Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

293. Action Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson¹

Washington, October 4, 1968.

SUBJECT

• Possible Crisis in Berlin

I have gone over the Berlin situation with my people in light of the Kraemer paper I sent to you.² This is the way we see it:

Military Indications

There is no significant change since Czechoslovakia in the Soviet military threat against Berlin. Their increased forces in Czechoslovakia cut down what they can mount immediately against Berlin. But the roads are good and they can change force dispositions in a day or two. Moreover, their alert status is improved.

The conclusion is that the current disposition of Soviet forces does not tell us much about their intentions toward Berlin.

The Soviet Propaganda Campaign against the Federal Republic:

The Russians are no longer coming down so hard on the claim that they have the right to intervene in the Federal Republic. They base this claim on Articles 53 and 107 of the UN Charter, which relate to actions against former enemy powers.

They began pushing this line pretty hard at the beginning of July. The Germans became very nervous. To counter this we took the following actions:

• —On August 31, when Secretary Rusk warned Dobrynin about Rumania, he specifically warned that Berlin was a “state interest” of the U.S.³
• —On September 17, the U.S., the UK, and the French, in separate announcements,⁴ said publicly that Articles 53 and 107 of the UN Charter did not give the Soviet Union the right to interfere in the affairs of the Federal Republic. We also said that such intervention would bring a NATO response.
• —On September 20, Secretary Rusk repeated this position privately to Dobrynin.⁵
• —On October 2, Secretary Rusk made the point again in his speech at the UN.⁶
• —The next day, Gromyko in his speech to the UN did not assert Soviet intervention rights in the Federal Republic under the UN Charter.⁷ For the moment, they seem to have backed off this line.

The most serious threat lies in Communist moves to put pressure on Berlin by challenging Federal Republic rights and activities in the city. They could do this by:

• —Putting more restrictions on the movement of people and goods between the Federal Republic and West Berlin. Last spring they got away with new visa and passport restrictions and travel taxes. They may well try to step up this kind of pressure—again without challenging Allied rights in the city.
• —Intensifying their propaganda charges that Federal Republic meetings and other activities in Berlin are provocative acts. This could weaken Berlin morale and threaten the viability of the city.

The Russians have been building up this kind of propaganda campaign. On September 20 Secretary Rusk told Dobrynin we were concerned about the menacing Soviet tone on Berlin. He made it clear that any move against Berlin would be very dangerous and that we cannot accept pressures against Berlin or against Berlin contacts with the Federal Republic.

Dobrynin took no notes at this meeting. We cannot be sure that the full weight of Secretary Rusk’s warning was brought home to the Kremlin.

Gromyko, in his speech to the UN, repeated the Soviet position that the Federal Republic had no rights in Berlin—but, with velvet glove, issued a warning that any “aggravation of tensions” would be Bonn’s fault:

“The Federal Republic of Germany has ceaselessly laid claims on West Berlin, which has a special status of an independent political entity. Our answer is clear: West Berlin has never belonged, nor does it belong or will it ever belong to the Federal Republic of Germany. If sometimes an aggravation of tensions may occur here, the responsibility for this lies squarely with the West German Government.”

A crisis could be associated with some important meetings the Federal Republic has scheduled in Berlin the end of October and early November. These are:

• —October 27 to November 2: meetings in Berlin of about twenty committees of the Bundestag.
• —November 3 to November 7: the National Party Congress of the Christian Democratic Union.

These are high visibility meetings. If the East Germans—with Russian support—increase travel restrictions and the Russians intensify their propaganda campaign against Berlin so as to interfere with these meetings, the impact on the city and throughout the Federal Republic could be great. We could have another Berlin crisis on our hands.

This would be a good time, therefore, to try to negotiate quickly an Allied Declaration on Berlin along the lines of the memo we sent you on September 17 (attached).⁸ As you know, this is what the Germans requested. The Declaration would be negotiated with the UK, the French and the Germans in Bonn. If you approve, Secretary Rusk could get this moving in his bilateral talks with Brandt, Debre, and Stewart at the UN in New York.

You have previously set this aside as too openly provocative. The question is: do you now regard it as appropriate to move forward so as not to leave Gromyko’s warning unanswered.

A fall-back position would be to agree that all three former Occupying Powers make a parallel démarche through diplomatic channels rather than in a public declaration. The experts believe this would not be as effective, but better than inaction—which could mislead Ulbricht and Moscow.

A decision is urgent because Secretary Rusk dines with the NATO Foreign Ministers on October 7 (Monday).

Walt

Go ahead with the Allied Declaration on Berlin

A tripartite diplomatic démarche

No

Call me⁹

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 16. Secret. A notation on the source text reads: “Rec’d 10:20 a.m.”
2. On October 3, Rostow presented President Johnson with an untitled memorandum on the policy of the East German Government by Fritz Kraemer, “an extremely intelligent civilian who works in the Department of the Army.” (Ibid.)
3. See Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XVII, Document 90.
4. See Department of State Bulletin, October 7, 1968, p. 365.
5. See Document 290.
6. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, October 21, 1968, pp. 405–410.
7. For text, see U.N. Doc. A/PV. 1698, pp. 6–14.
8. Not printed. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, vol. 94)
9. The President checked this option.