Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

166. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel¹

Washington, February 28, 1965, 12:56 a.m.

843. For Harriman from the Secretary. Embtels 1057, 1058, 1059 and 1060.² The President has approved two amendments to instructions contained in Deptel 823.³

(1) Add to numbered para 5 following language: “USG recognizes that Israel’s highest priority arms need is for the completion of the tank program which had been arranged with West Germany. It is prepared to consider sympathetically this need if West German deliveries are not completed.”

(2) Substitute following language for numbered para 6: “Israel agrees to provide the USG with complete assurances with respect to the non-acquisition and non-manufacture of nuclear weapons and will give favorable consideration to the acceptance of IAEA safeguards as soon as practicable.”

We cannot agree at this time to inject bombers into Near Eastern situation. General language of numbered para 5 of course leaves it open to Israelis to raise this question with us later.

Regarding substitute language on IAEA, you should make it clear that we cannot accept that Israeli situation is tied to problems in other parts of the world rather than solely to the situation in the Arab states. We can conceive of no threat of any kind to Israel from any non-Arab state and in particular from such potential nuclear powers as India. Language used means that at minimum we would expect Israeli acceptance of IAEA whenever Nasser similarly accepted those controls.

It may be useful for you to have in mind that IAEA controls on nuclear materials can be tailored by negotiation to meet specific circumstances and conditions. For example, agreements can be either for indefinite duration or a specified period. They can also include escape clauses which may provide that any party can terminate on a certain period of notice or that they may be terminated if a certain set of circumstances materializes.

If negotiating situation makes it seem useful, you might put forward idea that Israeli acceptance of IAEA controls could contain escape clause to effect that agreement could be terminated by Israel if any Arab state acquired nuclear facilities capable of producing weapons and, within a given period, refused to accept IAEA or other controls satisfactory to GOI. You should, however, put forward any such thought as your own idea and strictly ad referendum.

We hope these amendments will enable you conclude deal 28th. We deeply appreciate stout efforts and able presentation you have made during past three days.

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Jernegan and Talbot, cleared by Rusk with the President by telephone, and approved by Rusk. A message to Komer from Bromley Smith, February 28, states that the reply was cleared with the President after he read Harriman’s 3-part message and that the telegram was dictated by Rusk after discussion with the President. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Harriman Israeli Mission (II)) Rusk called the President to call Harriman’s message to his attention and cleared the two amendments with him. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversations Between Johnson and Rusk, February 28, 1965, 11:12 and 11:37 p.m., Tape F65.09, PNO 5–6)
2. For telegrams 1057, 1058, and 1060, see Documents 163–165. Telegram 1059 from Tel Aviv, February 28, reported that Eshkol pressed for a U.S. commitment not only on tanks and planes but on timing and that Peres indicated Israel would not insist on the B–66 if a comparable aircraft was available. (National Archives and Records Administration,RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 ISR)
3. Document 160.