Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

336. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Embassy in Greece¹

Ankara, November 30, 1967, 1515Z.

2638. NATUS. Ref: Ankara 2637.²

1. FonMin asked me to call at 1500 Nov 30 and reading from notes conveyed following points representing decisions of Cabinet.

A. GOT will accept substitute language for para 4 of agreement as recommended by Ambassador Eralp and reading: “In response to the appeal of Secretary General, UNFICYP under its existing mandate would be available to undertake an enhanced and broader pacification role, which would include supervision of disarmament of all forces constituted after 1963 and new practical arrangements for the safeguarding of internal security including the safety of all citizens”.

B. GOT reserves right to return to Security Council to seek enlarged improved mandate for UNFICYP if operations under existing mandate prove unsatisfactory.

C. Turkey’s NATO allies and especially US, UK and Canada should declare immediately after appeal issued by SYG that they support appeal as a whole but giving particular support to para 4.

D. At Security Council meeting on Dec 15 concerned with prolongation of UNFICYP consensus of members should be sought by Turkey’s allies to obtain approval of new role for UNFICYP envisaged para 4 SYG’s appeal. (This most important to box in Makarios.)

E. GOT insists that withdrawal of Greek forces start in shortest possible time and be carried out in continuous and uninterrupted fashion and in good faith. (FonMin explained this is essential to avoid complications and to establish a basis for an improvement in Greek-Turkish relations.)

F. Repetition of incidents such as those of Nov 15–16 on Cyprus must be avoided at all costs. Absolute security must be maintained on island.

G. Greek Cypriots must avoid provocative acts. GOT has given like instructions to Turkish Cypriots.

H. Makarios must be prevented from playing role in New York in connection with SYG’s appeal that would sabotage Turkish-Greek agreement. NATO allies, especially representatives of US, UK and Canada, who took part in working out “five points”, should play efficacious role to this end in Nicosia. Interval during which SYG’s appeal issued and replies given is especially critical. Makarios should not say appeal is unacceptable to GOC, should not be allowed to interpret it so as to sabotage it.

2. FonMin then said that under above conditions, and once agreement with SYG on new formula for para 4 seemed assured, he saw no need for Vance to hurry to New York. On the contrary, he could usefully remain in Athens and endeavor to plan with Greeks accelerated withdrawal of Greek troops in manner indicated above. (Implication was GOT would do its part on standdown.)

3. Caglayangil said that as soon as SYG makes his appeal GOT would like to have clear affirmative answer from GOG without qualifications or interpretations. Makarios could say GOC accepts appeal of SYG reserving always its own viewpoint regarding final solution. He should say nothing more. If style and content SYG’s appeal conforms to agreement GOT will immediately respond that it accepts and is ready to conform to it. GOT will point especially to para 4 saying that it approves and supports this provision.

4. I said would immediately report FonMin’s remarks.

5. Septel follows on conversation and supplementary points.³

Hart

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/VANCE. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Received at 2317Z. Also sent to the Department of State, Nicosia, and USUN and repeated to London, Ottawa, and the Mission to NATO. The source text is the Department of State copy.
2. Telegram 2637, November 30, reported on the meeting at which Hart presented Caglayangil with a summary of the Vance-Makarios talks and reported on the draft text agreed to by Makarios. (Ibid.)
3. Not found.