Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVII, Eastern Europe

105. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 10, 1964.

SUBJECT

• The Hungarian Situation and US-Hungarian Relations

PARTICIPANTS

• Ferenc Nagy, former Prime Minister of Hungary
• Monsignor Bela Varga, former President of the Hungarian Parliament
• Richard H. Davis, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
• Harold C. Vedeler, Director, Office of Eastern European Affairs
• Robert B. Wright, Director, Mutual Defense Control Staff, E
• Robert M. McKisson, Deputy Director, Office of Eastern European Affairs
• Christopher A. Squire, OIC, Hungarian Affairs

On September 10, 1964, at 3:00 p.m., Hungarian émigré leaders Ferenc Nagy and Monsignor Bela Varga called on Mr. Davis at their request. Msgr. Varga opened his remarks by noting that, although he could not speak for the entire Hungarian Committee, he and Mr. Nagy were in agreement with US policy towards Hungary. The US policy of building bridges to Eastern Europe had impelled Mr. Nagy and himself to go to Europe to observe its effect, particularly, the reaction of Hungarians. He was glad to say that the news from Hungary in this regard was very good. Hungarians had hope in America and were waiting for America not to start a war or a revolution but to make even further progress in inducing peaceful liberalization in Hungary. After spending considerable time in Vienna talking to the stream of travelers coming out of Hungary, Msgr. Varga said that he had gone alone to Rome, where conversations with Vatican officials showed that the Vatican’s policy was parallel to that of the US, namely aimed toward inducing the liberalization of Hungary’s internal regime.

Mr. Nagy noted that since this US policy towards the EE countries had first been presented by Assistant Secretary Tyler in late 1962 and later reiterated even more strongly by Deputy Under Secretary Harriman before the European Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee,² he and Msgr. Varga had supported that policy in a positive fashion. Indeed Mr. Nagy and Msgr. Varga favored closer US-Hungarian contacts because they realized that no matter how long Communist regimes lasted the Hungarian people needed to survive under the best obtainable economic and moral conditions. Among the émigrés, opinions were divided. It was needless to say that some exiles felt it was better not to sell grain to Hungary, for they feared this helped the Government and thus tended to lengthen the rule of the Communists. He and Msgr. Varga were not of that opinion, however. While he did not know what future events would bring real changes in the form of Hungary’s Government, in the meantime the Hungarian people must live and survive. The Hungarian population situation was particularly bad since, according to the latest UN figures, Hungary had the lowest birthrate in the entire world. This was a reflection of the people’s fear and uncertainty over tomorrow.

In order to be able to take a firm stand on policy toward Hungary, Mr. Nagy continued, it was necessary to know the opinion of Hungarians in Hungary. He was not concerned to represent the émigrés, he added, but rather the views of the Hungarian people at home. So he and Msgr. Varga went to Europe to meet Hungarians traveling abroad. They had collected a lot of information, little of it new, but all of it strengthening their conviction that they must give positive support to the US policy towards Hungary and Eastern Europe. In the process they had met a great many Hungarians, in Paris and in Vienna. None of the Hungarian visitors were afraid to talk to them.

Mr. Nagy said that he and Msgr. Varga had asked each Hungarian with whom they had talked what their opinion was of US policy toward Hungary and of the idea of broadening economic and cultural relations between the two countries. The Hungarians were asked specifically if they believed that increased US-Hungarian contacts would strengthen the regime without being of real benefit to the Hungarian people. Not a single person opposed the US policy towards Hungary. Without exception workers, engineers, clerks and farmers asked them to help in bringing about negotiations between the US and Hungary. Mr. Nagy and Msgr. Varga of course told them that the US has a definite policy concerning relations and contacts. While it was true that in Hungary the process of liberalization and relaxation had progressed much further than in most other EE bloc countries, in Rumania the Government had taken certain steps towards asserting Rumanian independence of the USSR and these steps had made it possible for the US to reach certain understandings with Rumania. The US had not seen similar steps towards independence on the part of Kadar. Those Hungarian travelers interviewed by Mr. Nagy and Msgr. Varga were not happy at this explanation, and stated that it would be very difficult for Kadar to take similar steps in the near future because of his personal relationship with Khrushchev, the presence of Red Army units in Hungary, and the fact that “fellow travelers” in the regime such as Janos Peter (the Foreign Minister) were so subservient to Moscow. There were, moreover, no “great” men in the Hungarian Government who could be expected to visualize Hungary’s future place in the international scene.

The Hungarian travelers offered some detailed advice on economic projects that the US should foster for Hungary. It was suggested, for instance, that the US help Hungary process her bauxite into aluminum, which would give Hungary added use of her most abundant natural resource, lessen her economic dependence on Moscow where the bauxite (and alumina) is now processed on terms unfavorable to Hungary. To set up a smelting plant, the US would have to supply a power source to Hungary. If this were to be an atomic power plant, of the type talked about for Rumania, it would have the added advantage of giving Hungary a reason for keeping the Hungarian-mined uranium, now exported to the USSR, for Hungary’s own consumption. In the cultural field, the Hungarian travelers urged an expansion of the US scholarship program for Hungarian students, but with close control of the selection of students in US hands. They suggested that the US should seek to influence the Hungarian Government to abolish the State Office for Church Affairs, which served not to help the churches in Hungary but only to corrupt them.

In summary, Mr. Nagy noted that it was the opinion of Msgr. Varga and himself that it was indeed desirable to improve US-Hungarian relations, regardless of their basic belief that nothing short of complete independence would be acceptable for Hungary in the long run. Mr. Nagy added that it would be desirable that the US Government, in improving relations with Hungary, should get the idea across to the Hungarian people by radio or other means that the increased contacts were being undertaken for the sake of the people and that these contacts must of necessity be through the Government in order to reach the people. In answer to a question from Mr. Vedeler, Mr. Nagy indicated that in his opinion the most effective types of exchanges with Hungary would be student exchanges and an agreement to allow publications to enter both countries on a reciprocal basis.

Mr. Davis thanked Mr. Nagy and Msgr. Varga for making their views known to the Department and said he was pleased to see that they agreed with the general outlines of US policy. The policy, Mr. Davis added, must be developed as occasion presented itself and this is what the US was doing.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 2 HUNG. Confidential. Drafted by Squire.
2. The text of the Tyler statement was not found. The reference to Harriman’s testimony is apparently to a statement made to the House Foreign Affairs Committee in April 1964. For text, see House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Recent Developments in the Soviet Bloc, Part 2 (Washington, 1964), pp. 348–355.