Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

277. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, April 22, 1967, 0015Z.

4795. I now recommend:

(1) That for present we continue fairly starchy posture toward new Greek Government but still stay in touch with it and not burn bridges by threatening cutoff of aid and other drastic measures unless government’s performance in next few days is rough and rotten.

(2) That I attempt to stay in closest possible communication with King and that we rapidly canvass steps which could strengthen his hand, since King likely can prove principal focus for restoring normalcy. While I do not now expect situation to require emergency evacuation of Royal family, urgent response to King’s request on helicopters would be practically and psychologically valuable.²

(3) That our public and press posture reveal our regret and our distaste for process of changing governments by military coups but also reflect a certain slowness to pass moral judgments since there remain so many gaps in our understanding of what has happened and why.³

Talbot

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 GREECE. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Received at 7:38 p.m. on April 21 and passed to the White House, CIA, DOD, NSA, and USIA at 7:50 p.m.
2. See footnote 2, Document 276.
3. In telegram 4797 from Athens, April 22, Talbot commented: “So far as I perceive we have now completed reportage of the day of the rape of Greek democracy. I am certain that Greece will long rue this day’s events, whose long range effects are hard to foresee.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 GREECE) Talbot’s comments were reported to the President in an April 22 memorandum from Rostow. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Greece, Vol. 2)