Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

299. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State¹

Ankara, August 29, 1967, 1620Z.

966. Report No. 1. Subj: Cyprus and the dialogue.

1. Following must be fully protected as Caglayangil intended his comments only for my ears.

2. I have now had two conversations with him² and expect follow-up tomorrow with Asst SecGen Turkmen, following which expect to present more complete report containing suggestions for President’s future conversation with King Constantine in Washington. In interim it is clear that:

A. GOT and GOG are and have been in contact throughout last month regarding Greek proposal for PriMinister level meeting. There is no lack of contact. Proposal has been under intensive review and apparently considered by National Security Council evening Aug 29. Ambassador Tuluy here from Athens as an advisor. Further details by separate message.

B. GOT is not well impressed with proposal for PM-level meeting which it sees as reflecting GOG desire for “gesture” to show to NATO Allies that it is legitimate govt by appearing to negotiate major question with its neighbor. On substance GOT sees no signs GOG prepared to take real step forward. Caglayangil adversely impressed by “bargaining tactics” of Greek Govt, failure to make progress on substantive preparations for high-level meeting. GOT concerned over position in which would find itself in proceeding to such meeting (which could not be held without publicity) in face recent Greek public pronouncements that only solution for Cyprus is enosis. If Prime Minister Demirel went to meeting under present circumstances his political opposition would galvanize general Turk public around suspicion he meeting Kollias “to discuss enosis.”

3. I made point that our assessment of King Constantine, with whom Ambassador Talbot enjoys particularly close relations, is that he is deeply committed to find Cyprus settlement which would lay basis for permanent friendship with Turkey; and that he could and would be sort of guarantor or underwriter of any agreed settlement, thus legitimizing it for an elected successor Greek Govt. Caglayangil agreed with our assessment of King but stated GOT does not feel same confidence toward rest of GOG, which in discussions continuously raises the ante “from two to eight” in its own favor. GOT has emphasized to GOG that on basis its four principles “there are 20 ways” to settle Cyprus problem: federation, cantonment, adjustment of Zurich agreements, etc. Greece on other hand offers Turkey “lease for sixty or eighty years”. Former US Ambassador Warren (believe he meant Amb. Hare) had supported such offer to Inonu who replied that even if Parliament accepted it he would refuse for “only a big power can keep a base on foreign territory.” In answer my query about personalities he said Economou-Gouras is a technician and ineffectual. Kollias much better but controlled by, not controlling, the military leaders. I said this left question of how dialogue could be carried forward but I expected that King Constantine would mention privately to President at Washington GOG’s “unanswered” proposal for PM level meeting. As it possible that King is not fully informed on GOT-GOG exchanges proposal, was there something useful President could say in rejoinder?

Caglayangil suggested might be emphasized to King that in view tension in Middle East now is time for rapid solution of Cyprus problem. Greece should recognize that Turkish attitudes conditioned by former possession of Cyprus and by allegiance of Turk-Cypriots to Turkey. It should therefore take into account not just what is in Turkey’s interest but what is within Turkey’s range of possibilities, in negotiating Cyprus settlement. Then he hesitated and said Turkmen would let me have more closely reasoned suggestion August 30. (This being Turk holiday I expect it may be August 31.)

I also stressed that we also felt that now was time to reach such agreement since present Govt of Greece, if it could be galvanized to take substantive steps would not need concern itself as much with press or public position as would a successor elected government. Latter in fact would probably be unable to tackle such basic decision but on other hand would find it hard to reverse or declare illegitimate such agreement if it carried King’s endorsement. Caglayangil and Turkmen seemed to agree.³

Hart

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Repeated to Athens and Nicosia.
2. Reported in telegram 967 from Ankara, August 29. (Ibid.)
3. In telegram 972 from Ankara, August 31, Hart reported that a meeting between the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers would take place September 9–10. He added that Demirel had expressed pessimism about chances of a breakthrough. (Ibid.)