Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

116. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel¹

Washington, December 24, 1964, 12:29 p.m.

536. Israel-Syria. Even though SC consideration November 13 incident² was technically without issue Dept believes debate, behind-scenes negotiations and votes indicate abundantly broad SC consensus on major steps necessary to prevent recurrence such incidents. Without attempting set out guidelines for resolution specific issues behind Nov. 13 clash (UNTSO must continue exercise primary responsibility for this) Dept wishes convey to GOI and SARG its recognition this consensus exists, has force and merits Israel’s and Syria’s respect.

For Tel Aviv. You should make following points to Acting Foreign Minister:

1. Although SC decision technically nullified by Soviet veto, believe resolution as amended constituted expression of majority opinion which should not be ignored. Comment by Israeli Foreign Minister after SC vote on Almagor incident September 4, 1963,³ equally appropriate this instance: “Technical veto cannot detract in slightest from moral and political significance of stand formulated in Security Council.”

2. Differences between majority and minority in SC had essentially to do with SC’s interpretation of events November 13. On question of what should be done to prevent such incidents in future there was consensus that demarcation in disputed areas and participation in MAC meetings by Israel and Syria are necessary.

3. Israel would serve cause peace in area by acting in spirit this limited but very real consensus.

4. We think Israel should continue to exercise same restraint in response in UNTSO request it has exercised during last three weeks in Tel al-Qadi area both there and elsewhere along ADL. Specifically we would hope Israel would not resume patrolling in disputed Tel al-Qadi area but rather attempt again by working with UNTSO to remove causes of conflict in area or at least agree to such measures as UNTSO might suggest that would minimize danger of escalation such as occurred November 13.

5. We exerted considerable effort to see that unbalanced resolution did not emerge from SC. If controversial Israeli patrolling activities are a proximate cause of further violence in Tel al-Qadi area we would find it very difficult—if SC is again seized of matter—to achieve even limited influence on other members we succeeded in achieving this time.

For Damascus. Appreciate fully our limited influence with SARG but believe expression our views could have some positive effect. You should inform Acting Foreign Minister (a) We deeply regret Sovs vetoed res which contained nothing of harm to Syria and so many elements favorable to its long-term wishes, viz., a strong request “that Israel as well as Syria participate fully in meetings” of MAC. (b) Our conviction that in spite veto SC majority opinion should be respected. (c) Whatever SC differences on interpretation November 13 incident there was limited unanimous agreement MAC should be fully utilized and demarcation Tel al-Qadi area should be matter first priority. (d) We hope Syria will make special effort cooperate with UNTSO to reduce tension in Tel al-Qadi area, specifically as regards efforts to demarcate line.

To possible recriminations that we in service Israel during SC debate you should not fail note Israelis had objected strongly US–UK resolution, but that we tabled it nevertheless because we believed it most important SC throw itself behind measures to prevent recurrence such incidents.

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–SYR. Confidential. Drafted by Heywood H. Stackhouse; cleared by Davies, Buffum, and Sisco; and approved by Jernegan. Also sent to Damascus and repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, USUN, and Jerusalem.
2. On December 21, the Security Council failed to adopt a U.S.-British draft resolution (S/6113) deploring the renewal of military action on the Israel-Syrian Armistice Demarcation Line on November 13 and recommending that both parties cooperate with the Chairman of the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission for the purpose of maintaining peace in the area, that the parties cooperate in the continuation and completion of a survey begun in 1963 according to the recommendations of the UNTSO Chief of Staff, and that both parties participate fully in the meetings of the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission. The resolution received 8 votes in favor and 3 votes against but was rejected because of the Soviet Union’s negative vote.
3. On September 3, 1963, the Security Council failed to adopt a U.S.-British draft resolution (S/5407) concerning an August 19 incident on the Israel-Syrian border, with 8 votes in favor, 2 against, and 1 abstention, the Soviet Union voting in the negative.