• —Keep the Israeli issue in the icebox.
• —Achieve a modus vivendi among the Arab governments:

  (a) Use the good offices of the US to further the Kuwaiti mediation of the Yemen dispute;

  (b) Do what we can to help reestablish British relations with the UAR. He explained this second point as relevant to the first in that the British have substantial influence in Saudi Arabia and can do a lot to break down the animosity between Faisal and Nasser.

• —Maintain a workable economic relationship with the UAR, including encouraging the IMF and IBRD to help. He described the importance of this in ways that do not sound like a threat but they come close. As he put it: Just as no government can expect to have good relations with any nation in the western hemisphere without the approval of the US, so is it true with the UAR in the Middle East.

He raised again the proposal he had made to Mr. Rostow on Saturday of our sending to Cairo another mission like the Ed Mason enterprise several years ago.⁵ He felt that, if we agreed to a new round of food aid, he could sell this to Nasser. When he asked what I thought of the idea, I said I felt it could be useful if it connoted a willingness on the part of the UAR government to adopt more pragmatic economic policies and to consider the analysis of western economists.

In general response I told him I felt he was addressing two points not necessarily wholly related. First is the political element of our response to UAR food requests. Contrary to some impressions that might be logical in Cairo, our delay in deciding should not be read as political. Second, I felt that our delay had to be read in the context of our broader concern over the world food problem.

I explained how the US and the world are going through a transition in their thinking about agricultural development and food aid. Washington in particular in the last three months had been coming to grips with this new situation in a way that almost required delaying any decisions on food aid until we had sorted out our position on the worldwide problem. I realized the difficulty of convincing Cairo that preoccupation rather than premeditated neglect could be a reason for our delay, but I felt this was much closer to the truth and hoped he could convince his government.

When I turned the discussion to Syrian-Israeli relations, he had little to offer in the way of interpretation but did volunteer that he had cabled Nasser yesterday that the UAR should do what it could to restrain Syria. I told him we appreciated that because we were very much concerned that the Israelis might launch another strike if terrorist activity continued, and especially if it cost another Israeli life. He diverted the discussion to an exposition on how the UAR had been quite responsible on the Israeli issue. I agreed that it had been better than some of its neighbors and hoped that in this instance it could do all in its power to avert another blowup.

In parting, I left with him the two USDA paper-back books on the world food problem and outlined to him the new facts about the world food situation as we see it. He ended by reiterating his plea for a US decision “within 10 days”.

He retained his composure throughout, but was more emphatic than I had ever seen him.

H.S.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. V. Secret. A copy was sent to the Department of State.
2. See Document 378.
3. A brief memorandum of Kamel’s meeting with Rostow on January 14 is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. V.
4. January 14.
5. Economist Edward Mason visited the UAR in March 1962. For the summary of his report, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XVII, Document 230.