308. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECT
- US–UAR Relations III—Secretary’s Unofficial Comment
PARTICIPANTS
- The Secretary
- NEA—Ambassador Hare
- NEA:UAR—Donald C. Bergus
- Ambassador of the United Arab Republic, Dr. Mostafa Kamel
Kamel concluded by saying that the UAR wanted to cooperate with the United States, that it had taken measures to prove this, and that he hoped to have an opportunity to convey this directly to the President.
The Secretary said that he wanted to see Ambassador Kamel again soon to make an official comment on his presentation. As for Kamel’s request to see the President, we would take this matter up. The Secretary wanted time to think about the other points. The rest of the Secretary’s remarks would be made on a personal basis and should not for the time being be reported.
The Secretary had followed the Ambassador’s presentation with interest and appreciation. He was grateful for the renewed invitation to visit Cairo and would be in touch with the Ambassador about it. He hoped that the Ambassador would come in again in a very few days.
On the question of divisions in the Arab world, the Secretary wanted the Ambassador’s frank assessment of the competition between the Arab Socialist countries vs. the conservative ones. While we would not expect Egypt to stop saying its methods were the best way to achieve economic development, would it be possible for Egypt to consider this a problem that each country should solve for itself? Kamel replied that Nasser was convinced that it was not his business to change other countries. He felt that if the Yemen were solved, this problem would be resolved. The issue of “groupings” among Arab states depended heavily on US–UAR relations. It was important that Egypt not feel it was being cornered.
The Secretary expressed personal appreciation for Ambassador Kamel’s efforts in the field of US–UAR relations. As to food, the problem was changing dramatically. There would be a Development Assistance [Page 616] Committee (DAC) conference next week to talk about the world food problem over the next ten years. The world was facing a terrible crisis. Before World War II the underdeveloped countries sold food to the industrial countries. Now the industrial countries were sending 40 million tons annually to the underdeveloped countries. Surpluses had been exhausted. As a colleague of the Secretary’s had remarked, there could no longer be a “garbage-can approach” to the problem. Acreage would have to be increased to meet the additional food needs. The orders of magnitude were staggering. We would be sending India wheat in quantities amounting to about 60% of what the US consumed annually. But still this was a relatively small percentage of India’s annual need. It was a worldwide problem which everyone must go flat out to solve. The countries short of food would have to take rigorous measures. We had so insisted to the Indians. The US had taken risks in drawing down its own food reserves to meet the needs of others.
Maybe, the Secretary continued, we should look at the UAR in the context of the world food problem. We could examine what the UAR was doing in such fields as use of Aswan Dam waters, desalination, etc. and come to a projection over a ten-year period. This might establish a different framework than the one under which the US has sent food in the past. A framework of total effort might be an improvement on past methods which have sometimes been unhappy. The Secretary reemphasized that he was speaking informally, personally and unofficially.
The Secretary had been stimulated by the UAR statement of willingness to accept international controls on nuclear activities. This was a most important development. We would see what we could do to make it of significance. The United States was utterly opposed to the introduction of nuclear weapons in the Middle East.
On Yemen, the Secretary was not sure that a direct role by the United States was the best way a solution could be found. If the US got into the negotiating process it would bring a lot of extra baggage with it in the form of relationships and understandings in other fields. Perhaps the formal Kuwaiti role could be built upon. The Secretary would comment officially later. His impression was that both sides desired a settlement. Certainly the Yemenis themselves must pray daily for a settlement. What perhaps was needed was more diplomatic precision in instruments of settlement.
During Faisal’s visit to the United States, the Secretary had been struck by the fact that he had not wanted to create difficulties for the UAR. Faisal had referred to Nasser as his “Arab brother” and said the Arabs must find ways to live with each other. Faisal had told the Secretary privately that he would not object to food going to other Arabs.
The Secretary thought that the view that the Bank and Fund have a constructive role to play in Egypt’s development was a good one.
[Page 617]The Secretary said there was no element of truth in the proposition that the US had any interest or any activity in an attempt to overthrow President Nasser. This would be beyond the pale.
A delicate problem in US–UAR relations arose from the fact that the United States at long last was becoming sensitive. This was not just a problem of Zionist pressures. There was growing recognition of the need for protecting the sense of dignity of the President and the Secretary of State. Kamel returned to the possibility of resuming Presidential correspondence. The Secretary said we would think about this. The US, continued the Secretary, had exhausted its capability to go on its knees bearing gifts.
We did not necessarily want gratitude. We could live with silence but not with abuse. Kamel said he had done what he could in this regard.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Bergus and approved in S on July 25. The memorandum is Part III of III parts; Parts I and II are ibid. For the remainder of the conversation, see Document 307.↩