Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

298. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel¹

Washington, June 11, 1966, 10:33 a.m.

1085. Deptel 1052.²

1. As soon after Prime Minister Eshkol’s return from African trip as feasible you should see Foreign Minister Eban for review of arrangements under which USG has been invited visit Dimona. You should make following points:

2. USG appreciates considerable efforts to which GOI went to arrange for satisfactory visit in April 1966. We would like interpret success of that visit as good augury for future USG-GOI arrangements this field.

3. At same time we consider it most important there be no misunderstanding on part GOI of utter seriousness which USG, at highest level, attaches to prevention nuclear proliferation in Near East. As Secretary told Eban this is matter of fundamental significance to US-Israel relations.

4. As GOI aware, USG attaches considerable importance to periodicity of visits and trusts relevant details can be worked out satisfactorily.

5. For technical reasons USG considers that periodicity needs be semi-annual. Scientific reason (given to Embassy in Deptel 938, June 15, 1963,³ but apparently not then relayed to GOI because of Ben Gurion resignation) which you may give Eban is as follows: As is widely known and accepted by knowledgeable international scientific community, a reactor size of Dimona could be operated so as to discharge single fuel load approximately every six months if intended for ultimate production of weapons-grade plutonium, whereas for peaceful purposes the burn-up period would be about two years.

6. As previously stated on several occasions, what we want is full access to Dimona’s facilities and records every six months. We believe this should be done as matter of course without need for complicated negotiations and protracted delays that have accompanied our visits so far.

7. You should use occasion to stress to Eban USG interest in substantive response to President’s letter to Eshkol on IAEA safeguards dated May 21, 1965⁴ (Deptel 698, 1966, paragraph 5).⁵ It will be recalled USG considers placing Israel’s nuclear facilities under IAEA controls a preferable alternative to bilateral arrangements under which US teams have been visiting Dimona. We have been impressed by Prime Minister’s recent statements on nuclear policy and believe it would be in Israel’s interests to give these statements added credibility that would result from IAEA safeguards.

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AE 11–2 ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Gamon on June 7; cleared by Symmes, James W. Spain of INR, Bromley Smith, Robert S. Rochlin of ACDA, and in substance by Robert H. Kranich of ACDA/IR and Stabler of AEC; and approved by Davies.
2. Telegram 1052 to Tel Aviv, June 2, instructed the Embassy to tell Eban that U.S. officials were generally satisfied with the March 31–April 1 visit of the U.S. team to Israeli atomic installations but were concerned that Israeli personnel could supply no information about Argentine-Israeli transactions of uranium concentrate, which they understood had occurred and for which there were no provisions for safeguards equivalent to the IAEA safeguards system. The Embassy was instructed to request clarification of the whereabouts in Israel of Argentine uranium concentrate and its use or intended use, noting that this type of problem added to apprehension in high levels of the U.S. Government and elsewhere and underscored the need for IAEA type safeguards to reassure the world of the peaceful orientation of Israel’s nuclear program. (Ibid.)
3. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XVIII, Document 274.
4. Document 218.
5. Telegram 698 to Tel Aviv, March 1, instructed Barbour to stress to Eban the need to make arrangements for the long-pending Dimona visit. Paragraph 5 instructed him to remind Eban the President was looking forward to an answer to his May 21, 1965, proposal for IAEA safeguards. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AE 11–2 ISR)