173. Airgram From the Embassy in Romania to the Department of State1
SUBJECT
- Where Does Romania Stand Three Months After Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia?
REF
- Bucharest A–4732
Summary
The following review of the Romanian situation is an updated and slightly expanded version of a briefing paper prepared for Mr. James Lowenstein, Consultant to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who visited here on November 28–30. It expresses the view, already set forth in the airgram under reference, that the Romanians are determined to hold to the essentials of national communism.
Introduction
It is clear that the Soviets are trying to take maximum advantage of the invasion of Czechoslovakia in order to consolidate their hold on Eastern Europe including Romania. The Romanians are under indirect pressure resulting from the logic of the situation, namely that the Soviets are willing to use force in Eastern Europe in order to achieve their objectives. They are also under direct pressure in terms of Soviet demands on a number of important substantive issues (in this connection, we would not be at all surprised if the most recent spate of rumors of an imminent invasion of Romania had not been deliberately encouraged by the Soviets in order to frighten the Romanians into making substantive concessions). The new situation in Eastern Europe has had significant effects on the internal scene where the Romanians are looking for increased support from the population. And, of course, it has also affected foreign policy where, to a limited degree, the Romanians are lying low, although otherwise acting in accordance with the precepts of national communism.
Internal Situation
One of the main characteristics of the internal situation is the continuation of the regime’s highly controlled and gradual liberalization [Page 464] despite (one might even say because of) the new situation in Eastern Europe. This can be noted in a number of areas. In internal security affairs, the Secret Police continue to be on a short leash, there have been several rehabilitations of people sentenced in the 1950’s, the emphasis in speeches is on socialist legality, and the latest Grand National Assembly session (November 11–13) passed a new Code of Criminal Procedure which on the face of it is a better guarantee of individual rights than the previous one. In addition, the regime shows every sign of relaxing somewhat its stringent restrictions on travel abroad. In the cultural sphere, although the official line sounds very conservative, in practice the regime seems to be increasingly tolerant of unorthodox art and varying trends in literature. As for the economic sphere, the search for efficiency is no doubt an important factor in the continued quiet work behind the scenes on a limited degree of economic decentralization. Decentralization is also one of the key aspects of the reform of higher education, implemented at the beginning of October, as a result of which the universities and other institutes of higher education will exercise some of the powers previously exercised by the Ministry of Education.
No doubt the regime believes that steady (albeit very limited) progress in the direction of internal relaxation will win it a greater measure of popular support. The search for increased support is also behind the recent measures affecting the minorities. Following an RCP Plenum in October, county and central nationality councils of the Hungarians and the Germans were established. (There are also county, Ukrainian and Serbian councils.) Although their functions have been only vaguely defined in official speeches, this is a gesture of considerable significance. As for the intellectuals, Ceausescu’s recent speeches (at the Universities of Cluj and Iasi) showed his concern for their preoccupations and a significant number of intellectuals have been elected to leading positions in the new Front of Socialist Unity which serves to symbolize and (so the regime hopes) to encourage national unity.
Foreign Affairs
The attempt of the Soviets to consolidate their hold over the socialist camp is taking place in a number of different contexts.
They are trying to “strengthen” or “tighten up” the Warsaw Pact. Although we know very little about the detailed proposals, we have reports of varying reliability that at one time or another the Soviets have demanded integrated military units, more power for the Warsaw Pact Commander-in-Chief, increasing the size of the Romanian Armed Forces, and increasing the standardization of equipment throughout the Warsaw Pact countries. They have also been pressing for Warsaw Pact maneuvers in Romania. The Romanians will probably cooperate to some extent on some of these demands, and Romanian agreement to beefing up or tightening up the Warsaw Pact is in fact a concession since the [Page 465] Romanians would prefer that there not be any pacts at all in Europe and, short of that, that the Warsaw Pact organization be as quiescent as possible. However, we do not anticipate that the Romanians will be willing to give up national control of their Armed Forces to any significant degree. Certainly, this would be inconsistent with Ceausescu’s categorical rejection in his November 29 speech of any renunciation of sovereignty in the Warsaw Pact context (Bucharest 3174).3 Moreover, we gather that in compensation for their willingness to play along on some matters, the Romanians are pressing for a greater Eastern European voice in Warsaw Pact affairs. As far as maneuvers in Romania go, we have it on very good authority that they have agreed in principle to such maneuvers in 1969, but this agreement is subject to a government-to-government agreement specifying the exact duration and location of the exercise and the size of the forces participating therein.
The Soviets and their allies also seem eager once again to try to enhance the authority of CEMA, although here we know even less about their specific proposals. In any event, Romanian opposition to giving CEMA supranational powers was flatly reasserted by Ceausescu in the speech referred to above.
The Soviets have succeeded in obtaining the agreement of many communist parties, including the Romanians, to holding a World Communist Conference in Moscow in May of next year. Romanian agreement to a conference at any specific time is indeed a concession since all along the Romanian argument has been that while a conference is desirable in principle, in practice the conditions are not propitious (this is a reference to the refusal of the Chinese and some other communist parties to have anything to do with it). Perhaps the Romanians felt they could make this concession more readily now that the Italian, Austrian and French CP’s had agreed to hold the meeting. In any event, the real measure of Romanian willingness to be conciliatory on this issue is not so much whether they attend a conference as whether they agree to a binding line which would have an adverse effect on their relations with Peking and other communist parties opposed to Moscow or independent of Moscow and on their relations with the FRG and the West in general. The thrust and tone of Ceausescu’s comments on the world communist movement in his November 29 speech make it very unlikely, in our opinion, that the Romanians would adhere to such a line.
Meanwhile, the pattern of Romanian foreign relations continues much as usual. Although in the immediate aftermath of the invasion of Czechoslovakia the Romanians were perhaps sensitive to the visibility of their ties with West Germany, Israel and the United States, at the present [Page 466] time relations with these three countries are normal and insofar as the United States is concerned they are, if anything, improved. Thus, there is a breakthrough on the issuance of visas for Romanians emigrating to the United States, and the just-signed Cultural and Atomic Energy Agreements and the Agreement with IREX reflect the Romanian desire to expand cultural and scientific relations with us. In addition, negotiations are about to start on a civil air agreement between Romania and the United States. Romanian relations with other countries of the non-communist world are following the usual pattern, and Manescu’s recent trip to Latin America shows that the Romanians are indeed anxious to further expand them. At the same time, Romanians remain neutral in the Sino-Soviet conflict and maintain their cordial relations with Peking.
Conclusion
Romanian national communism has already suffered some setback. This is certainly true to the extent that the Romanians are no longer saying loudly and openly what they really think about Czechoslovakia. It is also true to the extent that the Romanians, as noted above, presumably feel obliged to make some limited concessions of a substantive nature on important bloc issues (e.g. the Warsaw Pact and the World Communist Conference). The Romanian leadership itself, for all Ceausescu’s assertiveness, must be uncertain to what extent it can salvage national communism such as it has developed since the early 1960’s. Presumably, they hope that by trimming their sails for a while they will be able to ride out the storm. At this time, and assuming the Soviets do not bring military pressure to bear, we believe that the Romanians will hold on to the fundamentals of independence not only because freedom from control by Moscow is essential doctrine but because Ceausescu himself cannot afford, if he wishes to maintain his personal ascendancy, to go very far down the road of concessions. In addition, a number of factors are helping the Romanians to keep their noses above water. One of these is the disunity in the communist movement, and the continued opposition of important communist parties to Soviet policy toward Czechoslovakia. Another factor is the absence, so far, of a real revival of the East-West Cold War, the compulsions of which would greatly reduce Romanian freedom of maneuver. And, finally, there is the fact that the Czechs themselves are cooperating to a degree. If there were a bloodbath in Czechoslovakia and the Soviets imposed direct control there, the Romanians would feel under even greater pressure than now.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 ROM. Confidential. Drafted by deMartino. Repeated to Belgrade, Berlin, Bonn, Budapest, London, Moscow, Munich, USNATO, Paris, Prague, Sofia, and Warsaw.↩
- Airgram A–473, October 24, reported on the continuity of Romania’s national Communist policies in the wake of the Czech invasion. (Ibid., POL 27–1 COMBLOC–CZECH)↩
- Dated December 2. (Ibid., POL 15–1 ROM)↩