Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

292. Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, October 1, 1968.

[Here follows a 6-page discussion of background to the crisis, legal position of the parties, and Allied administrative machinery already in place to face a crisis in Berlin.]

VII. Berlin Contingency Planning

US strategic thinking with regard to military contingencies in Berlin have been set out in National Security Action Memorandum No. 109 of October 23, 1961 (see Appendix)² which still provides current US view of the governing sequences and graduated responses in a Berlin conflict.

Detailed contingency plans are available which have been devised to meet various categories of contingencies. By experience we know that rarely does a crisis situation exactly meet the developments as they occur. Nevertheless we believe that plans that we have are well adapted and sufficiently flexible to meet real situations as they arise. The major kinds of contingencies that might well arise in the foreseeable future and the kinds of contingency plans designed to meet them are as follows:

A. Soviet/GDR action directed against FRG access to Berlin on the ground (road and rail). The Soviets may permit the East Germans to take action against FRG travellers instead of Allied traffic because (1) such a course is safer; (2) appeases Ulbricht’s claim to sovereignty; (3) provides an indirect but very effective way of undercutting Berlin’s viability; and (4) is a course of action that tends to exploit divisions between the FRG and its allies. The new passport, visa and tariff measures that were instituted in June provide an adequate basis for immediate and effective har-assment of FRG travellers.

There are three major ways in which FRG travellers to and from Berlin could be harassed by the GDR authorities:

1. Denial of Berlin access to German travellers on a broad scale, but short of blockade conditions. This action could easily be implemented by the GDR simply by refusing to issue visas to travellers on trains, busses, and on the autobahn.

Allied Response:

Depending upon the scale of these actions the Allied Powers would protest in East Berlin, the Western capitals, and Moscow, in that order; the FRG would certainly protest and warn the GDR through Interzonal Trade channels (IZT agreement does not permit harassment of goods or passengers). There would be an immediate diversion of essential FRG travel to the air routes and the Allied carriers would add some flights. (Note: an air bus scheme run by Modern Air Transport, an American carrier, is well into the discussion stages with the Minister of Transport.)

2. Interruption of German Cargo Traffic on a significant scale (i.e., more than token harassment for 2–3 days) by charging exorbitant fees, applying unreasonable inspection standards, false quarantines, excessive delays, or outright denial of access rights.

Allied Response:

Protests through diplomatic and IZT channels, followed by FRG and Allied economic and political countermeasures (e.g. expansion of export control measures; refusal of TTD’s). Some limited transport of special cargoes by Allied train or by air cargo might well be attempted at an early stage, but not on a large scale.

3. Complete and sustained blockage of FRG traffic, passenger and cargo, while less likely than harassment, provides the Allies with one of their most difficult contingency problems.

Allied Response:

Aside from attempting to blunt the immediate effects of blockade by shifting passengers and cargo to air transport (which can be har-assed —“Harassment of Air Corridors,” below), no immediate relief is at hand. Complete blockage of German rail, road and barge traffic certainly would be followed by a period of intense diplomatic activity, expanding airlift implementation, breaking off of IZT and NATO-wide implementation of more serious Allied economic political and even military countermeasures (e.g. augmentation of Berlin military forces, increase in Allied military traffic, publicized buildup of Berlin stockpiles). If the blockage persisted and a significant economic, physical and/or psychological threat is posed to Berlin, the Allies will consider taking civilian ground access under their auspices. If, as a result of the failure to end the blockade of civilian traffic, Allied travel also became blocked, Allied contingency planning would be applicable (see below). Since Allied access to Berlin for military travel is a matter of formal agreement and of Allied right (which the Soviets have formally recognized over the years), tampering with Allied access, in any form, is much riskier for the Soviets and poses a threat of general war. A number of contingency plans to determine exactly what Soviet intentions are in a given situation exist.

B. Interference with Allied access can come either by blockage of the Berlin/Helmstedt autobahn by the Soviets or East Germans, or by blockage of the Allied Military trains between Helmstedt and Berlin.

Allied Response:

The first aim of all contingency plans in this area is to determine Soviet/GDR intentions. For example, the tripartite armed train probe is designed solely as a test of Soviet/East German intent to use force to stop the daily Allied trains. One thrown switch or one removed section of track, if backed up by Soviet/GDR force to prevent the Allies from put-ting the track in order, would establish this point.

Similarly, a contingency plan for a company-level probe up the autobahn from Helmstedt is designed solely as a test of Soviet/East German intent to use force to keep the autobahns closed. This contingency is available for use following failure of diplomatic initiatives. We have also planned a second probe from the Helmstedt end of the autobahn, consisting of a reinforced battalion combat team which is designed to achieve one of two political objectives: (1) provide circumstances under which negotiations with the Soviets might prove fruitful, or, (2) compel the Soviets to face the imminence of general war. The purpose of the battalion probe is not to fight its way through to Berlin but to demonstrate Allied determination and to test the extent to which the Soviets may be willing to use force.

Finally, there is available a tripartite division-size force, again available for operations from the Helmstedt end of the autobahn. It is assembled under tripartite aegis upon the decision of governments, but to be implemented only under the command and control of NATO, since use of a force of that size through GDR territory obviously has implications for all of NATO. (One of its missions would be to extricate the battalion combat team probe.)

C. Harassment in the Air Corridors to Berlin

Soviet aircraft could undertake a campaign of harassment of civil flights traveling in and out of Berlin through the three air corridors set up by the Western Allies and the Soviets in 1946. Air access is solely an Allied responsibility and only Allied civilian and military aircraft fly the Berlin routes. However, the Soviets may permit harassment of civil Allied flights because they are carrying—or are alleged to be carrying—categories of FRG passengers forbidden by the GDR to travel in and out of Berlin.

Soviet air harassment would probably take the form of large numbers of Soviet military flights in the corridors, some of which might buzz or otherwise worry our civil flights in the corridors. (This could follow an initial demand by the Soviets that the Allies permit GDR officials to screen FRG passengers at West Berlin airports, ostensibly to determine individuals forbidden to travel across East German territory.)

Allied Response:

Initial Allied response to air harassment would take the form of protests through the Soviet controller in the Berlin Air Safety Center and Allied notes to the Soviet Ambassador in East Berlin. If civil air travel becomes clearly hazardous because of near-misses with Soviet flights or other dangerous moves by the Soviet aircraft, Allied plans call for unarmed military air transports, one from each Power, to provide an immediate response and a test of Soviet intentions. These flights are presently on six hours’ stand-by. (In the event that air harassment is carried out by East German air units, the Allies would treat the Soviets as nonetheless responsible and continue to deal only with them.)

Contingency plans exist to cover the possibility of Soviet withdrawal from the Berlin Air Safety Center and include the situation of an attempted East German filling of the vacated Soviet position. These plans are currently under active review. In any case, the Allies will continue to hold the Soviets solely responsible and will attempt to pass on flight information to Soviet authorities in East Berlin as a flight safety measure. Rapid political advice to the Allied controllers in the Berlin Air Safety Center is of course essential.

In the event civil air carriers cease to operate, Allied plans provide for military-sponsored air service (MSAS), using civil aircraft either under government contract or with military crews. MSAS, which would operate initially without passengers, would keep Allied civil air access alive, help replenish Berlin stockpiles, and establish Soviet/GDR intentions. If Soviet/GDR action were to result in damage or loss of an Allied civil aircraft, tripartite plans call for possible fighter aircraft escort flights, subject to national approval at each stage of implementation.

D. Naval Countermeasures

A number of NAVCONS (Naval Contingencies) were approved by the WAG in 1967. While detailed planning is the responsibility of the appropriate national authority, a wide range of possible countermeasures affecting naval and maritime activities is now available which could be implemented in time of crisis. Prior to implementation a national decision would have to be made in each case, which probably would be coordinated through the WAG. As conceived, the naval countermeasures include a flexible and escalating series of moves including:

1. In-port harassment of USSR/GDR/Bloc shipping

2. In-port seizure of lend-lease ships

3. Delays and administrative harassment of shipping in Kiel and Panama canals

4. Intensified surveillance of submarines and surface vessels

5. Intensive naval exercises and augmentation of national naval forces

6. Electronic countermeasures against hostile shipping

7. Boarding and searching of ships with embargo or selected items

8. Exclusion of hostile shipping from selected areas

9. Minor damage inflicted on shipping up to/including seizure of designated ships on the high seas

E. Air Harassment of Berlin

Activity inside West Berlin proscribed by the Soviets or East Germans, such as FRG meetings, may be expected to stimulate Soviet/GDR air activity over the city. These have in the past taken the form of frequent sonic booms and low-level jet flights over West Berlin “targets” such as the Reichstag building, where Bundestag (Parliamentary) committees meet while in Berlin. Soviet helicopters may also intrude an unwelcome presence over the city. The effect of such harassment is mainly psychological, although there can be serious dangers to Allied civil and military flights using West Berlin’s three airfields. Berliners have shown that they can take a heavy sonic pounding, at least for periods of several days at a time, without showing undue strain.

Allied Response is limited to protests to the Soviets through the Berlin Air Safety Center and through diplomatic channels.

F. Threats to the Continuation of Allied Control of the Western Sectors of Berlin

Extensive plans for the defense of Berlin in the event of attacks on the very existence of Free Berlin, whether from internal insurrection (coup de main) or military attack from outside the city, exist.

Efforts aimed at a “spontaneous” uprising by the SED directed against Berlin authority can be contained by the 15,000 Berlin police now in Berlin, supported by the 10,000 Allied troops in the city. If the East Germans make a determined effort at a take-over which might get out of hand, augmentation of the Berlin military forces (from the nearby FRG) always remains a possibility.

The control of civil disturbances is primarily a Berlin policy responsibility, but Allied planning is based on the assumption that the only way to counter the enemy threat of surprise is for every military and police unit to have detailed orders to secure points vital to the defense of Berlin in the following order or priority: (a) countering a potential military threat, (b) maintaining law and order, (c) re-establishing Allied control within West Berlin. If hostile elements penetrate border defenses, defensive positions call for falling back on a series of shortened lines while protecting vital internal communications lines. Troop commanders will see that S- and U-Bahn lines are closed, will block canals, keep railway repair yards under surveillance, maintain ready reserves, pacify areas under their control and keep on the alert for a direct military attack in support of the initial civil disturbance or surprise attack.

In the event of a military attack, the Allies plan to secure strong points in the city and secure the most vital lines of communication. Plans are based on a prior alert time of twenty minutes.

1. Source: Department of State, SIG Files: Lot 74 D 344, SIG Memo 87. Top Secret. An attached October 1 memorandum from Arthur Hartman, Staff Director, Senior Interdepartmental Group, to members stated that the paper was prepared for discussion at the October 4 SIG meeting.
2. Not printed. For text of NSAM No. 109, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XIV, pp. 521–523.