Office of the Historian

155. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson1

Washington, February 19, 1965.

SUBJECT

  • Near East Arms

After further consideration of the Jordan Arms request, I see no alternative to improving the package we have offered to King Hussein and agreeing to consider balanced assistance for Israel. For the reasons discussed in the enclosed memorandum,2 this will require coordinated actions in Amman, Tel Aviv, and Cairo. These actions will be necessary to insure that the major policy shift we are making adequately protects all of our interests in the area and minimizes domestic political reactions.

I recommend you approve the following actions:

Jordan

(1)
Agree to sell ground force equipment costing about $42 million, including 100 M–48 tanks to be delivered in 1965 to 1966 rather than 1965 to 1969 as originally authorized.
(2)
Agree to consider selling additional ground force equipment including M–48A3 tanks with the 105 mm gun with deliveries to be made from late 1967 through 1968.
(3)
Cooperate with Jordan in finding suitable supersonic aircraft from Free World sources on the understanding that, if Jordan is unsuccessful, we would then tell the Jordanians we would sympathetically consider selling them 20 F–104s with deliveries starting in 1968 or 1969.
(4)
Reach an understanding with the King that Jordan will not station tanks on the West Bank.

Israel

(1)
Inform Israel that if there should develop any disproportionate buildup of arms on the Arab side, we will consider making selective, [Page 341] direct sales on credit terms, provided Israel had exhausted all other sources of supply.
(2)
In return, we would expect Israel:
(a)
to support quietly our Jordan program and to assist in abating opposition to our aid to other Arabs and
(b)
not to undertake preemptive action against Arab diversion works, but, rather, take this problem to the United Nations where the United States would be prepared to support the principles of the Johnston Plan.
(3)
Before making any sales, we would wish Israel to accept full IAEA safeguards on all their nuclear facilities and to provide assurances they would not develop a nuclear weapons capability.
(4)
Agree to review with Israel dangers posed by Arab diversion plans.

The U.A.R.

To attempt to prevent severe Arab reactions, apprise Nasser by a letter from you, of the reasons leading to our decisions to sell arms to Jordan and to consider direct sale of arms to Israel (draft enclosure 2).3

Domestic Pressures

Assuming Israel’s acquiescence in sales to Jordan, give confidential briefings to selected American Jewish leaders and members of Congress.

George W. Ball 4
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Harriman Israeli Mission (II). Secret. The memorandum bears no drafting information. It was sent to the President with a covering memorandum of February 19 from Bundy noting that a meeting was scheduled for 6:15 p.m. that day. The President met with Ball, Bundy, and Komer between 6:45 and 7:39 p.m. on February 19. (Ibid., President’s Daily Diary) No record of the meeting has been found. Bundy attached a February 19 memorandum from Komer and stated that he shared Komer’s view that the Department of State proposal was “a little heavy on the Jordan side and light on the Israeli’s.”↩
  2. The attachment entitled “Recommendations on Near East Arms,” unsigned and undated, is not printed.↩
  3. The draft letter is not attached. A handwritten note by Komer states that the draft was detached for redrafting.↩
  4. Ball signed for the Secretary above Rusk’s typed signature.↩