134. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State1
776. From Talbot. Reference Deptels 793 and 795.2 In view indications in reftels that my instructions for talks with King Hussein may be under fresh review, I have focussed on Jordan arms question in morning discussion here today with Ambassadors Barbour, Barnes, Battle, Cottam, Hart, Knight, Meyer and Strong. Solbert and Bunte also present.
Views expressed by all Ambassadors reflected sober concern that protection and promotion of U.S. interests in Near East becoming increasingly difficult as Arab-Israel conflict moves toward what some of them believe could be early climactic stage. All agreed that Jordan arms question can be approached effectively only in context of current Arab drive for unified political and military actions, symptoms of which are tensions over diversions of Jordan waters, Palestine refugee emotions, incidents on Israeli borders with Syria and Jordan, publicity on German-Israeli arms arrangements, etc.
Each Ambassador present expressed belief our interests in Near East best served by proceeding with Jordan arms offer. Differences centered on such questions as speed with which transaction should be [Page 299] concluded, inclusion of U.S. supersonics in offer, and open sales policy to Israel and other countries in region.
Hart, Strong, and Battle urged we should play for time in hope other and more moderating influences could be brought to bear on situation. Meyer also felt this a possible course. Hart argued arms race will continue whether or not we block entry of Soviet arms into Jordan and we might as well stay in the picture because when Arabs and Israelis fight, we will in any case have to move in to stop them. He thought if we sold F–5s to Saudi Arabia, this would encourage Jordan to look at F–5s instead of F–104s and thus slightly reduce sensitivity of supersonic issue. Barnes agreed.
Strong was persuaded we could not look with equanimity on early clash between Arabs and Israelis. Impossible to see consequences of such a clash, he pointed out; our remaining friends in Arab world might well be undermined or destroyed in process. He urged that as monarchs are strong force for moderation, we should keep trying to bolster them. He saw other key in area as Nasser and UAR with whom he saw no alternative in interests of peace to trying to get back into a better relationship. If rapprochement with Nasser should fail, he felt, Near East bound to go into more difficult crises. If Nasser is interested in moving toward rapprochement with U.S. he may not wish press for early conclusion on supersonics for Jordan. Strong concluded we should play out our hand with Hussein by being forthcoming on ground equipment but difficult on question of supersonic aircraft. He would not like to see U.S. aircraft involved in deal because that would open up U.S. arsenals to Israelis who now have twice used air attacks against Arabs and may see air action as most economical and useful military instrument in future.
Ambassador Battle, agreeing we should offer arms to Jordan to block Arab standardization on Soviet equipment, urged that we try to delay Hussein trip to Cairo, now tentatively scheduled for next week, until he was persuaded to make careful investigation of Western European sources of supersonic aircraft. Without much optimism, Battle hoped we could avoid a crunch with Jordan until several of our political Congressional difficulties with the UAR have become more manageable. In the end he would offer U.S. aircraft to Hussein to preempt Soviet-UAR entry there.
Ambassador Meyer suggested that in view of difficulties of maintaining arms sales restraint in face of easy accessibility to other arms sources by both sides, we should permit military sales to any purchaser. He has found the Arabs talking much as they did in the 1950’s and has seen emotions and unrealism building up to dangerous levels. Therefore he questioned whether we need exhaust ourselves in efforts to postpone a confrontation. Perhaps an early bloodletting would not [Page 300] be too bad an alternative, especially as a clash several years hence could easily involve larger forces and more sophisticated equipment. In any case conflict now hopefully limited could precipitate on intervention to deal with root problem of Jordan waters which has taken Palestine issue out of icebox. To him the alternative would be to continue playing for time, mainly in the hope that Arab unity would break up once again.
Ambassador Barbour agreed that the policy of general arms restraint makes little sense now because of relatively easy availability of arms elsewhere and breaches already made. He also doubted that “even-handedness” can be considered a viable policy, in part because we never had been as close to Arab states as to Israel and in part because he felt chances of maintaining peace might be improved by making certain all parties knew U.S. would not permit Arab attacks on Israel. On assumption Arabs would depend on Soviet backing in any military adventure, he believed Arab aggression would collapse if, as seemed most likely, Soviets should demonstrate they would not face confrontation with U.S. in Near East. As a tactic to meet the immediate situation, he would provide U.S. arms including supersonics as a fallback to Jordan on the basis of also making open arms sales including aircraft to Israel. Barbour also was inclined to believe that Foreign Minister Meir’s reaction to the Jordan arms proposal, although firm and serious, reflected less concern over this aspect than she had shown about Syrian and Lebanese programs to divert the headwaters of the Jordan. However, in view Harman’s immediate approach to USG it appears GOI position has hardened following subsequent talks with Eshkol.
Ambassador Cottam believed that offering arms including supersonics to Jordan at present time represented an essential step up protection of our interests in Near East, but to make our relations with Arab states satisfactory we would need to go beyond this. We should find better ways to take account of and adjust to modernization and doctrines of liberation, unity, and socialism, fueled by anti-Zionism and anti-imperialism.
Ambassadors Knight and Barnes questioned whether we still have latitude in area necessary to pursue tactics suggested by some of their colleagues. Ambassador Knight felt with passage of time we had lost several options open to us two or three years ago and our major failure in these years of relative quiet had been our inability to persuade Israel to give up its hard line “fortress Israel” concept and to seek accommodation with the eastern Arabs. He estimated that we have now moved so far to final confrontation between the Arabs and Israelis that “even-handedness” policies are probably no longer useful. He thought we might better restrain the forces leading toward an explosion [Page 301] by a policy of open military sales to all parties and of making fully clear where U.S. stands in case of conflict. While unfortunate, he thought we should deal with situation as it is shaping up and not as we would have preferred it. On Jordan, he felt strongly that we should go the whole way to save Hussein from going the Soviet arms route and to keep on our side only truly friendly state in area that adjoins Israel.
In his opinion, we should bend over backwards to meet the problems caused by the provision of supersonic aircraft to Jordan because he is convinced our offer will get nowhere without supersonics.
Ambassador Barnes expressed view that U.S. arms package as currently constituted could not meet King Hussein’s needs. On question of likelihood of Hussein and UAC accepting Western European supersonics for Jordan, Barnes believes Hussein not favorably inclined toward Mirages. Barnes further believes Western European supersonics will not in eyes of UAC match MIGs or F–104s both in terms of performance and his present understanding of French financial terms. There are some rumors in Beirut of a possible Saudi-Lebanese-Jordanian joint purchase of Mirages on very favorable terms. Barnes feels this would cause Hussein to look somewhat more favorably on Western European aircraft. Hart believes it would reduce USG influence in Saudi Arabia.
Barnes reported that Hussein is scheduled to go to Cairo next week, probably about February 10, for talks with Nasser and the UAC. Barnes estimated that without promise of U.S. supersonics Hussein cannot sell the U.S. package in Cairo, and will not resist anticipated UAC decision that he should therefore accept the proffered MIGs. Difficulty arises over fact Hussein considers he committed himself last September to accept MIGs if he could not get U.S. supersonics. In the judgment of Barnes, should Hussein try to resist a UAC decision that he take MIGs, he could probably not stand 48 hours against a new UAR-UAC campaign labeling him still a tool of imperialism who was blocking Arab plans.
Ambassador Hart asked that it not be construed that the U.S. has lost all its important assets in the Arab world. Saudi Arabia, for example, has not been deeply inoculated with anti-Westernism. While ready to pay for Arab rearmament against Israel, Faisal is much more concerned over the intrusion into the peninsula of Soviet influence, Arab socialism, and the Egyptian military presence. He will himself avoid Soviet weaponry. An additional reason to play for time lies in Faisal’s future utility as a moderating influence.
The above comments which reflect the diversity of views of our Ambassadors were made after I had laid out in detail our recent agonizing policy appraisals in Washington. I had described our efforts to balance the risks of Soviet-UAR military presence in Jordan against those of arms oscillation fueled by American sales to Israel as well as [Page 302] to several Arab countries, and had discussed the possible consequences of polarization between Soviet-Arab forces on one side and Israel and the U.S. on the other.
I had also pointed out as clearly as possible the overlapping foreign policy and domestic political concerns which had been taken into account in the President’s instructions to me.
Comment follows.3
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN. Secret; Limdis. Passed to the White House.↩
- Telegram 793 to Beirut, February 4, stated that unforeseen developments might require Talbot to postpone his departure for Amman. (Ibid., ORG 7 NEA) Talbot was in Beirut attending the Chiefs of Mission Conference. Telegram 795 to Beirut, February 4, informed Talbot that Harman had requested a meeting with Ball the next morning to deliver a message from Eshkol to Johnson and conveyed a summary of Eshkol’s message as given to Jernegan on the telephone by Harman. (Ibid., DEF 12–5 JORDAN)↩
- Talbot commented in telegram 777 of February 5 that the assembled Ambassadors all felt Hussein was “on extremely difficult spot with other Arabs” and might well capitulate to the United Arab Command after hearing that the United States was unwilling to furnish U.S. supersonic planes. (Ibid.)↩