297. Memorandum of Conversation1
PRESENT
-
United States
- Secretary Clifford
- Ambassador Lodge
-
Germany
- Chancellor Kiesinger
- R/Adm. Guttenberg
- Press Chief Ahlers
- Interpreter Weber
Kiesinger said Secretary Clifford was a most welcome guest. The German people, he said, attached great importance to NATO and to the United States alliance. They have an overwhelming conviction on that subject. He hoped that the nuclear planning meetings had been good.
We must, he said, jointly study what happened in Czechoslovakia—without nervousness and without being hectic. He did not believe that Germany should be looking for a “big brother”—nor was it. We Germans, he said, are aware that we must do our part to the utmost of our capacity.
In view of the existing military balance, notably as regards conventional forces, Germany’s best protection are the U.S. troops on Germany’s own soil. It is they who make the aggressor think twice.
Kiesinger said he had asked himself many times whether the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia was undertaken solely because of events in Czechoslovakia or whether it was but one phase in a much larger scheme. The Soviets, he said, seem to be out-flanking us on both of our maritime flanks, using intimidation among other methods.
Kiesinger said he had had many talks with eminent men both here and in his travels and still he was not sure what their aim really is. He was sure that they were trying to weaken NATO and that they have had some success.
On the whole, he thought the second explanation was the right one—that Czechoslovakia is part of a larger scheme. We are thus at a decision point in history and “I say this as one who does not favor reviving the cold war and who realizes that the US and the Soviet Union must be in touch with each other. Indeed, we must find a way of proceeding whereby both things are done: that is, the great powers are in touch with each other and are also in close consultation with their allies.”
[Page 768]Kiesinger quoted an unnamed European Prime Minister as having said recently: “If the Russians had waited two years, nothing would have been left of NATO.” Kiesinger realized that there was some weakening in both camps; the question was in which situation was the danger greater.
We must thus expect serious crises in the future. It is quite likely that the Russians will be reckless again. Yet even the use of force cannot eliminate the urge of nationalism. He could not help but be impressed by what had happened to Czechoslovakia and by the fact that the Western world seems all too willing to neglect necessary security measures. “I fear there will be a rude awakening.”
Secretary Clifford said that he brought regards from President Johnson who wished to convey thoughts to Chancellor Kiesinger in two areas; (1) with regard to Czechoslovakia and (2) with regard to NATO.
In Washington “we think,” said the Secretary, “that the Soviet incursion into Czechoslovakia is exceedingly serious.” It is not merely a question of the intervention alone. The manner in which the Soviet Government reached this decision should also give us pause. The military performance was very efficient. The planes were well handled in bad weather. From a political standpoint, of course, it could hardly have been worse. There was no proof whatever of outside aggression against Czechoslovakia. Soviet intervention was dangerous, awkward and impulsive politically, while being sophisticated militarily. It showed that the hardliners had taken over in the Politburo.
We don’t know whether it is an isolated action or not. Does it threaten Romania? There are ten to fifteen divisions there which could be in preparation for a move into Yugoslavia. The Soviet may well feel that, having taken the first step, they might as well go ahead.
We too are aware of the situation in the Mediterranean. Our Sixth Fleet is there and we have strengthened it. The Soviets have progressed with their Navy. They have a helicopter carrier, marines and landing craft, and a submarine building program. This is not a comforting picture. Secretary Clifford recalled Gromyko’s recent statement at the UN that “as far as Socialism is concerned the Soviets know no national boundaries.” All these events have brought about a complete collapse of the hopes of the many persons who thought that a new era was at hand.
These events also show the transcendent importance of NATO. We reaffirm our obligation to it. If an ultimate Armageddon is to be prevented, it will be by NATO. We recognize, of course, that each member is a sovereign power and must make its decisions for itself.
In the US Congress, the belief is held that the US has met its obligations to NATO and that there should be no need to keep forces there 23 years after the end of World War II. Indeed this belief is growing. Senator Symington has introduced legislation to cut the number of American [Page 769] troops down to 50,000. Senator Russell, the Chairman of the Armed Serv-ices Committee, is critical.
The Administration now in power believes these viewpoints to be in error. We maintain many troops, in many places.
But the pressure in the US to cut our contribution in NATO goes on because some of the NATO countries are not doing their share. Belgium and Canada are actually talking about reducing. The British talk about bringing troops back for service in NATO but we see very little coming to NATO. We, in the Administration, must be able to tell Congress of what Europe is doing. There is real pressure from the people. This is our problem, said the Secretary, and “I am telling you about it.”
More must also be done in the balance of payments field. We have a $700 million deficit. The conferences on this subject at the lower levels are dragging badly. The problem will be there no matter who is in power.
We understand that our enlightened self-interest is involved in NATO. The deterrent to the Soviet Union today is that an invasion against Germany would be an invasion against the US. The Soviet Union is not persuaded by weakness.
Our expenses in the strategic nuclear field are growing.
In reply, Kiesinger asked Clifford to present his respectful compliments to President Johnson. He said he was quite aware of the situation which Secretary Clifford had described and wished to say two things: (1) Germans are reconsidering their contribution to NATO, notably as regards troops and (2) when the government passed the last defense budg-et it did so with the reservation that “we might have to increase it.” An increase of as much as 15% would be serious. In spite of prosperity, public revenues have not risen commensurately. Germany, he repeated, was not looking for a “big brother.” The German Defense Ministry was preparing a “white paper.” He personally believed Germany should increase, he said.
The question of offset was an old problem. It involves a very considerable amount of money. The government is about to review it. Our representatives, of course, were bound by their instructions. An inter-departmental committee has been created to take a new look.
Please tell the President, he said, that in both areas “we are doing new thinking.” A 15% increase in the defense budget and a 3.4 billion for offset, make a total of 7 billion DM out of 81 billion DM in the total budg-et. This means new taxes, as cuts in other parts of the budget are not possible. We need the backing of the whole population.
DeGaulle had said on his last visit to Bonn2 that France has more forces in Germany than the United Kingdom. Will the French too ask [Page 770] Germany for offset payments? Seven to eight hundred million Deutsche Marks for the French added to amounts for other countries could amount to 8 or 9 billion DMs. He said he wished to expose the whole problem. “I want,” he said, “to meet United States interest and NATO. We will try.”
Secretary Clifford said that yesterday at the meeting British Defense Minister Healey had said that the big deterrent to Soviet aggression was our tactical nuclear weapons. Clifford said it is not the tactical nuclear weapon; it is actually the presence of 300,000 soldiers. He had told Healey he was rendering great disservice to NATO by saying this. Should this idea ever get back to Congress there would be trouble. It is an invitation to disaster and it shows the difference of concepts on this problem.
Mr. Clifford said in conclusion that he could not suggest what the Germans should do. He said they must decide for themselves and do what is most important for their country.
Kiesinger said he saw the problem just as Clifford did but he was also aware that the German farmers “want billions.”