71. Memorandum From Robert Ginsburgh of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow)1
Washington, July 23, 1968.
Walt:
Here are Bill Lemnitzer’s answers to the two questions you raised with me yesterday.
The four major conclusions which emerge are:
- —Czech defection would weaken the Warsaw Pact threat to Western Europe—but probably not enough to justify reduction of current NATO forces.
- —Czech neutralization would justify some reduction in NATO force levels—dependent on our confidence that the Czechs would remain neutral in the event of war.
- —Forces for possible intervention in Czechoslovakia could involve 1 U.S. brigade, 2 French divisions, and 2 FRG divisions.
- —Employment of anything more than 1 brigade ought to be accompanied by NATO mobilization, which would require six months to reach planned force levels.
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- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Czechoslovakia, Memos, Vol. 2. Top Secret.↩