Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

363. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson¹

Washington, December 12, 1966, 11:35 a.m.

SUBJECT

• King Hussein’s Problem

At this morning’s breakfast with the Vice President, Bob McNamara, Nick Katzenbach, Bill Handley, Bill Macomber, Howard Wriggins, and Rodger Davies, the King’s problem was thoroughly discussed. Sisco and Goldberg could not attend; but both have been brought in. Nick talked with Goldberg and, while not familiar with the details, Goldberg agrees this is broadly the right course. Sisco, who was committed to breakfast with Eban, is now going over the package.² The conclusions were as follows.

1. The proposed package was insufficient to meet the King’s essential political needs.

2. Movement on a larger package would be appropriate only as we pressed discussions with Israel on improving border surveillance technology. These will be started by Nick with Eban today and would go forward at the UN and in the Middle East with Israel, and, hopefully, with the Arab countries as well.

3. Bob McNamara, Nick, and the others agreed that the package for Hussein should be expanded in the following ways: (a) delivery of the 12 F–104’s presently in the Jordanian pipeline should be accelerated. Six should be drawn from the inventory within 30 days and delivered to Hussein even though the pilots and ground environment are not yet ready; (b) 18 self-propeller antiaircraft units should be airlifted within 30 to 60 days; (c) the $4.7 million package to improve mobility, firepower, and effectiveness—which you have already seen—should also be airlifted.

4. When he talks to General Khammash, Bob McNamara would make clear that, while this is less than the King asked for, it is a substantial and prompt response and that we have several parallel concerns: (a) the King should stress quality, rather than quantity, and we could only make this package available if he agrees to keep his manpower at present levels; (b) we assume he would continue his policy of moderation and restraint and his considerable efforts to prevent guerrillas from using Jordan as a base for operations against Israel and we will consider helping him to improve his border police (AID is reviewing this part of his problem); (c) no United Arab Command troops should be situated on the West bank area of Jordan.

5. Several present hoped that you could personally take ten minutes with Khammash before he sees Bob McNamara tomorrow at 11 o’clock to discuss: (a) our concern for Hussein’s future; (b) our substantial and prompt response; and (c) our need to discuss the longer run financial implications of this assistance. However, Nick does not want to trouble you, knowing that, if you see Khammash even for five minutes, you will feel it necessary to see Eban. I believe you should keep out at this stage.

6. We will get flack from the Israelis no matter what we do, although Eban acknowledged to Goldberg the raid was a grave error. It was the consensus of all present, including the Vice President, that this sort of package is what is required and we’ll have to use our discussions with Eban to insure Israel’s friends here sit tight.

7. Unfortunately, time is short, because Khammash should see McNamara and McNamara leaves for European discussion tomorrow afternoon. Nevertheless, I see little alternative to helping Hussein in this way. And we will press hard on Israel the importance of border stabilization through the UN if possible and directly, if that is the only way.

8. I, therefore, recommend you accept the attached package, plus accelerated delivery of 6 F–104’s within a month and 18 40mm AA guns within 60 days, under the conditions set out in paragraph 4.

9. Nick and Bob suggest Bill Macomber, an old Jordanian hand, shortly go out to talk, on your behalf, to his friend Hussein. His cover would be an examination of the AID implications of Hussein’s defense problem.

10. A short letter from you to King Hussein will come up shortly for signature.³ It could be carried back by the King’s emissary, General Khammash, who returns on Tuesday evening, Dec. 13, or Wednesday, Dec. 14.

Walt

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. III. Secret.
2. Rostow’s handwritten note in the margin reads as follows: “He has gone to New York to clear with Goldberg. We’ll hear later in the afternoon. W.”
3. Rostow sent the draft letter to the President with an undated memorandum from Katzenbach recommending that he send it, a December 12 memorandum from Katzenbach (Document 365), and a covering memorandum of December 12. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. III) The letter was not sent.