Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

298. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, August 7, 1967, 1130Z.

684. Ref: Athens 604.²

1. During my conversation with King July 30 he referred once again to the possibility that in end he might have to come into confrontation with present regime. As Dept aware King’s view of inevitability or desirability of confrontation has varied in past several months depending generally on temperature of his cooperative relationship with Junta (read Papadopoulos). More recently King has indicated he views immediate period after submission of draft Constitution as sensitive one in which confrontation may be unavoidable if regime does not keep faith with its assurances re Constitution and early referendum [document number not declassified].³ This same three-month period is also considered one of incipient crisis by a majority of Greeks who for present are willing to give regime chance to prove its intention.

2. King spoke of contacts he had made with senior Generals and others, and seemed reasonably expectant that in event of showdown he could get adequate support to oust Junta. He did not want to precipitate action, however, unless US knew and approved of his purposes. He did not ask, as he had done in the past, about prospects that he could count on American fleet presence or logistic assistance.

3. In replying, I pointed out that at present US heavily committed in many parts of the world. I tried to get him to understand that US should not be looked to for participation in any change in governmental arrangements. This sort of decision could be made only by him. King said he understood, but if it should become necessary to move he would advise USG in advance.

4. As example of influences now being brought to bear on King, I was interested in his account of secret visit to him by retired General Gennimatas, former Chief of HNDGS. Latter had reminded him there had long been suspicions that Papadopoulos and other colonels had been plotting and that he, Gennimatas, had dispersed them to distant commands whereas subsequently Gen. Spandidakis had permitted them to reassemble in Athens posts. He thought this could mean Spandidakis was in on plot, though he hoped not. In any case, colonels are more known than respected by armed forces, who now accept their authority for lack of current alternative. Gennimatas proposed that when new Constitution ready King move to dispose of colonels. They could be thanked for their role in saving country from Communism, decorated, and returned to dispersed units or retired. From then on, armed forces would pay no attention to them. Alternatively, they could be forced to resign from army in order to stay in politics. Here, again, they would lose grip over armed forces. Key point, he said, was not to permit important further changes in the army before the new Constitution readied. It would then be essential to move before Junta consolidated control over army commands. Whatever course King might choose to pursue in ridding country of these colonels, Gennimatas was convinced armed forces would support him absolutely. King had listened with interest but without commitments. He said he did not know whether Gennimatas was organizing a movement among senior military people against the colonels, but in any case he would not interfere. (DATT comment: Gennimatas’ views are correct but he is not known to be in any particular contact with any group.)

5. Comment: We have recently had reports of preliminary plotting by several groups of officers (mostly recently retired) [2 document numbers not declassified].⁴ We believe some of this is motivated by their belief King would support a countercoup. (It is fairly generally assumed that his trips to north were for purpose polling amount of support he could count on in such event.) Some may also believe that American attitude of coolness toward a “colonels” regime implies we would support a countercoup by other military. However, we see no evidence yet that plotters pinpointed so far would be an improvement over current regime, either as scheduling early return to constitutional processes or acting with more leniency in repressive measures. This estimate would, of course, be revised if regime gave indications of betraying assurances both to US and Greek public re return to parliamentary life. We will also have to watch carefully what, if any, progress various groups make in coalescing to point they undermine regime’s control of key units in Attica area or consolidate their control of sufficient other ones (Larrissa and the north) to neutralize regime’s superiority in Attica.

6. (Comments cont’d) Some of the plotters are known to have been awaiting my return and any comments I might make, either directly or around town, to get nuances of latest Washington attitude toward present regime. To extent there are incipient coup ambitions in Greek military, we face tricky period of attempting to avoid giving impression either that we firmly endorse present regime or that we would encourage some countercoup.

7. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] DATT concur in comment.

Talbot

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 GREECE. Secret; Exdis.
2. Telegram 604, July 31, reported King Constantine’s impressions of the internal political situation. (Ibid.)
3. Not found.
4. Neither found.