Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

373. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State¹

Amman, December 22, 1966, 0001Z.

1570. From Macomber. Deptel 106069.²

1. Concluded negotiations with King Hussein afternoon December 21. In course of this and earlier meetings we have come to following understandings:

2. King does not agree with our belief that there has been no basic change in Israeli policy toward Jordan. He understands, however, that US response is predicated on this assumption and aimed primarily at easing current situation, rather than dealing with longer term threat of revised nature.

3. His Majesty understands very difficult position facing us should it turn out that dramatic effort to strengthen Jordan army along lines of McNamara package was happening in apparent conjunction with introduction of foreign Arab troops into Jordan. While understanding the implications of this for USG, he also feels that introduction of foreign troops is incompatible with Jordan’s own interests. He cannot give an absolute guarantee that he will be able to keep foreign troops out of his country but he does guarantee to the President that he will do all he can to keep them out.

4. The King has committed himself to hold increase in current actual force levels (50,000) to an increment of 3,000. He wishes President to know that he understands and shares US concern for escalating troop strength. He asks him to understand, however, that some increase at this time is absolutely essential. He also wishes to personally assure the President that at earliest opportunity he will try to cut back his troop strength. He has specifically agreed one year from now to reexamine need for additional 3,000 troops in light of political and financial conditions existing at that time.

5. King intends to continue his moderate policies and measures to enhance area stability. In this connection, Jordan will persist in its efforts to prevent terrorist infiltration into Israel.

6. King Hussein understands that USG is fully prepared honor US-Jordanian sales agreements of 1964 and 1965 provided GOJ can continue to meet payments on schedule from funds obtained from sources external to Jordan. He understands also that US not prepared to alter terms of these agreements. He knows we are willing to give vigorous diplomatic support to GOJ effort obtain necessary funds from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. He is fully aware, too, our position that any funds obtained from such sources or from UAC would be applied first to meeting GOJ obligations under US purchase agreements and would be available for general support of GOJ forces only after US obligations met. (In early February King plans to visit Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in search of funds; and in March will go to Libya for same purpose.)

7. With respect to option to purchase 24 additional aircraft,³ King understands that we are prepared interpret “on or about January 1” liberally and that we believe it would be preferable wait to exercise this option until he has, with our support, obtained necessary funds from Saudi Arabia or Kuwait. In any event, he understands if GOJ exercises option in January, payments totalling 5.4 million will have to be paid in January to USG and that these obligations would have prior claim on UAC funds over their use to finance any increase in force levels.

8. King understands that we acquiesce on enlisted men’s pay raise of magnitude of twenty-five percent. In our agreeing to this, he understands that we will take raise into account in later negotiations for a new ceiling in Jordanian military budgetary expenditures to replace current 19.2 million dinar limitation.

9. I have informed King that under difficult political and financial circumstances he facing USG will not proceed with all $5 million projected cut in our budget support for FY 67. I have therefore indicated that, subject to Congressional appropriations, our budget support payments for the coming year will be reduced to $27 million rather than to $25 million. Also indicated that in restoring a portion of our cut I would have to make it clear that all our budget support for forthcoming year would be subject to 57 percent special letter of credit arrangement as we had earlier informed his government.

10. On basis of foregoing I have also told Hussein that we will deliver the equipment listed in McNamara package and make every effort to airlift a substantial portion of this equipment to Jordan in next 30 to 60 days. I have indicated that it will not be possible to augment package to extent he and General Khammash requested in our first meeting, but have given him list of machine guns, radios and communication wire, as spelled out Deptel 104754,⁴ noting that we were prepared to add these items to initial McNamara list. King expressed disappointment that package still did not include upgunning of M–48 tanks. He understands, however, that while this request can be considered on another, later occasion, it is not part of our current package.

11. While indicating disappointment that other items had not been added to McNamara package, King Hussein said that present package dramatically flown in to Jordan will help situation here “very, very much.”

12. King believes that advance loan of six F–104’s, and their presence here will be most helpful. I have confirmed that we will attempt to deliver them to Jordan in course of January and early February. King understands that when American pilots are piloting the planes they will be used only for training of Jordanian co-pilots. He has also guaranteed that every effort will be made to avoid these planes coming into combat with any of Jordan’s neighbors as long as they are being serviced on ground by US personnel, even when they are being piloted by Jordanians. Additionally, he is aware that if other foreign aircraft should be stationed in Jordan while the F–104’s are still here on a loan basis, we will have to reexamine question of whether they should remain.

13. We have agreed on proposed text for public announcement of package along lines suggested Deptel 106068,⁵ with paragraph added for use in Jordan only. (Text being sent separately.)⁶ Hussein would like to make announcement Friday morning Amman time and agrees with us that numbers and types of equipment should not be revealed publicly.

14. In course my final meeting with Hussein on December 21, we also discussed tactics of forthcoming Cairo meeting as well as King’s current thinking with respect to changes in his government. These discussions reported in Embtel 1569.⁷

15. After returning to office and dictating foregoing, I received call from Prime Minister Tell who said he and General Khammash had talked to King re agreement which we had reached and must see me at once. We met at Embassy residence and meeting began with my reviewing point by point all key language of agreement spelled out paras 2–12 in this telegram. Prime Minister and Khammash, in an intense and emotional effort, made in the next two hours one last try to obtain further concessions. While much of old ground again gone over, main thrust Tell-Khammash argument was that U.S. response was not enough and that by our failure to be more forthcoming we were denying Jordan minimum necessary support needed at this critical time. They asserted that King’s sense of courtesy masking depth of his disappointment and that their own disappointment was “many times greater” than the King’s.

16. Tell argued pay raise, which King pretty much committed to after meeting with officers previous evening, would not be possible. (I went over figures to show that it would be.) Tell also suggested that it might have been better to head off pressures for troop build-up by deciding not to take U.S. package and instead going ahead with plans to accept foreign troops into Jordan. Khammash felt King, after last night’s meeting with officers, was also committed to much larger troop build-up than would now be possible. Khammash, in very emotional state suggested that he might not be able carry on. (Unless he calms down, I suspect he may resign in next day or so, as he did once before on a similar occasion. If so, I believe King will be able persuade him withdraw resignation.)

17. Throughout meeting I made it absolutely clear that while recognizing sincerity of their appeal we had come to the end of the line. I added, however, that in view of their comments, I thought I should contact His Majesty to see whether he was having second thoughts about the agreement we had reached. At that point Tell interjected to say that there was no question about going back on the deal, that it had been made and it was too late now for it to be unmade. Shortly thereafter, when Tell and Khammash finally concluded that there was in fact no more give in my position meeting ended.

18. While I have no doubt there was considerable sincerity in this eleventh hour effort on the part of Prime Minister and Chief of Staff, I believe that Hussein while disappointed is not as deeply disappointed as they are suggesting. Further I believe that under the circumstances we have made about the right deal.

19. When I returned to the office I found waiting for me to carry back to Washington a very courteous and appreciative letter to the President from King Hussein. Text of letter follows by separate telegram.⁸

20. My continued presence here now will only raise false hopes that there is in fact further give in my position. I have said goodbye to King and will be leaving Amman for Washington morning 22nd.

Burns

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/MACOMBER. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.
2. Telegram 106069 to Amman, December 20, authorized Macomber to accept an increase of 2,000 in the force level and to accept another 1,000 if he was convinced it was absolutely necessary, stated that the United States would expect to share the burden of increased budgetary costs of an agreed force build-up, authorized him to reduce the cut in U.S. budget support for fiscal year 1967 to $2 or $3 million, and reminded him that he was authorized to yield the entire $5 million if he considered it absolutely necessary. It instructed Macomber to try to discourage the Jordanians from exercising their option to purchase 24 additional aircraft on or about January 1, 1967, and to advise the King that the United States was not prepared to recede from the terms of their agreement on payment for the aircraft. (Ibid.)
3. After extensive U.S.-Jordan discussions in early 1967 on this subject, Burns reported in telegram 2938 from Amman, April 12, that he met with Khammash, who was authorized by the King to conclude the revision of the F–104 package. The Jordanian Government was exercising its option for 6 additional F–104s and planned to exercise its option for the remaining 18 aircraft in March 1968. Delivery of the 18 aircraft currently on order was to begin in July 1967 and continue through June 1968. Delivery of the next 18 aircraft was to begin in March 1969. Payment due in 1967 on the ground package and the first 18 aircraft would be $26.5 million, with the possibility of deferring $2 million until 1968. (Ibid., DEF 19–8 US–JORDAN)
4. Dated December 18. (Ibid.)
5. Dated December 20. (Ibid.)
6. The text was transmitted in telegram 1572 from Amman, December 21. (Ibid.)
7. Dated December 22. (Ibid.)
8. Telegram 1571 from Amman, December 22. (Ibid.)