Office of the Historian

153. Memorandum for the Files1

Washington, February 18, 1965.

SUBJECT

  • Near East Arms Problems

PARTICIPANTS

  • The Secretary
  • U—Mr. Ball
  • NEA—Mr. Talbot
  • NEA—Mr. Jernegan
  • NE—Rodger P. Davies

The Secretary reviewed the proposed memorandum to the President on Near East arms2 and made the following comments:

In the first paragraph, “compensatory assistance for Israel” should be “balanced assistance”. The former, he thought, implied we were “paying off” Israel. Our concern, in fact, is with Israel’s security.

He thought that we should not agree at this juncture to tell Jordan we would sell U.S. supersonic aircraft if their needs would not be met from other free world sources. He suggested we should do no more than agree to consider the sale. Mr. Talbot replied he felt we would have to go beyond this. Since the Jordanis were in the process of checking with the French on the Mirage, we might be faced with the problem within two weeks.

The Secretary said that we should not go beyond considering sympathetically the sale of aircraft. He noted that prior to 1967 we might for a variety of reasons have to cancel the sales agreement.

Paragraph 2b, the Secretary thought, implied that we would condone an Israeli attack provided it had exhausted action in the UN. He said that we must never indicate that we would endorse a preemptive attack that would be support for an aggression. He suggested that we inform the Israelis that the diversion problem should be taken to the UN where the U.S. would be prepared to lend support on the basis of the principles of the Johnston Plan.

Mr. Talbot hoped the U.S. could stick with this position. The Israelis already seemed to be preparing a case on the internal and external threat to Israel, and comparing their position to that of the U.S. in Southeast Asia.

[Page 338]

The Secretary asked that the reference to an Israeli undertaking not to deploy offensive missiles be eliminated. With the UAR developing missiles, the US could not ask Israel to forego them.

The Secretary said that further action with Israel and the UAR should await Hussein’s reply to our proposed memorandum following his return from Cairo.

The Secretary asked why the whole problem of the Near East arms race could not be given urgent consideration in the disarmament conference in Geneva. He thought the proposals to Jordan and Israel could go forward and still leave us room to undertake such a move.

Mr. Talbot undertook to explore this possibility with Mr. Foster.

  1. Source: Department of State, NEA/IAI Files: Lot 80 D 102, Arms Deals with Israel, Background File. Secret.↩
  2. Evidently a draft of Rusk’s February 19 memorandum, Document 155.↩