372. Memorandum From W. Howard Wriggins of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow)1

SUBJECT

  • Arms for Hussein

Hussein and Macomber are bargaining hard.2

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Hussein welcomes the McNamara package, believes that the drama of the airlift will be very helpful, as will 6 F–104’s in advance. He will do all in his power to prevent the stationing of non-Jordanian Arab troops in Jordan; he will continue his moderate policy toward Israel.

Now remains at issue his force level. Macomber has pressed hard for no increase but for a substantial improvement in quality. General Khammash wants an increase of 10,000 from the present 50,000 on deck to 60,000. However, Macomber believes the King is under pressure to increase numbers as well as quality—his generals do not find it credible that they can meet the threat from both Israel and Syria without a numerical increase. (Note: The United Arab Command’s plans for Jordan implied a total strength of 75,000 including an 8,500 national guard. The Government of Jordan has authorized a strength of 55,000, but had not gone farther than 50,000, a level we had never formally agreed to.) Macomber believes a 2,000-man increase is reasonable to absorb the new equipment we are adding. He hopes to hold the line at that. But if he can’t, he feels the pressure is strong enough to warrant taking out a small insurance policy by accepting a 5,000-man increase, but for one year only.

On budget costs, we and they had reached agreement on the Jordanian defense budget of some $54 million. We have been providing a declining level of budgetary support ($37 million in 1962, $32 million in 1966). We have told Congress that we are continuing to reduce this support. And we had planned cuts of $5 million a year beginning this year.

DoD estimates that apart from the costs of the McNamara package the add-on costs are as follows:

1. pay raise $6 million
2. 2,000 men to handle new equipment: $2.5 million
3. 3,000 men to 55,000 total: $3.5 million
$12.0 million

Where will this $12 million additional come from?

1.
Khammash says he can cover these costs for one year out of UAC funds (though we are somewhat skeptical).
2.
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait could be tapped by Jordan, with our backing, in the event the UAC contribution does not come through (but we’re already expecting them to pick up the $70 million balance from the tank and plane sales and therefore can’t expect much more).
3.
We ourselves could scratch our $5 million cut in budget support, and might put in some additional contingency fund if necessary (though this would undercut the important goal of shifting Jordan to development funding).
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I assume the President would prefer to satisfy them with a bit more cash in the form of budget support than have a new crisis on his hands.

Have you any reaction to the above before I join in a State-Defense meeting at 10:45?3

  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. III. Confidential.
  2. Macomber’s reports from Amman are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/MACOMBER.
  3. The memorandum bears no indication of Rostow’s reaction.