125. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson1
SUBJECT
- Your Meeting with Ambassador Battle—Next Moves with the U.A.R.2
Embassy Cairo indicates that President Nasser will wish to see Ambassador Battle on his return to Cairo. This follows on various indications that the U.A.R. would like to improve relations with us. The Department recommends that you explore the following with the Ambassador and authorize him to convey our views to Nasser as soon as possible after his return to Cairo Sunday.
I. What We Want from the U.A.R. on the Congo
We seek termination of Nasser’s support of dissident groups in the Congo and use of his influence in the Organization of African Unity in support of the Central Congo Government. The U.A.R. has indicated it will not buy a position of unconditional support for Tshombe but shares our objective of seeing a stable, independent Congolese Government emerge from the present chaos. We feel there is room for some bargaining with Nasser on this issue.
II. What We Need in Way of Policy Implements
Nasser faces an acute supply crisis coupled with a shortage of foreign exchange and credit facilities. Termination of PL–480 shipments would aggravate the crisis although Soviet assistance—granted at a price of further political concessions—would enable him to ride it out, we believe. Nasser’s reliance on PL–480 foodgrains is so great that the program poses the threat of unbalancing his economy unless he knows he can count on it. Two years of Congressional criticism coupled with the “running down” of our economic cooperation program have caused suspicion and frustration. What we need to draw the U.A.R. into a more cooperative posture is a “carrot” to hold before it—an assurance of continued support from the “Food-for-Peace” program in the years ahead.
[Page 277]III. The Importance of “Normalizing” U.S.-U.A.R. Relations
Getting back onto even keel with the U.A.R. is important for issues other than the Congo. If we let the situation lead to an open break, Egypt will use Arab solidarity and emotionalism to bring pressures to bear against British and American interests and against Israel. Only the Soviets will benefit from such a situation. We could lose military and civilian air rights (MATS, PanAm, TWA), oil concessions (a billion dollars a year to the U.S. balance of payments), unharassed passage of the Suez Canal, and much of our influence in the Arab world. Friendly regimes in Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, and Saudi Arabia would be subject to intense nationalistic and possibly subversive pressures. Arab Communist parties would operate openly in the area as probable price for Soviet support to the U.A.R. and other Arab states.
None of our major interests in the Near East have been damaged over the past six years. We must ensure that this situation continues.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Cables, Vol. II, 6/64–12/64. Secret. The memorandum bears no drafting information, but another copy indicates that it was drafted by Jones and Davies. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US)↩
- The copy cited in footnote 1 above bears the typed notation: “White House (President) appointment Saturday, 1/25/65” and the handwritten notation: “Cancelled—Pres in hospital.”↩