Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

174. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State¹

Tel Aviv, March 3, 1965, 1 p.m.

1098. From Komer. Deptel 854.² As we thought Governor Harriman’s reports made clear, almost half of difficult argument here has been over language our brief on Johnston Plan.

Israeli alarm bells rang from moment we started speaking of US willingness express support of “the principles of the Unified Plan (Deptel 823,³ para 7) or that US supported Johnston Plan” as equitable standard by which to judge water rights of riparian states (Deptel 823, para 3).

Israelis kept asking what this fancy new language meant. Did we still support Johnston Plan or not? They said this reaffirmed all fears aroused recently by Talbot’s evasiveness, letter to Mrs. Sisto, etc., etc.

Israelis regard us as committed to Johnston Plan as a whole. They keep coming up with new references to the record to sustain their stand. Clearly their tactics are going to be to hold us as much as possible to letter of plan.

While this is obviously a bargaining position, they mean to play it to hilt as long as possible and beyond present round of discussions. As Eshkol keeps saying, “It is ok if Lebanon takes 35 MCM’s of water but not if it takes 36 or 40.” However, Eshkol in aside to me Monday said, “Don’t take away our whole basis for compromise. Don’t try to make us compromise at the beginning of a crisis rather than at the end.”

He gets the issue clearly, and Harriman said in return that we obviously weren’t going to let Israel tie us down to last letter of Johnston Plan, which only agreed to by Israel, not Arabs. Our firm policy was to see that Israel got the water to which it was entitled.

They then cited President Johnson’s 2 Jan. 1964 letter to the P.M.,⁴ delivered by Sargent Shriver, which said, “We stand behind you in your rights of withdrawal in accordance with the Unified Plan.” We said this still our policy, but not that Arab part of plan was inviolable.

Stripped of all diplomatese, Israelis see US as slipping away from them on Jordan waters issue, in interests of promoting some other form of compromise. Relevant phrases in our memo of understanding, which I regret to say were not fully understood by me at White House nor properly flagged by me for President, have greatly heightened their suspicions. They think our next step will be to say they don’t really have to go to war if 320 MCM allocation is shaded slightly. After all, they’d still get most of the water they need. This in turn adds greatly to their reluctance give up their own right of pre-emption in exchange for wobbly promise of US support.

Barbour and I fully agree US cannot let Israelis so tie us down to letter of Johnston Plan that we lose any flexibility in necessary effort work out some new form of peaceful compromise. But manner in which we have sought to evade this issue has inflamed Israeli suspicions and greatly complicated our negotiating task.

Deptel 854 shows Dept. still evading issue, while we believe it must be squarely faced. We recommend (and know Harriman does) that we stand firmly on statement in President’s Jan. 1964 letter to Eshkol and on Harriman’s statement here, that we support Israel’s right to water allocated to it under Johnston Plan.

This gives us half a loaf of freeing us on Arab portion of plan. It gives Israelis half a loaf by quieting their fears we’re beginning to renege on their allocation of Jordan waters too. Moreover, it gives us good public position in Israel and elsewhere against which Israelis will find it hard to make convincing arguments.

Barbour

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL ARAB–ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Received at 7:59 a.m. and passed to the White House. Repeated to New Delhi for Harriman.
2. Telegram 854 to Tel Aviv, March 2, stated that the Israeli Embassy raised the question of whether the language used by Harriman and Komer about the Unified Plan and Jordan waters represented a falling back from the U.S. position taken in discussions with the Israelis in January and February 1964, especially in the memorandum given Ambassador Harman on January 24, 1964. (See Document 11.) Telegram 854 asked how deeply Harriman’s and Komer’s talks had gone into questions such as allocations, transfers from Lebanon to Syria and Jordan, and the possibility of renegotiation and whether the Israelis seemed alarmed at the U.S. attitude on questions of this type as contrasted with the U.S. opposition to a pre-emptive strike. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL ARAB–ISR)
3. Document 160.
4. Document 1.