167. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State1
1064. For the President, Rusk, McNamara—from Harriman. At Eshkol’s request I agreed to send him memorandum of understanding and letter to the President (Deptel 823 as amended by 843)2 before our meeting this afternoon. As Komer had an engagement with Peres preceding the meeting, I gave him these papers to deliver.
Peres took papers to Eshkol and returned after one hour, just before I arrived, to tell Komer Eshkol felt no agreement was possible on basis these drafts. Eshkol suggested brief meeting to conclude our talks gracefully and submitted draft communique (see septel).3 Komer deduced [Page 362] from reference to continued talks that this meant Mrs. Meir projected visit this month. In effort to head this off Komer urged on Peres that Mrs. Meir visit counterproductive. Peres commented that I was only one who could say this to Eshkol.
Under these circumstances I asked Barbour to arrange for me to see the PriMin alone instead of as large group.
In this personal talk, Eshkol told me he had discussion with Cabinet and it was impossible for him to put through our proposed arrangements. He explained nothing was offered except indefinite assurances. When I referred to sentence on replacement German tanks he commented “sympathetic consideration” did not have the meaning to the Jews that I assumed. These words had been used for years, going back to the days of the Balfour Declaration, only to produce disappointments. After long but calm argument as to whether US Government intentions could be trusted he agreed but maintained something definite had to be settled now to reassure his colleagues. He underlined changes for the worse to Israel’s security since his visit to Washington last June and asked why could we not at least make some gesture which would justify him with his Cabinet in acquiescing to our Jordan arms deal. If planes are not available why not some more tanks. (He referred to the 232 M48A3s they had hoped to get, against the 150 finally agreed to.)
The upshot was that he proposes Jordan deal be held up a week. Peres and General Rabin go to Washington quietly at once to review change in Israel’s military situation with the hope that a specific deal can be agreed to for a limited amount of hardware (a few tanks or planes). Eshkol would then expect to get his Cabinet to go along with Jordan sale, and agree to no publicity on our arms sales to Israel as we want.
I had previously told him Mrs. Meir was not the one to send to Washington. I had to admit however that the matters relating to peaceful methods, including recourse to United Nations on the Jordan water problem, were in her field. Eshkol suggested we work together in any way we wanted to explore all peaceful means to deal with this problem. Israel wanted more than anyone a peaceful way to get its share of the water. Eshkol assured me I could state to the President that Israel had no military intentions at the present time and that certainly no action would be taken while they were working with us on every possible peaceful solution. Eshkol agreed to carry on discussions with us on this subject in any way or in any place we wanted.
On nuclear problem Eshkol again gave assurance Israel had no plans for development nuclear weapons. He accepted my statement that the President felt one of his chief world responsibilities was to prevent nuclear proliferation, particularly since Red China’s detonation, and said he wanted to cooperate. However he explained he could [Page 363] not get his AE Commission to accept IAEA without some specific consideration such as Nasser agreeing as well. However he wanted to assure the President Israel wanted to help and would not make the President’s task more difficult.
Taking the above and my previous talks into consideration, I recommend that (1) We divide up our package—I think we will do better with them separately. (2) Eshkol be permitted to send Peres and Rabin to Washington quietly, and Hussein be held off for a week. (3) Dept after consultation with Stevenson decide how to proceed with Israel on Jordan water problem. (4) We continue our pressure on IAEA inspection nuclear facilities in context of nuclear problem.
Eshkol is not dominant in Israel. He is well meaning but does not control. I feel that in the long run we will do better with him if we try to understand his political problems and negotiate realistically on each matter. He knows tough trading, but is susceptible to friendly understanding.
I have an engagement with Eshkol tomorrow afternoon to take my leave and hopefully to give him an answer. I urgently ask for a reply to this message, and approval of my departure for Kabul tomorrow, Monday midnight.
Regret I haven’t been able to bring home the bacon but feel that much has been accomplished in calming Israeli emotions on our providing arms to Jordan and the ground has been prepared for reasonable future understandings on issues involved.
Barbour and Komer concur.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 ISR. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Received at 4:49 p.m. and passed to the White House and DOD.↩
- Documents 160 and 166.↩
- The text of the draft communique was transmitted in telegram 1065 from Tel Aviv, February 28. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN)↩