Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

315. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, August 12, 1966.

SUBJECT

• US–UAR Relations

PARTICIPANTS

• Dr. Mostafa Kamel, Ambassador of the United Arab Republic
• The President
• The Secretary (joined the talks shortly after they began)
• NEA—Ambassador Hare
• White House—Mr. Rostow

Ambassador Kamel expressed appreciation for being received. He conveyed the good wishes of President Nasser to the President and “to the newly-weds.” Kamel then said that President Nasser had very much appreciated the President’s photograph. President Nasser valued it highly not only for its own value but also as a symbol of the President’s wish to have good relations. Kamel then presented Nasser’s photograph to the President and said it was being given in the same spirit. The President expressed thanks.

Ambassador Kamel then launched into a lengthy presentation which followed quite closely the presentation he gave the Secretary on July 13.² He said that Nasser wanted good relations with the United States, that these were important for the entire Near East and that good relations were compatible with the ideals of President Johnson. Nasser wishes to dispel confusion regarding our relations. Kamel thought it important that we differentiate the fundamentals from the nonfundamentals in our relations. The fundamentals included opposition to communism, continued flow to the West of oil, and calm in the Palestine situation. All other problems between us were secondary and they should not affect our judgment on the fundamentals. Kamel at this point and later in the conversation referred to the difficulties created by US communications media. Since returning from Cairo, Kamel could say authoritatively that the UAR would adhere to the fundamentals in our relationship and wished to work with us to resolve some of the smaller problems.

Kamel likened US–UAR relations to a Catholic marriage in which there could be no divorce. The UAR had taken a number of actions to demonstrate its desire to work with the US. These had not just been words but were specifics. They had been intended as “signals” of the UAR’s good intentions. The UAR would persevere in seeking a settlement of the Yemen issue but it was not simple and it would take time. The UAR was willing to accept nuclear safeguards “as prescribed by Vienna.” Kamel warned that if any Middle East country obtained nuclear weapons it would create a very serious situation. At this point the President interposed that the US remained adamantly opposed to the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Near East. Kamel then reviewed the list of “signals” he had set forth in his July 13 discussion with the Secretary. The only new element was a statement that the UAR would do its best to make the maximum use of additional land reclaimed as the result of additional waters available from the Aswan High Dam. He stressed that after the present “transitional period” during which Egypt was obtaining its wheat needs through the CCC it would be essential to obtain some kind of food assistance in order to permit the UAR to remain non-aligned. He bespoke USG support for the UAR in the latter’s discussions with the IMF and World Bank.

The President thanked Ambassador Kamel for his presentation. He noted that he was leaving Washington within a very short time. He would not attempt to discuss each individual point raised by the Ambassador. He would ask Messrs. Hare and Rostow to analyze the purport of the Ambassador’s presentation so that he could review it. The President said that if the Ambassador had any further points to make they should be communicated to Mr. Rostow.

The President welcomed Ambassador Kamel’s statement on nuclear safeguards. He expressed the hope that the Yemeni talks would succeed. He said that the US desired improved relations with the UAR. He did not feel that there were any basic differences between us. He respected the efforts which had been made to improve these relations. Improvement would come more easily if our differences could be discussed quietly and not publicly.

As a final point Ambassador Kamel stressed the importance of PL 480 assistance to Egypt and his hope that an agreement could be accomplished by early next year.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US. Secret. Drafted by Bergus and approved at the White House on August 18. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting took place at 1:48 p.m. in the Oval Office at the White House. (Johnson Library)
2. See Documents 307 and 308.