Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

296. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Embassy in Germany¹

New York, October 8, 1968, 2127Z.

6954. Secto 68. Subj: Secretary’s October 8 luncheon with Brandt. Following based on uncleared notes FYI Noforn, and subject to revision.

Secretary gave luncheon for FonMin Brandt attended by Amb Knappstein, Egon Bahr, FRG FonOff, and Alex Johnpoll, GER. Highlights of conversation were:

1. Sovs, FRG and Berlin. Brandt told Secy that his speech at the UN and particularly the references to FRG and Berlin had made a deep impression in Germany. He said Kiesinger had asked him to pass along the Chancellor’s own thanks.

The Secy informed Brandt that he had repeated to Gromyko what he had already told Dobrynin about Berlin being a state interest of the US; and had also raised with Gromyko the Sov propaganda attacks against the FRG. Gromyko had replied in two parts:

A. He stated quite categorically that the Sovs would not move against Berlin;

B. The Sovs object to what the FRG is doing in Berlin.²

The Secy had replied to Gromyko that what the FRG is doing in Berlin is our responsibility. There are no grounds for Sov objections, especially in view of what the East Germans are doing in Berlin.

The Secy told Brandt that we will simply have to watch the situation in Berlin and see how it develops. The President’s position on Berlin is clear and firm, and the two major Presidential candidates are also people on whom the FRG and Berlin can rely.

Brandt thought it would be helpful if progress could be made on an Allied paper that would make clear the legitimacy of what the FRG has been doing in Berlin over the years, but avoiding areas of juridical controversy between the FRG and the Allies. Brandt said that there was some difficulty with the French over this, but Debre had told him the French would go along with an internal paper along these lines (from the three Occupying Powers to the FRG) that would not be passed on to the Sovs. Brandt said that even such a paper would be better than nothing.

The Secy replied that this is a matter that requires thought. We have said a lot to the Sovs in recent weeks about Berlin and the firmness of our resolve to defend it. Would it be a sign of weakness in Sov eyes if we keep making one statement after another about Berlin? This is something we have to give some thought to.

2. NPD. The Secy told Brandt that the problem of the NPD in Berlin was not entirely the same as the problem that party posed to the FRG. We have to take account of US public opinion and how it reacts to the program of the NPD and its anti American posture in a city which is occupied by U.S. troops. We can do whatever is required to defend Berlin, but we cannot do that to defend the NPD.

Brandt said that some people in the FRG have criticized Schuetz for asking the Allies to ban the NPD; they say Schuetz should have waited for the FRG to act. Brandt thought this was nonsense. Schuetz was right to bring the problem before the Allies. The FRG may decide to bring the NPD to court, but in any event the courts would not hand down a decision before the 1969 Federal elections. The FRG Minister of Interior is conducting a study but it will probably not be ready for at least another two weeks. In the meantime, the NPD in Berlin is infiltrated with many Communist agents from the GDR.

The Secy thought that the Allies would now have no alternative but to act against the NPD, Schuetz having raised the matter. Brandt didn’t think there would be any objection from the FRG.

3. NATO. The Secy reminded Brandt of the discussion at last night’s dinner³ concerning an extension of the area of NATO interests beyond the strict territorial limits of the NATO countries, particularly into the Mediterranean and ME. If Sov forces were to move toward the Adriatic NATO would be faced with a major problem. These questions are not taken as seriously by some of the NATO partners as they deserve to be. This is so important that consultations at high levels and through special channels should be established. The Secy asked Brandt whether he thought there was any chance that a European caucus might be established in NATO. The US would not object if a European caucus were formed. The Secy pointed out that there have been occasions when we were ready to do what Europe wants, but were confronted by the fact that there is no Europe in that sense. Brandt replied that a European caucus based on a broad definition of Europe (including the Turks, Greeks, Portuguese, et al) would not work. There might be a chance for a narrower European caucus. The WEU would provide a good foundation for this but that would require French cooperation. Brandt said that he did not want to see anything happen that would reduce US engagement in Europe. Bahr added that creation of an additional grouping in NATO would add to the problems caused by the existing groupings.

The Secy asked, in connection with Stewart’s suggestion on extending the duration of NATO, whether Brandt thought there was any chance of French cooperation. Brandt replied that he did not exclude such a possibility. He thought that the phrasing of such a suggestion would be very important. The language suggested by Stewart was too temporary, being limited to “present circumstances.” Brandt said that the FRG and the Italians could accept a lengthy extension. On the other hand, other countries, like Denmark, would have problems.

The Secy pointed out that a decision that involved going to the Senate right now would cause some constitutional problems in the US.

Brandt asked whether the Greek regime was causing political problems for us. The Secy replied that we do have a political problem. Andreas Papandreou was very active. On top of that, the Greek regime does a lot of foolish things which create more difficulties. For example, they took away Miss Mercuri’s citizenship and Mercuri is a popular actress here. It is not easy for anyone here to step forward and defend the regime. The Secy said that Pipinelis was a man who seemed to have good judgment and commanded a lot of respect. As a NATO matter we may have to decide to increase our military assistance to Greece.

Brandt thought that it would be helpful all around if there were a NATO agency through which military assistance from one member to another could be channeled. It would certainly make things easier for the FRG.

4. Offset. Brandt raised the subject. He said that the FRG had set up a task force, and had raised the level at which it was being handled in the FRG. He didn’t know how close we could come to agreement in the next couple of months, but there was no doubt that we will have to get away from agreements that only cover a limited period.

The Secy pointed out that as a result of the Czech crisis things like the Mansfield Res had been put in the ice box for the moment. Undoubtedly efforts will be made to make them active again later. A satisfactory settlement of the offset issue will help us handle this.

Brandt said that it would also be helpful if a settlement of the offset problem could be worked out in the context of some broader NATO agreements. It is a matter of optics. It would not present a good picture if the only consequence in NATO of the Czech crisis were to settle this bilateral US–FRG problem. Brandt also cautioned against any expectations that the FRG would take the lead in a military build-up among the NATO countries. This would create problems within the Western community.

5. FRG-French relations. The Secy referred to Debre’s remarks at last night’s dinner on NATO choosing between nuclear weapons and doing nothing at all in the military field. As a matter of fact, there is hardly anything that would help NATO more than a demonstration of French solidarity with NATO.

Brandt said that the FRG has become disillusioned by the French, and this is also true of Chancellor Kiesinger who is quite disillusioned.

Brandt said that the Germans nevertheless will go on talking with the French about friendship between the two nations in order to try to save the new relationship between the peoples. The Secy though that it was important to leave the way open for France to return at some future time to Europe and NATO. In reply to Brandt’s question, the Secy said that our own relations with the French had improved in manner but not in substance.

6. Spanish bases.⁴ The Secy reviewed for Brandt our negotiations with Spain over the base problem. He told Brandt that even if we had gone along with the Spanish financial demands, they would have come right back with a request for a bilateral security treaty—something that simply could not have gotten through the US Senate. The Secy asked Brandt whether he thought there was any chance that the NATO partners would let Spain into the Alliance. Brandt said no. The Dutch, Norwegians, Danes, and the British would be opposed to it. But on the problem of Spanish bases, Brandt suggested to the Secy that he ask Ambassador Lodge to discuss this with Chancellor Kiesinger who is going to Spain on a visit shortly.⁵ The FRG might have some economic leverage that could be used, and Kiesinger might be able to accomplish something in Madrid.

The Secy thought it was an interesting suggestion and said he would be communicating with Amb Lodge about it shortly.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL GER W–US. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Also sent to the Department of State and repeated to all NATO capitals and USNATO.
2. See Document 295. Another memorandum of their October 6 conversation is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 69 D 182, CF 321.
3. See Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XIII, Document 332.
4. Documentation on the negotiations is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume XII.
5. Kiesinger visited Spain October 27–30.