Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

380. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson¹

Washington, January 16, 1967.

SUBJECT

• Another Israeli Raid?

Prime Minister Eshkol’s informal message to you this morning² makes it plain that the Israelis are not going to repeat the mistake they made in November. Our reaction to their raid on Jordan shook them badly. This time, they’re carefully warning us that their patience with Syria has about run out.

Despite Eshkol’s restraint, Israel is either on the brink of another attack or is pushing us to curb Syria. Israeli Charge Evron warned State this morning that “continuation of Syria’s policy would force Israel to take action.”³ Eban said about the same publicly.

Since the first of the year, the Israelis have built a full record in the UN of Syrian-based attacks. To strengthen their case further, they’ve accepted U Thant’s appeal for an emergency meeting of the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission. This costs little since press reports suggest that Syria will reject or sidestep the appeal.

We probably can’t stop the Israelis from another attack without laying our whole relationship on the line. We’ve offered border control equipment for them to test, but any system is months off. However, we’re pulling out the stops short of a showdown to encourage continued restraint:

• —Katzenbach told representatives of the Jewish Council of Presidents this morning⁴ that an Israeli strike would consolidate support for the deteriorating Syrian regime.
• —We endorsed U Thant’s appeal⁵ in a New York Statement.
• —We’re instructing Ambassador Smythe to tell the Syrians we believe Israel is on the brink of an attack and they can’t count on us to hold Israel back.⁶ We’ll say the same in Cairo.
• —We’ll have a response to Eshkol for you shortly.

Walt

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VI. Secret. A handwritten “L” on the memorandum indicates that it was seen by the President.
2. See Document 382.
3. In a meeting with Acting Assistant Secretary Handley that morning, Evron delivered an oral message stating in part, “The continuation of this aggressive policy will force Israel to take action in self-defense as is her international right and national duty.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 32–1 ISR–SYR)
4. A memorandum of the conversation is ibid.
5. A January 15 message from UN Secretary-General U Thant to the Israeli and Syrian Governments urged restraint and called for an emergency meeting of the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission. The text is in telegram 3582 from USUN, January 15. (Ibid.)
6. Telegram 119382 to Damascus, January 16, instructed Smythe to tell Foreign Minister Makhus that terrorist incidents were placing the Israeli Government under pressures that might become intolerable, that the United States considered that situation was dangerously close, and that the Syrian Government should not overestimate the U.S. ability to influence the Israeli Government against military reaction to acts of terrorism. (Ibid.) In a January 17 meeting, Makhus said that Syria had already agreed to the suggestion of an emergency ISMAC meeting but wanted it to deal with the question of cultivation in the demilitarized zone. (Ibid.)