Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

129. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson¹

Washington, February 1, 1965.

SUBJECT

• Jordan Arms Request—Impact on Near East Policy

THE ISSUES

Pressures, applied through the Unified Arab Command (UAC), for an arms buildup in Jordan as part of a larger Arab effort to attain military parity with Israel pose potential threats to very important American interests. At issue are:

1) How to meet King Hussein’s arms requests, levied by the UAC, without abandoning our traditional policy of restraint on arms sales in the Near East, which has so far served us well by preventing a polarization of the Arab-Israel dispute along Cold War lines; and

2) How to obtain Israel’s acquiescence in the sale of U.S. arms to Jordan.

The enclosed paper sets forth The Problem, as we see it, proposes A Strategy For The Years Ahead, discusses The Situation in some detail, describes The Stakes at issue, sets out pertinent Policy Considerations and makes Recommendations.

George W. Ball

²

Enclosure

The Problem

During 1964 we have been trying to maintain an even keel in our Near East relations in the backwash of Arab reaction to Israel’s completion of its Jordan River diversion project. The Arabs have equated the diversion with the establishment of the State of Israel in Arab territory and Nasser has used their emotional reaction to forge a solidarity, the duration of which will be central to our problems in the area in the years ahead. How the West meets the force of Arab Nationalist solidarity can be a factor in whether it is consolidated or diffused. How the United States meets its challenges will in part determine whether the trend will be to a polarization that would identify us wholly with Israel and unite the Arabs in alliance with the Soviets and Chicoms against us.

A Strategy for the Years Ahead

We need to engage in a series of complex operations to reduce the threat to our major interests and avert the danger of polarization in the area by:

(a) Using our diplomatic, political, economic and military power to maintain the best possible bilateral relations with all area states and to avoid a confrontation with “radical” Arab states so long as they avoid damaging our major interests.

(b) Encouraging social, economic and political reform and affording an alternative to Soviet economic support and military supply using, where necessary, highly selective military sales, to prevent a Soviet monopoly on arms supply to the Arabs.

(c) Persuading the Israelis that controlled Western sales to the Arabs, though painful for Israel to watch, will enhance the prospects of peace in the area.

(d) Renewing endeavors in the United Nations and directly with the parties to the dispute over Palestine to develop a trend toward eventual acceptance of Israel as a Near Eastern state.

Detailed recommendations appear below.

The Situation

(a) Having sensibly eschewed war as an immediate riposte to the Israeli water works, the Arab states have for the time being come together to sponsor and finance (1) Arab diversion works in Syria and prospectively in Lebanon and Jordan to deny to Israel much of the flow from the sources of the Jordan River; (2) a Unified Arab Command, ostensibly to protect Arab soil from Israeli aggression (preemptive or punitive attacks) against Arab water works; (3) the Palestine Liberation Organization, to stir up Palestine refugee pressure to return to old homesteads now in Israel; and (4) unified Arab diplomatic and economic pressures against Israel, including the boycott of foreign firms doing business with Israel.

(b) The united Arab front against Israel has so far survived for 12 months and shows signs of continuing, because of fear of Israel and because currently high—and still growing—oil revenues permit relatively easy financing of Arab schemes mainly by such states as Kuwait (which sees such payments as a way of buying into the club of independent Arab states), Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Libya, etc. How long this pattern of united action will remain dominant is a central question. Already there are signs that the usual divisions may re-emerge. Kuwait and some others have given indications of tiring of the heavy assessments, and some inter-Arab disputes (as in the Yemen) have reintensified.

(c) All our estimates continue to show Israel as maintaining its military superiority over the Arab states for the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, the arms race goes on. Israel is increasing its conventional weaponry, probably is getting French SSM’s, and may be exploring nuclears. The U.A.R. is obtaining more and better Soviet conventional equipment and is experimenting (not so far very successfully) with home-made missiles. Iraq and Syria are getting Soviet-made conventional arms. Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and particularly Jordan are requesting new U.S. weaponry, including supersonic fighters, to be paid for in the latter cases by UAC funds.

(d) Israel’s security anxieties are increasing rapidly because of the threats inherent in a united Arab front, the growing military strength of Arab countries, Arab diversion works which in time could cut off important water supplies to Israel, and more activist postures by Syria and Jordan along Israel’s borders and by political organizers among the Arab refugees. Israel has grown increasingly firm and even provocative in border patrolling, and the number of military incidents along its borders is rising. Responsible Israelis do not now rule out the possibility of preemptive or punitive strike against Arab targets.

(e) The Soviet Union, apparently envisaging new opportunities in the strongly anti-Israeli stance of all Arabs and anti-“imperialist” stance of some Arabs, and possibly goaded by Chicom rivalry, is stepping up its activities in the Arab world. In the past year the U.A.R. has obtained new military hardware and a new pledge of $280 million economic loans from the Soviet Union, promise of a $60 million loan from Communist China, and a $100 million loan from Kuwait. In contrast, the U.S. has offered no military assistance, made no economic development loan since 1963, maintained a small ($2.3 million) technical assistance program, and remained committed to the third and final year of a 1962 PL–480 agreement.

(f) The U.A.R. is involved not only with other Arab states vis-a-vis Israel, but also directly in the Congo problem and certain other “liberation movement” situations. In most if not all of these, our objectives are in conflict. In other situations, however (e.g., the Chase Manhattan boycott, certain issues in the non-aligned conference, etc.), U.A.R. efforts have helped us against other radical states.

(g) By cutting off PL–480 commodities from the U.A.R., the U.S. could hurt Nasser but probably not topple him (and, in any case, no visible prospective successor looks better). It would also set in train an Aswan-like reaction by Nasser leading to such punitive actions as cancellation of our MATs and commercial airline rights, inspection of vessels transiting the Suez for radioactive hazards, stepped-up pressure against the Wheelus base agreement, removal of UNEF from Egyptian soil with the consequent threat to the Israeli port of Eilath and of a direct Israeli-U.A.R. military confrontation, further stirring up of other Arab states against Israel, etc.

(h) Many of our friends and most of our opponents would like to force the U.S. into actions that would tend to polarize the Near East. So would some Americans.

The Stakes

Our major interests in the Near East are:

(a) The maintenance of peace, to preserve the freedom and integrity of Israel and the other states in the region. (cf: JFK statement 5/8/63)

(b) Ready access to and transit through the area by air, sea or land.

(c) Continued availability of oil and its economic movement to Europe.

(d) Denial of any part of the area to Communist-state control.

(e) Economic growth and political stabilization to increase the prospects of independence and stability.

The defense of these major interests (particularly the first four) is our central concern.

Policy Considerations

I believe the following are pertinent:

(a) Over the past years, none of our major interests have been damaged. We have dealt with lesser problems within the framework of our flexible bilateral relations with all states in the area. We must continue this.

(b) We cannot permit any state to challenge a basic interest without opposing it vigorously. If we cannot with dignity avoid a confrontation with the U.A.R., it has the power in the area to attack our special positions and to mobilize most if not all other Arabs into an anti-Israel front, thus effecting polarization since the Soviets would exploit the opportunity to give all-out support to the Arabs against Israel, “the beachhead of western imperialism in the Arab East.” Saudi Arabia might be in a position to maintain useful relations with us, but Jordan probably would have to follow the Arab Nationalist line or the regime would succumb to internal and external pressures that could be mounted from Cairo.

(c) Assuming, however, that we can maintain tolerable relations with Cairo, there is the possibility of continuing the strengthening of the regimes and capabilities of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon. In addition, we could and should continue to compete with the Soviets in the U.A.R., Syria, and Iraq by offering alternatives to full dependence on the Soviets. This would involve continued “Food for Peace” programs and a willingness, in the case of Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia, to sell military equipment up to the minimum levels being insisted upon and financed by the UAC.

(d) Although Israel may in fact understand that U.S. military deliveries to Arab states participating in the UAC buildup is the least disadvantageous of alternatives at hand, vigorous high-level efforts will be required to persuade Israel’s friends in this country that such a course (1) gives us a restraining hand on the amounts and types of equipment made available to these states; (2) prevents the introduction of Soviet equipment and Soviet or Syrian/Egyptian/Iraq trainers and technicians along the long frontier with Jordan; (3) loosens the “radical” Arabs’ otherwise total grip on the UAC, thus strengthening and speeding the prospects of a splintering of the support for the UAC.

Continuing strong high-level efforts will be required to resist pressures for compensating U.S. sales to Israel which would polarize the Near East to both Israel’s and our disadvantage.

Recommendations

A. That we actively and aggressively seek to resolve policy differences with the U.A.R. while carrying forward on our present PL–480 commitments and holding out the carrot of a new agreement for a further period. Should we be able to arrive at an acceptable political compromise on the Congo, limited economic development lending would be considered.

B. That we proceed to discussions of the Jordanian military shopping list along the general lines of a 5-year, $55 million ground equipment program and a major effort to persuade Hussain to purchase the supersonic aircraft he insists he needs from some Western European supplier—with the fallback that we will consider the sale and delivery of one squadron of U.S. planes as early as 1968 (after pilot training and construction of airfield for jets) as a last resort to prevent his taking MIGs.

C. That we inform Israel of the move we intend to make and seek to abort its strong adverse reaction with the argumentation developed above.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. I. Secret. The memorandum bears no drafting information, but another copy indicates that the covering memorandum was drafted by Killgore and the enclosure by Talbot and Davies on January 22. Attached to the copy is a January 22 memorandum from Talbot to Rusk forwarding the memorandum for his signature and a February 1 memorandum from Blaine Tueller of S/S-S to Rusk’s Staff Assistant Edward J. Streator stating that Ball had signed the memorandum and that Ball had talked to Rusk and had been to the White House to discuss the problem earlier that day. (National Archives and Records Administration,RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN)
2. Ball signed for Rusk above Rusk’s typed signature.