Office of the Historian

278. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece1

Washington, April 22, 1967, 1:44 p.m.

180648. For Ambassador.

1.
In fast-moving situation facing King and yourself, we recognize we unable to give close and current guidance. However, following are basic points which we believe should govern King’s actions and which we suggest you convey to him as opinion USG:
(a)
We believe it essential that the King remain in Greece.
(b)
We believe he should not depart from Greece except under duress.
(c)
We think that his position vis-à-vis the military officers controlling the government is stronger than he appears to think and that he should use what we consider to be their considerable need for him to extract from them the maximum concessions.
(d)
We think that his efforts vis-à-vis the coup officers should be toward reaching a compromise of type which will make it clear to Greek people that King has not capitulated but has forced military leaders to make significant concessions. We are not informed as to what other points may be at issue between King and the governing military group except the questions of suspension of articles of Constitution and the [Page 587] martial law decree. But there must be other matters, such as ratio of civilian vs. military in Cabinet, which could be used as bargaining points to off-set concessions which for example might be made regarding martial law decree. Latter concessions might involve limiting decree to specified time and moderating provisions calling for extreme restrictions on civil liberties.
(e)
If King is concerned about safety his wife and would feel better if she could go somewhere else, we would be willing to help in this. We believe it would be preferable for her not to leave Greek soil.
(f)
Finally, while we recognize that decision as to capitulation vs. resistance must be made by King alone, it is our view that if he capitulates he will have lost all opportunity for leadership. This does not mean that he may not have to compromise on some issues while showing his own stamp on the situation as he forces others to compromise, we would hope in as visible a manner as possible.2
Rusk
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 GREECE. Secret; Flash. Drafted by Rockwell and approved by Battle.↩
  2. In telegram 4836 from Athens, April 22, Talbot reported that the Embassy had tried to maintain contact in the last 24 hours with new regime “in order to exercise what influence we have toward more constructive second phase of coup than now appears probable unless coup group abandons its thuggery.” He also reported Embassy contacts with Nikos Farmakis and Lieutenant General Spandidakis. (Ibid.)↩