Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

278. Memorandum of Conversation¹

US/MC/17

Reykjavik, June 23, 1968, 1 p.m.

UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE FORTY-FIRST MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
Reykjavik, Iceland, June 24–25, 1968

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The Secretary of State
  • Assistant Secretary Leddy
  • Deputy Assistant Secretary Springsteen
  • Mr. Al Puhan, EUR/GER
• Germany
  • Foreign Minister Willy Brandt
  • Mr. Georg Duckwitz, State Secretary
  • Dr. Hans H. Ruete, Assistant State Secretary
  • Mr. Wolf Schilling, Personal Assistant to State Secretary

SUBJECT

• Berlin

The Secretary said that Berlin had been much on our minds. He was very much interested in how the Foreign Minister saw the Berlin problem. He would welcome information regarding Brandt’s visit with Abrasimov. The Secretary said he had three talks with Ambassador Dobrynin and, as Brandt knew, one with the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov on Berlin.

Brandt said he was anxious to give the Secretary full details on his meeting over and above those already given by Ruete to the three DCMs in Bonn,² and those which had been given to Ambassador Lodge yesterday.³ However, his notes would not arrive until later and details would have to wait until then. He said Abrasimov had asked him to come and see him before the East Germans imposed their restrictions.

The Secretary asked whether Brandt thought Abrasimov knew of East German intentions when he invited the Foreign Minister of the FRG.

Brandt was not sure. Abrasimov told him that he had been ordered to go to Moscow to report to the meeting of the Supreme Soviet later this month and to the meeting of the Central Committee in early July. Abrasimov had told Brandt he had instructions to discuss all aspects of the FRG-Soviet relationship and to report to Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgorny with Gromyko present. Abrasimov invited Brandt to say something first.

Brandt said he told Abrasimov that he sometimes felt a mood of resignation regarding the USSR. Two topics were then discussed in detail: the renunciation of force and Berlin. Brandt said Brezhnev had called while he was talking to Abrasimov. Abrasimov asked what points he should make to Brezhnev. Brandt said that he told him to say to Brezhnev that on Berlin the USSR must not go contrary to the spirit of détente. He told him to say that if the Soviets were not satisfied with the FRG’s April 9 memorandum on renunciation of force,⁴ Bonn was prepared to have further discussions. Abrasimov told Brandt that an answer to the April memorandum was on its way. Brandt gave it as his view that the Soviet reply would be quite negative.

Brandt concluded that there were no modifications in Soviet policy. While the Soviet presentation was not aggressive, there was stubborn insistence on their point of view. The Secretary said we had had that experience for many years.

Brandt said the Soviets appeared to play with history at times. He had recalled to Abrasimov that there were times in history where the Russians and Germans had been able to live in harmony. Brandt had cited in this connection the end of the 18th Century. Abrasimov did not disagree.

Brandt said Abrasimov had a paper with him on Berlin. Reading from this paper, Abrasimov attacked Brandt, stating that when he went from Berlin to Bonn and became Foreign Minister, the claims of the FRG on Berlin were stepped up. Abrasimov said he did not understand why the West Germans were complaining about the recent East German measures. He told Brandt that the FRG was fully aware of the treaty the Soviet Union had with the GDR and that it was the view of the Soviet Union that it was within GDR competence to impose the measures it had recently enacted. Brandt told Abrasimov that it was incongruous that the Yugoslavs and the West Germans should agree to dropping visas at the very moment the East Germans were imposing them.

The Secretary recalled that one Soviet official had called the East German measure anachronistic. Brandt said Abrasimov recited figures of people traveling to West Berlin, demonstrating that more West Germans went to West Berlin after the imposition of the East German measures than before. He asked Brandt how that could be called damage. Brandt said Abrasimov told him something which was apparently not in his paper, saying the Soviets wanted quiet (Ruhe), but warned Brandt that any manifestation of increased FRG presence in Berlin like the planned CDU Party Convention or a meeting of the Bundestag would have very serious consequences. Brandt added that Abrasimov said relations would be somewhat easier and certain things could be settled more easily after Schuetz, the Mayor of Berlin, was no longer President of the Bundestag. The Secretary noted that this was a point that bothered the Russians.

Brandt continued by saying that in Berlin itself, there was no feeling like that in 1958 or at the time of the Wall, but there was a good deal of resignation. Brandt said he was much worried about a deterioration. He felt that we might be in danger of getting on very wide roads, leading nowhere if we continue to talk about and plan on the basis of countermeasures developed in the past. The East Germans had been given the green light by the Soviets because of the effect their action would have on Czechoslovakia and on strengthening Bloc solidarity. East Berlin took its recent action despite knowing that in a relatively short period of time it could have gotten a good deal of money out of the FRG. He referred in this connection to the willingness of the FRG to pay oil subsidies and certain road fees. He said Finance Minister Strauss had been agreeable. He concluded that East German officials dealing with trade matters had been pushed aside in favor of a political act. If this conclusion was correct, fees for TTD’s, fees to be paid by East German ships, are all of questionable value as countermeasures.

Brandt assured the Secretary that he was aware of American criticism that the West Germans had reacted reluctantly to the East German measures. He said he was aware of our expectations that the Germans should do something more. But, Brandt said, if his theory was correct that the East German measures represented a political action, it would have to be dealt with by the three allies with the USSR and, unfortunately, the United States would have to bear the largest part of this burden. Brandt said very emphatically that the Russians must not get the impression that there can be détente which excludes the problem of Berlin. He did not wish to leave the Secretary with the impression that the Germans were rigid on the point of other countermeasures. But in his view the political significance of the East German action was the dominant factor.

The Secretary said that he had hit the Soviets very hard on the Berlin situation. He referred again to his meeting with Kuznetsov and his three talks with Ambassador Dobrynin. The Secretary said he had some real concern about the total relations of Communism and the Free World. He saw a real problem in the Soviet-China relationship. He thought the developments in Czechoslovakia and Romania had disturbed the Soviets greatly. He recalled the feeling close to panic in Moscow after the Middle East crisis erupted. He thought the Soviet leaders faced real problems which made them very dangerous.

The Secretary said that he personally had been expecting difficulties in Berlin, in Korea, and in the Middle East. He had asked Dobrynin what Ulbricht was afraid of. What dangers would Ulbricht see in the Czechoslovakia developments. Dobrynin had been unwilling to reply.

The Secretary said that we were in a very delicate total situation. He felt we would be very fortunate if we got through this fall without difficulties in Korea.

The Secretary agreed with the Foreign Minister that developments in Czechoslovakia had a bearing on the situation. So did the situation in France and the unsettled political situation in Italy. He felt that the surprises and tragedy in the U.S. electoral campaign had also affected Soviet thinking. At no time had solidarity among the Western powers been of greater importance.

The Secretary said the Soviets had emphasized in talking to us their strong feeling about FRG efforts to incorporate West Berlin. The Secretary characterized the East German move as shrewd, since the Soviets were aware of differences between the constitutional view on Berlin held by the FRG and the three Western powers. The Secretary said the Soviets cited the recent German emergency legislation as a cause of East German retaliation. He said he had brushed this aside, and he was aware that Berlin Mayor Schuetz had denied the applicability of this legislation to West Berlin. The Soviets have told us, the Secretary continued, they had no desire for tension and did not wish to affect access to Berlin. They called the recent measures simply a change in form, a change in formalities. The Secretary said the Soviets knew that U.S. citizens traveling to unrecognized regimes like that of Communist China or of Cuba regularly get visas. The Soviets went to special pains to say they wanted quiet (Ruhe) in Berlin. The Secretary assured Brandt he didn’t accept this Soviet explanation. He felt the Soviets must have known that the East German move would cause real problems. He told Brandt that we had protested the violation of Quadripartite Agreements reached after the end of the blockade of Berlin.

At this point, the Secretary expressed his appreciation for Ambassador Boeker’s coming to the United States. He said he was looking forward to seeing Chancellor Kiesinger in Bonn.

The Secretary reminded Brandt that the Kennedy administration had begun with a Berlin crisis. At that time we had taken a very strong lead. We increased our defense budget by millions. We moved troops but no one else added anything. The Secretary said we were all alone. The French made no contribution and indeed even the Foreign Minister’s predecessors in the FRG directed their suspicions at us rather than at the Soviets. The British were a pale echo. He said he wanted to be sure that we acted now with complete solidarity. He stressed the importance of establishing Four Power unity in the meeting tonight.

The Secretary said we were prepared to press the Soviets hard. He felt that it would be impossible for us to accept physical limitations on access to Berlin. This would affect Allied rights to Berlin. He reminded Brandt that the power to tax, as Chief Justice Marshall once said, was the power to destroy.

The Secretary agreed that countermeasures presented an extremely frustrating problem as long as physical access was not impaired. He mentioned the restrictions on GDR travel already taken by NATO. He wondered if it was not possible that the financial arrangements affecting trade could not be a matter of discussion between the two Germanies. He asked whether there had been any real interference with access.

Brandt said there were very few cases of interference. He recalled the East German decree on travel through the GDR by NPD members and a later one relating to FRG officials. He felt that the East Germans were not enforcing the latter measure.

The Secretary interjected that the measure against NPD members was obviously very clever because the Soviets knew we wouldn’t fight a war over NPD members going to Berlin.

Brandt said he had sought Tito’s judgment last week on the Soviets’ intentions in Czechoslovakia. Tito said he was almost sure the Soviets could not turn the clock back in Czechoslovakia. He gave as reasons the Soviets’ serious problems in other parts of the world, and the fact that Czechoslovakia had greater support in Eastern Europe, particularly in Hungary and Rumania, than the Soviets realized.

Brandt mentioned a recent incident where the East Germans stopped a truck carrying atlases which depicted the GDR as East Germany. This GDR gesture was a possible indication of future incidents. Brandt said the GDR could claim underwear manufactured in Berlin was produced for the West German Army. He thought that a most successful countermeasure would be to invite journalists to go to Berlin in an Allied car with Allied travel orders.

Mr. Leddy queried as to what the East Germans would do. There was no answer.

Brandt pointed out that in his view the imposition of fees was more important than the use of visas. Fees could be doubled; they could be used in a number of arbitrary ways. Brandt said he had told Abrasimov that the West Germans had been willing to make practical arrangements for the use of services maintained by the East Germans, roads, waterways, etc. He thought it was better to make a lump sum payment to the East Germans for the use of such services than to have fees levied on individual users. He noted that something like this had been worked out within IZT when he was Mayor in Berlin. He thought such proposals were of interest to East German planners, if they had any say in the matter, since they would remove the uncertainty regarding receipts of West German payments.

The Secretary thought Brandt’s efforts had been very constructive. He asked whether the time had come to suggest to the Soviets a Joint Commission to regulate such matters. It appeared to him, and he emphasized he was speaking only in an exploratory sense, that there were advantages in making such a proposal to the Soviets, even if it were rejected.

Brandt seemed receptive to the suggestion. He also mentioned the possibility of going back to the idea of establishing an access authority for Berlin though he wondered if the suggestion was not now passe. He said he would appreciate it if the Allied side would speak to the Russians about establishing some sort of a Commission. He thought the Germans could parallel this action by insisting that a pre-condition for it should be a guarantee of freedom of travel and traffic.

The Secretary thought we might get somewhere if we related travel and traffic to Berlin with general international practice. He wondered what India charged Pakistan for the transit of goods. He wondered if general international practice in this regard might not be studied and applied to Berlin. He saw a whole range of possibilities. Positive steps also were needed to strengthen Berlin. He asked if organizations now located elsewhere could be moved to Berlin.

Mr. Leddy said we had already suggested that the International Bank and the Fund hold their next meeting in Berlin.

The Secretary wondered whether we could find ways of buying more in Berlin. He thought the quadripartite Bonn Group might look into this. The Secretary said that if the East Germans intend to depress the economy of Berlin, we must demonstrate that we can lift it.

Brandt said he would appreciate the inclusion in any record of support for Berlin the fact that the FRG was willing to make its contribution. Brandt noted recent efforts by the Bundestag to give preferential economic and financial treatment to Berlin. He then noted that in a recent Cabinet discussion the question had been raised whether, after seven years, the time had not come to restate or reformulate Allied commitments to Berlin. He said his colleagues in the Foreign Office, and the Chancellor, also would not be unwilling to help reformulate the relations of the FRG to Berlin. Brandt said he would tell the French and British about it tonight if it made sense to the United States. Brandt said that differences in interpretation of the legal situation in Berlin had been exploited by the Russians. They might, however, be prepared to accept an interim arrangement until Berlin becomes a whole. He said this might be put in terms of West Berlin being “linked to the FRG” rather than described as a “Land of the Federal Republic.”

The Secretary said that this is a problem because it causes difficulties with the Russians and is divisive among the Four.

Mr. Leddy said the FRG “link” to Berlin might be stated in terms of viability.

According to Brandt, Abrasimov had voiced no objection to Berlin’s cultural and economic relations with the FRG. He wondered if experts might not be able to devise a formula which could take advantage of this Soviet view to make it difficult for them to impede travel.

The Secretary recalled that in the crises of 1961 and 1962 it was of the greatest importance in dealing with the Soviets to stress that we—the Allies—were responsible for Berlin; that the United States was in Berlin. Our responsibilities for Berlin and our position in Berlin resulted from World War II. We are not indebted to the Soviets or anybody else for our presence in that city. The Secretary said the Soviets had had to accept this, and that is why we have been sensitive to any suggestion that our responsibility for Berlin be diluted. The Soviets have emphasized that they have no interest in interfering with allied rights to Berlin. He noted that deriving from this is an allied interest in the closest association of Berlin and the FRG.

The Secretary noted that we could exercise little pressure on the East Germans because our trade with them was very small. Moreover, few Americans travelled to the GDR.

Brandt agreed and noted that German interest was far greater since 600,000 people travelled between West Berlin and the FRG during one month.

Mr. Leddy noted that as many as 10 million West Germans move to and from West Berlin annually.

The Foreign Minister said the NATO Agreement on TTDs would affect very few people. Trade between East Germany and the West had declined.IZT trade had declined last year by 11 percent, and by 13 percent in the first quarter of this year. At the same time Brandt noted that GDR trade with the East was on the increase.

Mr. Leddy pointed out that if measures in the trade field were to be effective, they would have to be concerted and imposed by all members of NATO.

Brandt said he liked the British very much but he had great doubts about British willingness to go along with that suggestion.

The Secretary laughingly agreed and reminded Brandt that we remembered British trade with Cuba and China.

Mr. Leddy said that he simply wanted to emphasize that we could not think of countermeasures in the trade field in isolation.

Brandt said if the existing IZT agreement were cancelled the FRG could not get another one including Berlin.

The Secretary recalled that during an earlier Berlin crisis the British had insisted trade countermeasures were steps to be taken only just before nuclear weapons would be used.

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 69 D 182, CF 303. Confidential. Drafted by Puhan and approved in S on June 25. The meeting was held at the U.S. Embassy Residence. The source text is labeled “Part I.” Part III, a discussion of NPT, is ibid. Part II, dealing with mutual force reductions, is printed in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XIII, Document 314. Brandt discussed the NATO meeting in My Life in Politics, pp. 165–166.
2. See Document 274.
3. No record of this conversation was found.
4. For text, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, pp. 997–1002.