130. Summary Notes of the 544th Meeting of the National Security Council1
Vietnam—Arms Sales to Jordan
[Here follows a brief discussion of Vietnam.]
Under Secretary Ball: Reviewed the problem of military assistance to Jordan. The Arab States are jointly trying to purchase arms abroad. Kuwait is funding the purchases. The United Arab Command has set force goals for Jordan. These include M–48 tanks and supersonic aircraft. Jordan, as a member of the Arab club, must purchase additional equipment somewhere—if not from us, then from the USSR. The supersonic jets Jordan wants to buy are not defensive weapons—therefore it is difficult for us to provide them.
There is no good solution to this problem and there are disadvantages from every course of action. If we say no to the supersonics, Jordan will ask Soviet aid. If we say yes, Israel will demand supersonics. Thus, no matter what we do, we will be contributing to the arms race in the Middle East which we have been trying to damp down. If necessary and as a last resort, we will have to give the supersonics, but we should first try to get Jordan to buy them from a European supplier. The decision in the Jordan case is a major one involving all the Middle East.
Acting Defense Secretary Vance: The Jordan request is indeed thorny. The Jordanians ask for M–48A3 tanks because the Israelis are getting them. They ask for F–104Gs, an up-to-date jet, rather than the F–104C or the F–104D which are antiquated planes.
General Wheeler: The United Arab Command already has superjets. If we add 20 supersonic planes to the Jordan force, the Arab-Israeli balance will not be upset. Libya and Saudi Arabia already have supersonics. The addition of these planes to the Jordanian force is not of great importance.
CIA Director McCone: Jordan will get supersonics either from us, from the Europeans or from the Soviets. The price of our not supplying them is too high to pay.
[Page 289]McGeorge Bundy: Either way the request is dealt with will end up being disagreeable for us. We should avoid giving Jordan supersonics if possible because the resulting Israeli pressure on us will be very great. However, we must make some arms deal with Jordan and do so before they decide to go to the Russians. We could agree not to give them supersonics now but review the decision again if they insist.
Assistant Secretary Talbot: Our reply to Jordanian King Hussein has already been delayed. I will be leaving Wednesday from Washington and be talking with Hussein in Amman on Saturday.
McGeorge Bundy: We have already informed Israel of the Jordanian request and we will discuss with them the decision we reach.
Secretary Dillon: We should not feel badly about an arms race in the Middle East because it is going on and we cannot control it.
Acting Secretary Ball: Secretary Rusk shares all our concerns about this request but he believes we should play out the negotiations until it is certain there is no alternative and then decide to give the supersonics. Assistant Secretary Talbot should press as hard as possible for some other solution but at the end of the road, he should refer back to Washington and at that time we would decide to go ahead.
If we agreed to give the supersonics, deliveries could be scheduled for 1968–1970. The planes would thus be under our control for a period. The Jordanians would be dependent on us for replacements and spares.
If the Jordanians do go to the Soviets and obtain supersonics, then the Israelis will be surrounded by countries having Soviet-supplied aircraft. The addition of a Soviet presence in Jordan would be serious, especially during difficulties which may arise from the diversion by Jordan of water flowing to Israel.
Acting Secretary Vance: Secretary McNamara’s view is that we should provide A–3 planes, 20 supersonics—104C and 104D—if the Jordanians cannot buy their planes in Western Europe.
The President: There is no problem in providing Jordan with the tanks they request. They should be told to buy their supersonic planes in Europe. If they do not wish to do so, then Mr. Talbot should cable us to this effect and await our reply. He should stay in Amman if it appears that the King is about to break off negotiations with us.
Acting Secretary Ball: The King can’t resist the domestic pressure he is getting. There have been attempts on his life. Recently he moved toward closer relations with the Arab states in order to gain personal security and security for his country. He could not break with Nasser even if he wanted to. If he does not break with us, how can he get the armaments the other Arab states are demanding he obtain?
[Page 290]Mr. Feldman: Jordan gets budgetary support of $46,000,000 annually from the United States. The purchase of arms by Jordan is considered a grant in aid by some people. This is not so but many will see our sale of arms to Jordan as giving a belligerent neighbor arms to attack Israel.
Every effort should be made to persuade Jordan to buy planes from France. We should also put pressure on Nasser to stop pushing King Hussein so hard. We should threaten to withdraw our budgetary support of Jordan. This would have the effect of raising the cost of the planes to Jordan. No decision should be made until we have carried out these proposed actions.
Robert Komer: We should try out the hard line on Hussein, not mentioning the supersonic planes in the beginning. Then if he insists, we should fall back and regroup, thus giving us more time before a final decision has to be made. King Hussein is not going to jump the reservation at once. In trying to save Hussein we may kill him. If we sell the planes to Hussein, then we will have to provide them to Israel. If this happens, Nasser could say that Hussein was a bad Arab. We should take this in two bites and only sell the planes if the Soviets make a firm offer to do so.
McGeorge Bundy: If we warn Hussein that U.S. budgetary support may be in doubt if he makes a deal with the Russians, the King would not be in a great hurry to make a Soviet deal.
Acting Secretary Ball: It is not necessary to reach a final decision tonight. When Assistant Secretary Talbot reports back on his talk with King Hussein, we will know much more and can then decide what to do.
General Wheeler: It is not likely that France would sell Mirages to the Jordanians.
McGeorge Bundy: We could try to overcome French opposition to a sale to Jordan.
Vice President Humphrey: In the light of developments in the Congo and in Egypt, if Jordan breaks with us, there may be a very serious reaction on the Hill. The AID bill would be seriously affected. King Hussein is on the U.S. dole. If we sell him supersonic planes, we will have all hell to pay. The sale of modern tanks we could possibly get away with but the sale of supersonics would create an impossible situation.
The President: We all agree that Jordan will get the planes from the Russians if they do not get them from us.
USIA Director Rowan: Either way we move we face serious difficulties. In a showdown and as a last resort, we will have to go ahead with the sale of supersonics.
[Page 291]The President: Mr. Talbot, before the MIGs arrive in Jordan, please call us.
(A State Department paper discussing the Jordan arms request is attached.)2
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Security Council Meetings File, Vol. 3, Tab 26. Top Secret/Sensitive; For the President Only. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting took place from 6:27 to 7:30 p.m., and a total of 24 people were present. (Ibid.) A memorandum for the record by McCone is in the Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80–B01285A, DCI (McCone) Files, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 February–30 April 1965.↩
- Document 129.↩