Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

173. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State¹

Tel Aviv, March 2, 1965, 2 a.m.

1082. For the Secretary from Harriman. In three hour talk with Eshkol, with Mrs. Meir participating, I believe I laid on the line all points covered in your message 849² with Komer by prearrangement filling in for double emphasis. We reviewed sentence by sentence memorandum of understanding, including authorized modification. I believe I am now in a position to advise what we can get in the way of an agreement with the GOI in time to deal with the Jordan arms arrangements.

I hate to leave before completing job but under circumstances think my continued highly publicized presence any longer is counterproductive.

Eshkol agreed it politic for me to leave tonight and appeared pleased that Komer would stay on with earnest desire of reaching some understanding.

A. To cover the most vital subjects first:

(1) Israel’s non-proliferation commitment: Eshkol has no intention of undertaking nuclear arms development under present circumstances and will restate whatever he has said before, including that Israel pledges it will not be the first to bring or develop nuclear arms into the Middle East. Constitutionally, he can not go much further without full Cabinet and Israel AEC Commission support with attendant public discussion, particularly as AEC Chairman is a political opponent of Eshkol.

Net of this is that our earnest talks, plus my appeal to Eshkol to be the President’s first supporter of non-proliferation has done some good for long pull. But it is clear that it is not politically possible for Eshkol to do more than the above, without long and full analysis of this problem, including deterrent effect of keeping [garble]guessing plus IAEA technical problems.

In sum I recommend that we not attempt to force Israelis beyond what Eshkol can do at this time.

(2) The most pressing problem is Israel’s Jordan River water rights. I am sure the President understands, far better than I do, that water rights in our Western tradition are fundamental to land rights. Interference with water rights is to Israelis as fundamental as invasion of territory.

Israelis will not agree in advance never to use force to protect the water to which we have agreed they entitled under Johnston Plan. They will agree to state affirmatively that they will use all peaceful means to protect their water rights as agreed to by us, and that they will explore with us and utilize every peaceful method to achieve these ends. However, they will not, and nothing will persuade them renounce ultimate use of force to protect their water any more than they would renounce use of force to protect their territory.

We must recognize also that use of force has varying degrees. I saw yesterday area where Syrian bulldozers were clearing the ground for diversion canal within a few hundred yards of Israeli border. One heavy machine gun could knock them out. Considering that last night Jordanian terrorists invaded Israeli territory 5 miles to blow up inhabited house, Israelis do not believe warning to Arabs on water will produce full-scale war. However they will agree not to use force till all peaceful means exhausted or preferably affirmatively state that they earnestly seek peaceful means of protecting their water sources. They will agree explore with us and utilize any and all peaceful means to this end.

A provision along these lines is negotiable, but we can not expect a renunciation under all circumstances of the use of force to protect Israel’s water.

B. On the minutiae of memorandum of understanding. In paragraph 2 Israelis don’t understand phrase “counter-diversion.” They request “counter” be dropped and suggest paragraph read “Both governments agree to review the dangers posed by Arab diversion schemes and the Unified Arab Command buildup.”

In paragraph 3 Israelis are highly suspicious of phrase Johnston Plan “an equitable standard by which to judge Jordan water usage by riparian states.” They fear this means a major change of U.S. policy. I urge we stop using fancy new language and tell Israelis we will support their right to water as provided in Johnston Plan.

Greatest difficulty in wording is in paragraph 5. Israelis feel we have insured ourselves three times against any possibility of U.S. direct arms sales. I do hope draft will be reviewed and we recognize that we have to convince Israelis we mean to sell them something. So I urge we drop word “selective” (it means nothing anyway) and combine last phrase of first sentence with last phrase of second sentence so that we state only once our expectation all reasonable Israeli efforts to get arms from Western Europe. Also I urge that “maximum effort” be amended to read “every reasonable effort.” With these changes Komer can work out (acceptable) wording for this paragraph.

C. Given changes along lines A and B above, Komer, Barbour and I believe we can make a deal promptly for Israeli acquiescence both here and in Washington in US arms sales to Jordan.

It is of course for Washington to decide whether we wish to abandon Jordan deal or do it without Israeli acquiescence. Either of these has its domestic and international risks.

For my part I earnestly recommend to you and the President that you accept our combined advice to get the best possible on the Jordan arms deal described above, and leave to future negotiations the other difficult problems we have to face with Israel. We always have the leverage of stopping arms delivery if Israelis misbehave. They know they must keep in our good graces, but we must understand in turn that we are dealing with a dedicated people who will not abdicate their right to survival.

In leaving I want to express my deep gratitude for the unbelievably prompt responses you have given me at the most inconvenient hours and with I realize, other taxing pressures. Many thanks.

Barbour

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis/Tan. Received at 7:28 p.m. on March 1 and passed to the White House.
2. The reference is apparently to telegram 848 to Tel Aviv, Document 171. Telegram 849 to Tel Aviv, sent to Amman as telegram 493, March 1, concerned arms for Jordan. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN)