Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

297. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson¹

Washington, May 31, 1966, 2 p.m.

Secretary Rusk recommends letting Ambassador Goldberg sound out the Israelis on the proposal he recently outlined to you (attached)² for setting the Arab refugee problem.

He emphasizes that this should be a very informal and tentative probe.

Since Eban took over, he has set up his own task force to study the whole Arab-Israeli problem. Eshkol is fully aboard. They are looking for ways to break down the “fortress Israel” idea and to build bridges to the Arabs. A lot of good ideas are forming.

We do not want to break this fragile reed by overloading it at the start. The steps Eban’s people are considering—greater contact between Arabs and Isaelis—lay them open to the charge of letting down Israel’s defenses. To many sincere Israelis, repatriating Arab refugees would be their Trojan Horse. So asking Eban to accept Ambassador Goldberg’s plan right now might push him too far too fast. Frankly, State does not give this idea much chance of success.

However, Ambassador Goldberg’s proposal does offer some new variations on the Johnson plan worth passing along to the Israelis as long as we do not push them. A hard sell would only backfire. So if you approve, I suggest you let me read back to State that you favor a carefully prepared low-key approach but want to be sure we do not appear at this stage to be pressuring the Israelis into something against their will.³

Walt

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. IV. Confidential.
2. See Document 291. Rusk’s May 30 memorandum is attached but not printed. Another copy of Rusk’s memorandum is filed with a May 31 memorandum from Saunders to Rostow commenting, “Attached recommendation comes because no one wants to shoot Ambassador Goldberg down.” It continues, “NE doubts the Israelis will buy but doesn’t want to squelch Goldberg’s response to the President’s request for new initiatives on the Arab-Israeli deadlock.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 5)
3. The President checked the approval line and wrote: “Put on my desk. L.” A June 3 memorandum from Rostow to Rusk states that the President authorized Rusk to instruct Goldberg to explore with the Israeli delegation in a “tentative, informal, and low-key manner” Israeli willingness to consider a new initiative aimed at breaking the Arab-Israeli deadlock over the refugee problem. It noted that the President understood that the approach would “not appear to the Israelis as an attempt to push them into something they are not prepared to accept.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, REF 3 UNRWA) No record of Goldberg’s approach to the Israelis has been found.