Office of the Historian

365. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach to President Johnson1

Washington, December 12, 1966.

SUBJECT

  • Military Assistance to Jordan

I have the following recommendations with respect to increased military assistance to Jordan. I have discussed these with Ambassador Goldberg and he is in agreement.2

1.
We should proceed with the recommendations in the attached memorandum which expedite current programmed MAP assistance and include an increment, primarily of defensive weapons, totalling $6 to $7 Million.3
2.
We should candidly inform the Israeli Government about this program. Based on my conversation with Foreign Minister Abba Eban, I believe that the Israeli Government will accept this program as necessary to support the regime of King Hussein. Eban quite candidly said that the Israelis had as much of a stake in preserving the King as we did.
3.
Ambassador Goldberg believes that we are likely to have a sizable domestic problem with respect to the increment even if the Israeli Government quietly agrees to it. He believes, and I agree, that in presenting this to the Israelis (and to the Jewish community in this country) it would be helpful to give something to the Israeli side of the ledger: We recommend
a.
We tell the Israelis that we will make every effort to speed up deliveries of Skyhawks (A4’s). Bob McNamara has no objection to this commitment and believes delivery probably can be speeded up somewhat to enable some delivery in advance of the scheduled date.
b.
We tell the Israeli Government that we will attempt to assist them in working out static defense plans and, to the extent possible, help with hardware to make this effective. We should further state to them that while we cannot presently commit ourselves to any dollar-for-dollar offsetting through AID or otherwise of our increased commitments to Jordan, we will take this into account in giving sympathetic consideration to Israeli requests for assistance; for example, we might [Page 715] be able to subsidize some of their African operations which indirectly benefit us. (There is a good deal of opposition to any firm commitment in this respect and many Government officials believe that we should not really offer anything in this regard to Israel at this time. Ambassador Goldberg and I believe, however, that to meet the sensibilities of the Israelis (and their domestic supporters) that we should make this general commitment as an appropriate response. The amount is not large and such a commitment would help the Israelis and help us domestically. We believe this can be worked out to the satisfaction of all, particularly since it is not necessary to do this simultaneously with the Jordanian move and can be worked out at a later date.)

Ambassador Goldberg would be happy to take this up with Ambassador Harman, who could help us greatly here with the Jewish community.4

Respectfully,

Nicholas deB. Katzenbach
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. III. Secret. Filed with a December 12 covering memorandum from Rostow to the President, which also forwarded the draft letter to King Hussein cited in footnote 3, Document 363.↩
  2. Telegram 101492 to USUN, December 13, from Katzenbach to Goldberg, transmitted the text of Katzenbach’s memorandum, noting that it was “the memorandum which we discussed last night.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 19–8 US–JORDAN)↩
  3. Not attached.↩
  4. There is no indication of the President’s approval or disapproval.↩