68. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State1
870. Personal for the Secretary. Of all of the potential points of friction or armed conflict between ourselves and the Soviets in connection with Berlin, the one that has concerned me most in recent months has been that of our helicopter flights over East Berlin. I was, accordingly, particularly interested in the telegram which the Dept sent to General Lemnitzer on the subject on August 29 giving approval for continuation of such flights (rptd to Bonn as Deptel 609)2 Because I consider this matter one of great sensitivity, and particularly since I do not know the extent of your recent personal involvement in this problem, I am taking the liberty of raising it with you directly.
You are aware of the general background of these flights. They were made only infrequently before erection of the Wall, but since then have been regularly programmed at four to six-week intervals. The Soviets have been objecting to the flights for some time, and they are now slowly escalating their threats. They have long referred to the helicopters as “air space violators.” On June 24, the Soviets implied that the flight might turn into something like “the incidents of January and March”.3 On August 3, the Soviet BASC controller said that “alert fighters will take the necessary measures.” There is no evidence that fighters were in fact lofted on this occasion, but we now have certain indications (concerning which I am asking CIA to brief you),4 that actual countermeasures might be taken against the next flight, possibly up to an attempt to shoot the helicopter down.
After looking into this matter very carefully, I have concluded that our justifications for continuing these flights, in order of priority, are (1) the old Berlin maxim that you never give up a right which you have successfully exercised; and (2) that through air photography from the helicopter, we are able to ascertain information about potential jamming devices which could threaten our utilization of our navigational aids.
It is obviously important to maintain the right of unhindered flight within the Berlin Control Zone under 10,000 feet. We have interpreted the right to include helicopter flights over East Berlin, and having established this interpretation through practice, I would agree with the Dept [Page 161] that we should continue the flights. I believe, however, that we should not equate the principle of maintaining unhindered utilization of the Berlin Control Zone with the maintenance of a particular frequency or pattern of helicopter flights.
I have been briefed on the intelligence justification for the helicopter flights, but am not fully convinced that the information could not be obtained by more conventional methods, i.e. by photography from normal aircraft. At any rate, due to the relatively static situation re Soviet installations, I do not think that the helicopter flights are required for this purpose as frequently as they now occur. The interval, in my judgment, could be increased to several months.
General Polk, the Commandant in Berlin who has just been relieved, is strongly in favor of a continuation of these flights at their present schedule, as are presumably other high military officials here who would be concerned, i.e. General Freeman, USAREUR, and General Disosway, USAFE. They can be expected to oppose any change in the present schedule. Indeed, the message to which I referred (Deptel 609) indicates that the Dept itself, after a recent interchange on this subject, has decided against any change.
Although I am not often more cautious in Berlin matters than the Dept, I question whether the advantage to be achieved, during the period intervening before the American elections on November 3, is worth the risk of being openly challenged by the Soviets with the possibility of their shooting down our helicopter. The shooting down of a US helicopter would inevitably result in a most serious confrontation between ourselves and the Soviets, with the possibility of further escalation. Since this would result from quite a different situation from that which occurred when our T–39 and RB–66 aircraft were off course and technically in the wrong we would be committed by prestige and principle to react strongly.
The Commandant in Berlin is expected to recommend a regular flight within the next few days. According to my instructions, he must first submit his plan to me for approval as to suitability of the timing in terms of the broader German and world situation. Any decision for an extended delay, however, in light of the DOD and Departmental interest should, I believe, be made in Washington.
In the circumstances, I recommend that the next flight be deferred until mid-winter. This will not give up the right, nor for that matter will it dispose of the problem, since the Soviets could shoot the aircraft down as easily then as now. Postponement would, however, preclude disturbance during a delicate period in our country, and could presumably be done without any serious derogation of our intelligence interests.
I believe this matter is of sufficient importance that you may wish to discuss it with Secretary McNamara, and possibly even the President. [Page 162] Until hearing from you, I will in any event delay approval of any further flights.