Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

92. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, January 26, 1965, 8 p.m.

2787. Subj: Helicopter flights over East Berlin. I was pleased to learn in CINCUSAREUR’s JCS 003943 J 3² that the policy governing helicopter flights over East Berlin is being reviewed and evaluated by the SecDef as to the military factors involved and that further flights will, in the meantime, be deferred until further notice. I have in several communications (Embtels 870, 904, and 970, Bonn A–780, Oct 27, 1964) and in letters to Amb Thompson dated Sept 24, 1964³ expressed strongly my views with respect to these flights. I discussed them with Amb Thompson during my recent visit to Washington. If necessary in order to obtain a change in existing policy I recommend that you talk about this matter with Sec McNamara personally.

I strongly recommend this because I consider these flights provocative—indeed, the only really provocative thing we now do in Berlin. It is quite clear that this type of flight was never envisaged under the original agreements. The flights have nothing to do with the maintenance of freedom of air access to Berlin in general, which is done hourly by commercial overflights. Their intelligence function is of course obvious to the Soviets. They do not in my opinion represent a show of strength or determination on our part, indeed quite the reverse, since we carefully gauge the flights on a hit-and-run basis to get out before the Soviets can locate them. The Soviets have given ample evidence that they consider them objectionable. They consistently vector fighters to find them and have threatened to “take care of them.” If these fighters do find them and precipitate an incident, either by attempting to buzz them out or shoot them down, we would be faced with the very difficult question of whether or not to abandon the flights in the face of force. I have looked into the matter carefully and am convinced that the intelligence gained is very meager and by no means worth the risks involved.

I frankly would be in favor of abandoning the flights altogether. However, if we want to maintain some theoretical right of helicopter flights, which we did not, apparently, consider worthwhile until the Wall, I recommend that we send a flight over very infrequently, say every six months to a year, over some non-sensitive area, rather than over prime intelligence targets as at present.

McGhee

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol 6. Top Secret; Exdis.
2. Not found.
3. Telegram 870 from Bonn is Document 68. In telegram 904 from Bonn, September 6, 1964, McGhee expressed doubts regarding the utility of helicopter flights over the East Zone. (Department of State, Central Files,POL 23–10 GER E) Telegram 970 from Bonn, September 11, reported on former Foreign Minister Brentano’s visit to Bonn. (Ibid., POL 6 GER W) Airgram A–780 from Bonn, October 27, 1964, reported on U.S. helicopter flights over the East Zone. (Ibid., POL 28–4) McGhee’s letter to Thompson was not found.