Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVII, Eastern Europe

170. Memorandum of Conversation¹

SecDel/MC/13

New York, October 1, 1968, 1:15–3:15 p.m.

SECRETARY’S DELEGATION TO THE TWENTY-THIRD SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

New York, September–October 1968

SUBJECT

• Eastern European Situation

PARTICIPANTS

• Romania:
  • Foreign Minister Manescu
  • Deputy Foreign Minister Malita
  • Ambassador Bogdan
  • UN Ambassador Diaconescu
  • Mr. Celac (Interpreter)
• United States:
  • The Secretary
  • Ambassador Buffum
  • Assistant Secretary Sisco
  • Mr. Kaplan, EUR/EE
  • Mr. DeSeabra (Interpreter)

Reviewing the situation and sequence of events in late August, Secretary Rusk said that there had been insufficient time for consultation with the Romanian Government prior to his meetings with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin and the President’s speech of August 30. We had had sophisticated information that day which we did not at all like, and our failure to contact the Romanians was surely not intended to be discourteous. The Secretary recalled that the Soviets had come back to us within 24 hours of his August 30 meeting with Dobrynin with assurances, for whatever they were worth, that they would not invade Romania.

Minister Manescu reiterated his understanding of this situation and repeated the Romanian Government’s appreciation for our efforts. The Secretary told Minister Manescu that, in these contacts with the Soviets, we had made completely clear that none of the information on which our concern was based had come from Romanian sources. Manescu expressed his gratitude, adding that it would have been a matter of considerable concern had such assurances not been given to the Soviets. He reviewed his contacts with Ambassadors Ball and Buffum during the late August–early September period. He said that although the Romanian Government, for understandable reasons of its own, had not published the President’s Texas statement of August 30, the Romanian people were well aware of it via foreign radio.

The Secretary said that we are not entirely sure of what is on the minds of the Soviet leaders at present. He thought that they may be frightened of their own idea of peaceful coexistence and that they certainly were displaying little understanding of the US motivation in building bridges to the Soviet Union and other countries of Eastern Europe. Against this background, the Secretary said he would refrain from mentioning Romania and Yugoslavia specifically in his October 2 speech before the UNGA, although he intended to mention Czechoslovakia and the important September 26 article in Pravda on the alleged Soviet right to intervene in the affairs of other nations.² The Secretary said that we consider that we have categorical assurances from the USSR and prefer, therefore, not to cast public doubt on this in our UNGA statement.

Manescu said that the Czechoslovaks had gotten themselves into an impossible position, both domestically and internationally, and had not known what to do. One of the real tragedies of the Czechoslovak situation was that, throughout the Dubcek period since January 1968, the Czechoslovaks had still considered the Soviets to be their best friends. Their euphoric attitude had been very clear during the visit he had made with President Ceausescu to Prague a short time before the invasion.

The Secretary said that a repeat performance by the Soviets in Romania would elicit a much stronger Western reaction than had been evident in the case of Czechoslovakia. The Secretary said the Romanians had these cards in their hands: 1) the attitude of the Romanian people, 2) the conscience of the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact followers, 3) the fact that an invasion of Romania would risk a fundamental breach of relations between the USSR and the West, and 4) the predictably furious response of world public opinion. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that Ambassador Dobrynin had told him only two weeks before the invasion that the fundamental question for the USSR was the Communist Party leadership in the countries of Eastern Europe. The Secretary added—and Minister Manescu agreed—that the Romanians posed no problem in this regard.

The Secretary expressed US concern over the fact that, for the first time in several years, we did not know what was on the Soviet mind. He found it significant that the Soviet leaders had not spoken out on the Eastern European situation but that the only Soviet reaction had come in what amounted to anonymous articles. It seems clear that the Soviets continue to want some kind of bilateral relationship with the US, the Secretary said, but they must realize that actions such as those taken toward Czechoslovakia make this extremely difficult. The Soviets, in fact, had specifically asked that nuclear missile talks continue.

The Secretary asked whether it would be better from the Romanian standpoint to have tensions reduced or to maintain them for an indefinite period. Manescu replied that the major issues raised by the Soviet threat should be kept alive while the local situation in Eastern Europe is permitted to calm down. The US, Manescu said, must make clear, though not in a cold war spirit, that the Soviets cannot do as they please. The Secretary replied that we have conveyed this message privately and that a judgment as to whether to make a public challenge of it depends on an assessment of whether it would be helpful or not.

Minister Manescu recalled that two prominent Westerners, Foreign Ministers Stewart and Harmel, had come to Romania since the invasion for long-scheduled visits. He appreciated this and said that normal East-West relations of this type should be maintained.

Ambassador Buffum asked whether the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia should be a separate agenda item at the UN or whether the subject should be discussed generally. Minister Manescu replied that it would be neither wise nor useful to try for an agenda item. The Secretary said that, although there would be considerable attention to this subject in the general debate, that there would be problems with a separate item. The Czechoslovaks themselves would oppose it, and many of the other 125 members would take that as a comfortable answer. It would be unwise to have a special item with a bad vote. Minister Manescu was not entirely certain that the vote would be bad but thought that the Czecho-slovak representatives would be placed in an unfavorable position in that they would no longer appear to have the right to resort to UN bodies when an actual need arose.

Secretary Rusk, speaking personally and privately, informed Minister Manescu that Ambassador Duda had called on him to request that the Soviet invasion not be a special item. Duda had said that the Czechoslovaks would have more maneuverability if the subject were discussed in more general terms.³ Manescu said that the new Czechoslovak Ambassador to the UN, Cernik, had made the same point.

Manescu said he hoped that the Secretary’s scheduled speech of October 2 would not “unleash the dogs of cold war.” The Secretary replied that he would speak with his usual unfailing courtesy. Minister Manescu said that was what he was afraid of.

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 70 D 418, CF 320. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Kaplan and approved in S on October 14. The meeting was held during the Secretary’s luncheon at the Waldorf Towers. The source text is labeled “Part I of II;” part II of the discussion dealing with Vietnam is ibid., Central Files, POL 27 VIET S.
2. Reference is to the Brezhnev Doctrine; see footnote 4, Document 23. For text of Secretary Rusk’s speech, see Department of State Bulletin, October 21, 1968, pp. 405–410.
3. See Document 95.