Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

314. Memorandum of Conversation¹

US/MC/10

Reykjavik, June 23, 1968, 1 p.m.

UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE FORTY-FIRSTMINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

Reykjavik, Iceland, June 24–25, 1968

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The Secretary of State
  • Assistant Secretary Leddy
  • Deputy Assistant Secretary Springsteen
  • Mr. Al Puhan, GER
• Germany
  • Foreign Minister Willy Brandt
  • Mr. Georg Duckwitz, State Secretary
  • Dr. Hans H. Ruete, Assistant State Secretary
  • Mr. Wolf Schilling, Personal Assistant to State Secretary

SUBJECT

• Part II—Mutual Force Reductions

The Secretary said we would have a very nervous time until Congress goes home for the political conventions. The troop reduction issue may come up as an amendment to the defense appropriations bill. The vote would be very close in the Senate. The Secretary noted there was a real move toward isolationism in the Senate. Some of the same Senators who wanted us to get out of Vietnam wanted us out of Europe. He thought it a miracle that we had been able to maintain our level of forces in Europe while we had hundreds of thousands of troops in Southeast Asia. The Secretary said we were trying to divert Congressional concern with MFR but we were not sanguine about the results. He regretted that there had been press speculation to the effect that it was our motive to deflect Congressional intent with MFR. He would find it very helpful if a good statement tying the removal of any forces to Soviet moves could come out of this NATO meeting. He saw one problem. We could live with the language adopted at the meeting of defense ministers on maintaining NATO military capability, but if there was a reference to unilateral reductions it would appear to be a challenge to the Congress of the United States. The Secretary said we would prefer more general language. He assured the German Foreign Minister that the President had no intention to withdraw combat forces from Europe or to dismantle NATO.

Brandt said he thought the Secretary’s request reasonable. The Germans were very much for mutual force reductions since any discussion of mutual force reductions would influence developments in Eastern Europe.

The Secretary agreed with this observation. He said we could accept all three of the drafts that had been prepared including the German one if the last sentence in the German draft, which referred to unilateral withdrawals, were dropped.

Brandt said he found the US proposed text better if the last sentence in the German draft was to be dropped.

Brandt said that he wished to make an additional observation to the effect that some of our friends were not aware of developments if a regrouping of forces did take place in Europe. It would leave the German Army with a bigger role than might be desirable. He said some cynical people have said that the German Army should be able to impress the Byelo-Russians without frightening Luxembourg.

The Secretary asked Brandt if he had discussed a new defense grouping within NATO with the British.

Brandt said there had been no real discussion.

Mr. Leddy said it seemed to us more important to have discussions in view of British moves out of the area East of Suez.

Ruete did not believe the British would raise this subject tonight.

The Secretary said he assumed that he would make the opening statement in the Senate, including the interpretations. This statement would represent the official position of the United States. He said we have warned the Soviets that if they contradict our interpretations, we may not have a treaty. He suggested that his opening statement in the Senate could be transmitted by him in a communication addressed to each NATO Foreign Minister and to Brosio.

Brandt thought this would be very helpful.

The Secretary said his opening statement would become part of the legislative history of the treaty.

Ruete asked how such a statement would bind the next administration.

The Secretary replied as far as the treaty was concerned, a change of administration would have no effect. He gave it as his opinion that neither Humphrey nor Nixon nor Rockefeller would take a different view from the present administration.

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 69 D 182, CF 303. Confidential. Approved in S on June 25. The meeting was held at the Embassy Residence.