Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

126. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, January 25, 1965.

SUBJECT

• Jordan Arms Request

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• U—Mr. Ball
• M—Governor Harriman
• NEA—Mr. Talbot
• NE—Rodger P. Davies

The Secretary asked whether we could not arrange a tacit guarantee of Jordan’s security in lieu of selling it arms. The U.S. could say simply that it would not permit Jordan to be overrun by Israel.

Mr. Talbot said the Arabs held that they would not attack Israel, but would react when Israel struck at the Arab diversion project. Jordan held it was part of a defensive arrangement with the other Arab states. Mr. Ball noted that circumstances pushed Hussein to cooperation with the UAC. His internal situation would be seriously endangered if he didn’t go along with the other Arabs. In addition, Jordan’s defensive position, like Israel’s, was “thin,” given the proximity of each other’s forces.

Mr. Talbot doubted Jordan could be diverted from acquisition of additional arms. It sought, however, maximum freedom of action from the UAC by acquiring arms from the West.

The Secretary said the U.S. had demonstrated its interest in Jordan’s independence through President Kennedy’s statement of May 8, 1963.² He thought Hussein knows his real enemy is Egypt, not Israel. By deeper involvement in the UAC, the U.A.R. threat to Jordan was enhanced. Hussein faced a bleak future of growing Egyptian influence to his country and of certainty that Jordan would take the brunt of any military engagement with Israel.

Mr. Ball said Hussein could not draw back without excluding himself “from the Club.” Mr. Talbot agreed that this was the heart of the problem. Hussein, however, sought to retain membership while keeping his powder dry. He wanted to avoid closer military ties with Egypt which runs the UAC show, but psychic factors prevented him from disassociating himself from Arab solidarity.

To the Secretary’s question as to Saudi participation in the UAC and whether Kuwait wouldn’t tire of making UAC contributions, Mr. Talbot noted that Saudi Arabia was a full participant and major financial contributor and that Kuwait’s $100 million per year increase in income assured continued support. Mr. Ball noted that Libya would soon be in a position to make larger contributions, and that these smaller states felt they must keep on trying to buy their independence.

The Secretary asked whether we couldn’t tell Jordan that we would not object to its acquiring MIGs provided there were no Russians involved in training. To Mr. Talbot’s remark that this then would entail UAR trainers, the Secretary noted that the Jordanians could be trained abroad on the MIG. Mr. Talbot said that a preemptive U.S. sale seemed desirable if Soviet arms supply threatened. Had we moved to meet Egypt’s arms request in 1954, the Near East today might be quite different. The same was true in Afghanistan in 1955 and India in 1962. It would have served both Israeli and U.S. interests had we provided Egypt arms from the West. Although relations might have been just as bumpy, we would have had some control through Egypt’s need to purchase new equipment and spares. Assuming Hussein did not dare leave the Club, would it serve our interest to limit Jordan to procurement from the West. Mr. Ball said that Israel’s bargaining power would be infinitely multiplied if Jordan and the other Arab states went over to Soviet supply. We would have chosen up sides. Israel could point to the Communist danger in the Arab states to justify arms procurement from the U.S.

Mr. Talbot said we had learned that the Arabs knew full details of Israel’s arrangements to acquire tanks. It was certain that they would insist on Jordan getting what Israel got. Significantly, Jordan’s request for M–48 tanks had escalated to the M–48A3 tank with 105 mm cannon—just what Israel is getting. The Secretary noted that we might suggest that Hussein get his tanks the same way that Israel does. Mr. Talbot said that there were 83 M–48s remaining in Germany and these might make up most of the 100 in our proposed package for Jordan (five-year).

The Secretary said that both Israel and Jordan in acquiring tanks were behind the times. Anti-tank missiles provided a surer defense. Mr. Talbot noted that the Pentagon had disagreed with this thesis when we tried to apply it to Israel. Mr. Ball noted that the diesel engine gave the M–48 sufficient range to make it an offensive rather than a defensive weapon.

Mr. Talbot said that given unpalatable alternatives, we believed that an effort to provide for a reasonably phased modernization of the JAA was the best for us. We would space deliveries of $55 million worth of equipment over the next four years. The minute division among the Arabs split the UAC, we could cut off the pipeline. However, if we forced a confrontation by refusing to sell, Jordan would be forced to a Soviet/UAR basis for her army; if we bought time by the sale there was some chance Arab solidarity might come asunder.

Mr. Ball felt from the Israeli viewpoint, either course would be advantageous. If American equipment went to Jordan, Israel would press for American supply. If Communist equipment went, Israel would press even harder for American supply.

Mr. Talbot said that we anticipated a negative Israeli reaction when they were informed of our decision. To reduce the heat, instructions to Tel Aviv must indicate that the President approved the decision.

The Secretary queried whether more time couldn’t be given to consider alternatives. Mr. Talbot said that this was the fourth time we had been pressed for an answer. However, the President’s illness and the Churchill funeral could permit us to slip the schedule for a week. We had still to get the President’s clearance and to inform the Israelis before we could proceed to informing Hussein.

The Secretary asked whether instead of informing Eshkol, we could not put the alternatives to him and ask his reaction as a loyal friend. Governor Harriman thought we would get a strong reaction with arguments that we should force Hussein to forego arms. We should be guided by our interest in preempting the situation and by the desirability of U.S. control through provision of spares and ammunition. Mr. Ball said that Israel would not object to a Soviet-U.S. polarization of the arms supply situation. Mr. Talbot assented and said that this would advance Israel’s objectives of a U.S. security guarantee and joint military planning.

In the Secretary’s view the two principal questions were: should we buy into both sides of an arms race? Should we buy major items of equipment for the UAC given its objective of developing strength against Israel? He asked whether this was something we could work out with the Soviets. Mr. Talbot replied that he had discussed this possibility with Ambassador Thompson who agreed that the Soviets had nothing to gain from restraint. Arm sales provided the principal entree for Soviet influence into the Near East. Governor Harriman thought there was no harm in trying this out with the Soviets.

Mr. Talbot said that we had learned that the details of Israel’s tank purchase arrangements were known to the press and they could hit headlines within two or three days. Our agreement with Israel was conditioned by a secrecy clause which could be invoked if the matter came to public knowledge. He felt that the strength of Arab reaction could be minimized if we cancelled that part of the arrangement which dealt with retrofit kits. We could then say that we had given approval to the shipment of M–48 tanks from Germany to Israel and apprise the Israelis that we could consider later a direct deal on diesel engines.

Both Governor Harriman and Mr. Ball noted that Prime Minister Eshkol and those accompanying him in June had given categorical assurances that the transaction through the Germans and Italians could be kept secret for two or three years.

Mr. Talbot said that in the event of cancellation, Secretary Vance was extremely worried about our public posture if the Israelis or the Germans leaked the fact that we had agreed to provide retrofit equipment. We could not very well deny the agreement even if we were able to say that we were not fulfilling it.

The Secretary said that he felt the cancellation of our part of the arrangement would leave both the Germans and Italians out on a limb. We had pushed the Germans into the deal and we should stand by it. As a great power we cannot back away from an agreement freely entered into. If the Arabs protested, we could note the large flow of Soviet arms to the area and that no-one publicized Soviet deals with the Arabs. We could also tell them that we would welcome resort to the Geneva Conference to explore ways and means of limiting the flow of armaments to the area. We should accordingly not invoke our cancellation right.

On the problem of Jordan arms, the Secretary decided action would be delayed until he could acquaint the President with the proposal.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN. Secret; Exdis/Tan. Drafted by Davies and approved in U on February 1.
2. Reference is to a statement on U.S. policy in the Near East made by President Kennedy at a press conference on May 8, 1963, in the course of which he declared that the United States supported the security of both Israel and its neighbors. (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, p. 373)