100. Memorandum of Conversation1

SUBJECT

  • Meeting of Janos Radvanyi with Director of Eastern European Affairs

PARTICIPANTS

  • U.S.
    • Mr. Harold C. Vedeler, Director, Office of Eastern European Affairs
    • Mr. Christopher A. Squire, OIC Hungarian Affairs
  • Hungarian
    • Janos Radvanyi, Chargéd’Affaires ad interim

Chargé Radvanyi called at his request at 11:00 a.m. January 13, 1964. After preliminary amenities, he handed Mr. Vedeler two “Reminders” each concerning the desire of a person considered Hungarian by the Hungarian authorities to return to Hungary from the US.2 Radvanyi alluded briefly to the possibility that a consular convention between Hungary and the US might obviate similar problems, which were presently faced both by Hungary and by the US.

Radvanyi then referred to the recent talks between Governor Harriman and Hungarian First Deputy Foreign Minister Peter Mod (December 14, 1963)3 and the general state of US-Hungarian relations. He added that negotiations appeared desirable at this time between the US and Hungary. He asked if the Department had noted the significance of Mod’s remarks to Governor Harriman that Hungary was willing to consider a general settlement of claims with the US. Mr. Vedeler assured Radvanyi that we had indeed noticed this point and were taking it into account. Radvanyi said that a “Polish type” of settlement was desirable, since Hungary would probably be facing fairly substantial claims which it would be hard pressed to pay under the Rumanian or Bulgarian formula. In other words, negotiations, which he felt might require some time, would need to take into account a prospect of increasing trade between Hungary and the US since only through such trade could Hungary [Page 294] expect to raise the necessary dollar sums to make payments on a general claims settlement (Radvanyi indicated that Hungary would seek compensation for the stock of the Babolna horsebreeding farm, which he alleged had been dispersed in the US).

Mr. Vedeler asked what progress had Hungary made in settling the problem of meat inspection requirements for export of its meat products to the US. Radvanyi said that this question was now in the hands of the technicians, and that by late February the Hungarian agricultural authorities would transmit evidence of Hungarian inspection standards to the US Department of Agriculture. In this respect he wondered if the US would agree to the establishment in New York of a one-man office representing Agrimpex to handle commercial sales of meat to the US, much as the Yugoslav and Polish trade offices in New York handled their respective exports. The office could be “temporary“, would be strictly commercial, and would not be a part of the Hungarian Legation’s Commercial Counselor’s office. Mr. Vedeler said that the Department would look into the matter. It was emphasized to Radvanyi that no MFN treatment of Hungary was possible under existing legislation.

In turning to another subject, Mr. Vedeler referred to various press reports about possible withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary and asked the Hungarian Charge whether he believed there was any basis for such reports. Radvanyi replied that he had no official knowledge of any proposed withdrawal, but that it was not impossible. Radvanyi thought personally that such a withdrawal was unlikely since the troops were mostly technical forces concerned with such matters as air defense under the Warsaw Pact and included very little infantry. Soviet forces were unnecessary for internal security in Hungary and there could be no question on this score. Besides, the average Hungarian, Radvanyi claimed, did not mind seeing Soviet forces remain in Hungary in order to minimize the need for Hungarian conscripts. In his opinion, withdrawal of Soviet forces from Hungary would be contingent on some international security arrangement such as a NATO-Warsaw Pact Non-aggression agreement. Mr. Vedeler suggested that it was difficult to see any operational or strategic purpose in the retention of Soviet troops in Hungary given the nature of modern military weapons. The absence of Soviet forces from Czechoslovakia and their withdrawal from Bulgaria and Rumania would support this view.

At this point, Chargé Radvanyi casually mentioned that he was pleased to report that as of January 1, 1964, the Hungarian Government had ceased jamming of the VOA, RFE and BBC radio broadcasts to Hungary. (The Department later learned that Hungarian Second Secretary Istvan Varga told Mr. Carl Sharek of USIA the same thing at approximately the same time.) As to VOA, Hungary found this official organ to be a “serious” station: he intimated, however, that the Department might [Page 295] seek to have VOA be “more objective”. Mr. Vedeler expressed gratification at the official information conveyed by Mr. Radvanyi that the Hungarian authorities were stopping the jamming of broadcasts. Both Mr. Vedeler and Mr. Squire noted that VOA endeavored to be entirely factual in its reporting and dealt to a great extent with American life and developments. As to RFE, Radvanyi said that Premier Kadar had decided to cease jamming of this station to bring some humor into the life of Hungarians, since RFE broadcasts were so ridiculous they could not be taken seriously. In his personal estimation, the Charge continued, RFE would probably not continue for more than a year. The Department’s representatives indicated that while RFE was not an official organization they could not agree with this estimate.

Radvanyi next adverted to Cardinal Mindszenty. The US, he said, should put pressure on the Vatican to find a solution of the case. It was unfortunate that there was no provision in the Catholic Church for the pensioning of Cardinals, he continued, since this might permit a solution of the issue. The US should play a leading part in the settlement of the Mindszenty problem. Mr. Vedeler pointed out that the primary responsibility in any solution of the problem lay with the Hungarian government and the Vatican. He referred in this connection to the statement of Mr. Mod in his conversation with Governor Harriman that negotiations were in progress between Budapest and the Vatican on this and other Church-State matters. Radvanyi indicated that these talks were not progressing very speedily.

In a discussion of cultural exchanges, there was agreement that gradual progress had been made during the past year. Mr. Vedeler asked what impressions the Charge had of the success of the recent visits to Budapest of Messrs. Steinbeck and Albee. Radvanyi said that he was uninformed about these visits except in a general way. He mentioned the successful visit to the US of First Deputy Minister of Agriculture Janos Hont, and the favorable articles which Hont had written recently in “Nepszabadsag”. Both Mr. Vedeler and Charge Radvanyi believed that satisfactory steps, often of a non-official character, were being taken in the cultural and exchanges field without any written agreements or protocols between the US and Hungary, and that this pragmatic approach was the best in dealing with these activities. Radvanyi then asked how the US viewed the travel to the US of MTI Director General Sandor Barcs, who would come as the private guest of the AP. Mr. Vedeler said that the trip seemed to be an excellent idea, particularly since we knew something of the importance of Barcs at Budapest. Radvanyi confirmed the fact of Barcs’ influence within the Hungarian Government.

In conclusion, Radvanyi noted that he was contemplating arranging for the visit of Istvan Tompe, Head of the Hungarian Radio and Television, to the US. Tompe was also a close personal friend of Premier Kadar [Page 296] and had modernized news coverage on the Hungarian Radio and Television. Now the Hungarian radio carried much better news than did the Hungarian newspapers, and in much more objective fashion. He intimated that it might be possible during a visit by Tompe here to arrange a meeting between him and the authorities responsible for Hungarian broadcasts of VOA, and perhaps even arrange network exchanges. Mr. Vedeler said that we would be interested to see whether such a visit would be worked out.

The meeting lasted slightly over one hour.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL HUNG–US. Confidential. Drafted by Squire on January 16.
  2. Not further identified.
  3. The Department of State reported on this meeting in telegram 304 to Budapest, December 14, 1963. (Department of State, Central Files, POL HUNG–US)