Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

117. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, December 31, 1964.

SUBJECT

1)

U.S.-UAR Relations; 2) Jordan Arms Request; 3) NE Chiefs of Mission Conference

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• NEA—Mr. Phillips Talbot
• NE—Mr. Rodger Davies

1. U.S.-U.A.R. Relations

Mr. Talbot said the press wanted to know where we were going with the U.A.R. To give direction to the press we first had need for some policy guidance. We needed to decide our reaction to the U.A.R. approach through F.M.C. officials.

The Secretary asked whether a message to Nasser or a reply from Nasser was due. Mr. Talbot replied that we had sent an oral message to Nasser on the Congo.² Since some Arabs, including Nasser, regard an oral message as being sent from a senior to a lesser official, it is problematic whether we get a letter in response to the President’s message. He noted that, meanwhile, Nasser had reactivated a long-unused [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]channel to express his desire to avoid further deterioration in our relations.³

Mr. Talbot asked whether the Embassy and USIS should be authorized to accept the U.A.R. offer of a building for the library.

The Secretary replied that it would be necessary to touch base with the President before an answer could be given on this. The President had been extremely upset by the signing of the purchase agreement for $17 million worth of wheat. In retrospect, the decision to continue all aid on the pipeline should have been checked out with the White House. The Secretary also said that the President is genuinely perturbed over the incivility manifested by Nasser and other radical leaders. He is inclined to consider such deportment unacceptable in international relations.

The Secretary said Nasser’s speech was not the core of our immediate problem; U.A.R. assistance to insurgency in the Congo was. If Nasser continues support of “wars of liberation” in Africa, we are on a collision course. Mr. Talbot said that he thought yesterday’s Security Council resolution on the Congo may provide a platform for a dialogue with the U.A.R.G. on this problem. The Secretary pointed out there were unpalatable elements in the resolution.

The Secretary asked about the merits of adopting a posture of not responding to U.A.R. overtures.

Mr. Talbot said that this was difficult because there were day-to-day decisions that had to be made such as the one involved in meeting a U.A.R.G. request for 250,000 tons of wheat flour under the multi-year PL–480 agreement. Agriculture now thought that no more than 50,000 tons could be justified. We need to send a telegram to the Embassy to acquire additional information. Mr. Talbot recommended that we proceed to get the data and, depending on the course of events, apprise the U.A.R. Ambassador during his call on the Secretary that we would move ahead on this request.

The Secretary agreed that the telegram could go provided the Embassy was in a position to provide the information without approaching U.A.R. officials.

The Secretary said that Senator Hickenlooper had come to see him in great agitation over U.S.-U.A.R. relations. He had become somewhat calmer, however, when the Secretary pointed out that we had not proceeded on the $25 million commodity loan, that we had not met U.A.R. requests for additional aid, and that we were coasting along on past commitments.

The Secretary said the CAB/FAA report on the Mecom aircraft should be surfaced normally through FAA channels. He thought Mr. Talbot should have a responsible officer carry the preliminary conclusions of the investigation to Mr. Mecom, along with FBI information on the background of the plane’s Captain. Mr. Talbot said that Mr. Davies would do so next Tuesday.

The Secretary thought it quite clear that Nasser’s speech attacking Ambassador Battle and the U.S. had been sparked by the version given him of the discussion between Battle and the Minister of Supply on U.A.R. aid requests.⁴

Mr. Talbot noted that this information had been imparted as Nasser was about to make what is characteristically the most emotion-laden speech of the year.

The Secretary repeated that the Congo rather than the speech represented the core of our problem. He thought it likely that the Sudanese could be brought to cut off transit of arms to the rebels. That would make it easier for the U.A.R. to back away.

Mr. Talbot said in briefing the press he planned to emphasize that while we could not have close relations with the U.A.R. given some basic differences, our national interests require reasonably good working relations.

The Secretary said he thought that we should point out that it is in our interest that we maintain correct relations as well as a modest presence and influence. Without these we will have no capability of seeking to moderate U.A.R. policy. He thought we should not emphasize our vulnerabilities to U.A.R. pressures since that might give Nasser an exaggerated idea of his capabilities. The Secretary thought it would be useful to let the press know that there are people in the U.A.R. and Arab world who are extremely concerned about relations between the U.S. and U.A.R.

2. Jordan Arms Requests

Mr. Talbot raised King Hussein’s eagerness to get American supersonics to fill his commitment to the Unified Arab Command. The Pentagon wanted to supply American aircraft, specifically the F–104’s. The Department felt that provision of American aircraft to Jordan would bring about the crumbling of our policy of arms restraint, particularly as regards Israel.

The Secretary asked if it would not be possible for Jordan to get aircraft from France. Mr. Talbot replied we were pushing this but the French aircraft were twice as expensive as American aircraft.

In response to the Secretary’s question whether we had filled the Israelis in on this problem, Mr. Talbot said that we were unable to do this until we had our internal lines straightened out. Some Israelis would fear MIG’s in Jordan. Some would prefer American to Soviet planes and might be willing to agree not to press for comparable treatment for Israel. Some others, however, would consider provision of U.S. aircraft as opportunity to press for U.S. supply of arms to Israel. We were making efforts to dissuade the Jordanians from the MIG’s and might in the end tell them that we could not accept MIG’s in Jordan. The Secretary asked whether, in fact, we would go that far. Mr. Talbot said that if the Jordanians accepted Soviet equipment the whole nature of our problem would change, prospects for arms control or restraint would be diminished and, possibly, the situation would then force the change in our relations.

The Secretary said that obviously supersonics for Jordan in the Arab-Israel context did not make sense. However, the F5 might provide an acceptable compromise.

Mr. Talbot responded that clearly we might have to negotiate on this, and he contemplated going to Amman in late January for this purpose. The Secretary agreed but again said that it was highly preferable that the Jordanians get their aircraft from either the British or the French.

3. NE Chiefs of Mission Conference

Mr. Talbot raised the possibility of the Secretary spending one day at a Near East Chief of Mission’s Conference while travelling to or from the CENTO Conference. The Secretary said that he would if it could be worked out. His preference for locale was Beirut.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Davies.
2. Reference is to an oral message from Johnson to Nasser transmitted in telegrams 3429 and 3443 to Cairo, December 12 and 13. The message declared that U.S. policy was to support an independent unified Congo and assist in its development, and it urged against support of the rebel movement in the Congo, which would provide the Soviet Union and China with opportunities to extend their influence in Africa. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence,UAR, Nasser Correspondence, Vol. I) Ambassador Battle presented the message at his first meeting with Nasser on December 19, reported in telegram 2129 from Cairo, December 19. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 UAR)
3. A December 28 memorandum from Jernegan to Rusk reported several UAR feelers seeking improved relations. (Ibid., POL UAR-US)
4. A December 24 memorandum from Talbot to Rusk commenting on Nasser’s Port Said speech reported the UAR version of Battle’s December 22 meeting with Deputy Prime Minister for Supply Stino. (Ibid.) Battle reported the meeting in telegram 2162 from Cairo, December 23. (Ibid., POL 31–1 UAR-US)