Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

151. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic¹

Washington, February 16, 1965, 12:27 p.m.

4855. Our immediate problem is to drive home to UARG fact that modification of Michel amendment² is no open sesame to new PL–480 agreements. Increments under existing agreement are out of question in any event and negotiations for new agreement would be unacceptable to Congress and US public as US–UAR relations now stand. Trust Embassy will lose no opportunity to impress these realities on UARG with specific reference to following points:

1. As state with important interests in Near East and major responsibility for defense of free world, US determined bring its power to bear for stability and progress that area: a) by opposing aggression; b) by cooperating in area development.

2. This policy is area-wide. USG is party to no intra-area disputes, seeks with every like-minded state friendly bilateral relationship tailored to specific needs, whether for trade, aid, military backing, or PL–480.

3. Title 1 program in Egypt is not designed to buy off UAR. We recognize sovereign right to differ. However, growing body of American opinion feels UARG has gone beyond protection its own interests into area of unwarranted pressure on US interests in Near East and Africa. Only major Administration effort turned back Congressional initiative to terminate PL–480 sales to UAR.

4. In defending his need for flexibility in conduct of foreign policy, President also gave recognition to need for improvement in psychological climate of US–UAR relationship if economic cooperation is to resume. He is counting on UARG to meet its share of responsibility by according more attention to US interests in the several issues that divide us.

5. Administration could not justify to Congress or public continuation of aid to states supplying bloc arms to Congo insurgents. Since US and UAR both support Congolese unity and independence, they should be able to dispose very quickly of this obstacle to their cooperation by working for constructive cooperation between OAU and GDRC for a realistic solution.

6. Continuing drain on Egyptian resources to support expeditionary force in Yemen also makes US aid to Egypt hard to justify. While USG is not party to Yemen negotiations, it will continue support earliest possible reduction of Egyptian presence for common good of US and UAR.

7. Washington regrets hostile statements from Arab capitals about Israel, is somewhat heartened by indications of UAR success in channeling Arab hostility into defensive rather than offensive posture. UARG has intimated best hope of peaceful Arab-Israel accommodation lies in consolidation of US–UAR relations. Equally true that Arab-Israel hostilities could destroy all that US–UAR cooperation has achieved or could be expected to achieve in this decade.

8. Also germane to above discussion is Deptel 4760.³

FYI: No decision yet taken here whether to recommend to President it in national interest to proceed issuance PA’s for remaining $37 million.

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID (US) 15 UAR. Confidential. Drafted by Jones; cleared by Davies, Jernegan, Curtis C. Strong of the Congo Working Group, Komer, and Macomber; and approved by Talbot. Repeated to Beirut.
2. See Document 127.
3. Telegram 4760 to Cairo, February 11, stated that before any new purchase authority could be issued under the existing P.L. 480 agreement with the UAR, the UAR must first meet its normal marketing and other commitments and that the issuance of the purchase authority must then be cleared at a high level as being in the national interest. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID (US) 15 UAR)